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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the
issues of confidentiality and privileged communication in
psychotherapy.

The term "confidential communication" is

generally used to describe those statements that are told
with the belief and trust that the other person will keep
them private.

In psychotherapy, there is an implicit

understanding that the therapist will maintain the privacy
of all statements the client makes.

'I'he term "privileged

communication" is more specific in its use in that it
refers only to communications that are protected from use
as evidence in a legal proceeding.

Depending upon the

specific situation and the law of each state, statements a
patient makes in psychotherapy may or may not be privileged
communication or legally respected as private.
The term "psychotherapy'' is derived from the Greek
words "psyche" and "therapeoi.:J.", meaning "spirit, soul" and
"to nurse, cure", respectively, or "cure of the spirit".
Webster (1970) defines "ps;[chctherapy" as treatment of
mental disorder by any of various means involving communication between a trained person and the patient .•. " (p.
1148).

This

co~munication!

the manner in which it is
~ay

treated and the ways it may or
1

not be used has increas-

2

ingly become an issue for psychotherapists, psychotherapy
patients and lawmakers.
Psychotherapists have generally regarded such communications as private and confidential and professions
involved in the work of psychotherapy have incorporated
privacy into their various ethical codes.

However, the

codes are often unclear in their statements and definitions.
For example, the phrase "clear and imminent danger" is used
to describe a situation under which information may be disclosed in the Ethical Standards for Psychologists (1979).
Would or would not this phrase include such acts as robbery, adultery or driving while intoxicated?
The legal system has not been any clearer.

English

common law, upon which our laws are based, does not allow a
psychotherapist to refuse to give testimony in court about
communications with a client and laws of privileged communication vary from state to state.

While some states have

statutes to protect confidentiality in psychotherapy, in
many states courts have the right to require testimony as
they deem necessary, regardless of ethical considerations.
Needless to say, conflicts and issues have arisen, both
within those professions involved in providing psychotherapy and in their interactions with the legal system.
In a well-intentioned rush to resolve these conflicts and issues regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy and to demonstrate the high ethical standards of their
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professions, psychotherapists have been pushing and convincing

lav~rnakers

to pass legislation explicitly stating how

communications between a psychotherapist and client may
or may not be disclosed; hcwever, this seems to be taking
place without a ccmplete examination of the subtle effects
that such laws could have o~ the practice of psychotherapy.
I~

addition, courts of law are assuming the responsibility

of deciding what legal duties are involved in being a
psychotherapist (e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California, 1976).
The resulting confusion is sharply evident in the
professional literature of psychotherapists as well as in
legal writings on evidentiary issues and on the rights of
patients.

Slovenko (1974), for example, notes that there

are so many exceptions in laws of psychotherapist-patient
privilege, that there might as well be no privilege.
Reynolds (1976), Sadoff (1974), Siegel (1979), Slawson
(1969), Strassburger (1975) and numerous others address
concerns raised in response to the laws and court decisions.
The title of Bersoff's (1976) article, "Therapists as
protectors and policemen:

New roles as a result of Tarasoff?"

suffices to indicate the identity crises and role conflicts
that therapists are facing in trying to reconcile their
legal duty, their duty to society, their duty to the practice of psychotherapy and their duty to the individual
client.

4
If one is to understand and evaluate the current
issues regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy, it is
necessary to have a full understanding of those factors
having a significant influence on the development of the
present situation.

This dissertation is an attempt to

thoroughly examine the moral, medical-therapeutic and legal
rationales of confidentiality in psychotherapy, to discuss
and explore the implications and subtle effects of current
legal interventions and to clarify what this means for the
individual psychotherapist and for the profession as a
whole.

Most of the published literature on privacy in

psychotherapy centers on the legal philosophy and technicalities of privileged communication.

Much less has been

written on the client's need and desire for confidentiality
in psychotherapy unrelated to testimony in a legal proceeding.

This dissertation includes a discussion of privileged

communication, but differs from previous writings by giving
greater emphasis to the individual's need for privacy by
examining the position on confidentiality of major
practitioner-theorists in psychotherapeutic techniques,
historical and philosophical discussions on secrets, the
legal history of privacy, research that either directly or
indirectly assesses whether confidentiality or lack of
confidentiality has any effects on success in psychotherapy
and the impact that legal intervention has on the practice
of traditional psychotherapy.

5

This dissertation can be divided into six major
sections.

The first four sections make up the literature

review and of=er a background for understanding issues of
confidentiality in psychotherapy.

The first part of the

literature review deals with trends in medicine, mental
health care and society that have led to the current high
level of interest in confidentiality.

The second part of

the literature review offers a historical and moral background to confidentiality by exploring the concept of natural law, the seal of confession and the committed secret
as discussed in Roman Catholic writings.

Although this

part is largely a review of material published elsewhere,
the discussion of the parallels between debates regarding
the seal of confession and confidentiality in psychotherapy
is original.

The third part of the literature review

discusses the viewpoints of major theorists in psychotherapeutic techniques as they relate to confidentiality and
examines the development of codes of ethics for psychotherapists, particularly psychologists.
The fourth part of the literature review focuses on
legal intervention in confidentiality in psychotherapy.
This part discusses laws and court decisions related to
privacy, specifically those regarding confidentiality in
psychotherapy and reviews privileged communication as it
relates to psychotherapy.
The fifth major section, the "Integration and

6

Hypotheses", brings together the previous chapters and
focuses on the differences in the approaches of natural
law, psychotherapists and the legal system to confidentiality and on the specific and subtle implications that
current legal intervention in confidentiality has on the
practice of psychotherapy.

This chapter is viewed as a

statement of the problems which confront the professions of
psychotherapy as well as the individual therapist.

It also

reviews research regarding attitudes toward confidentiality
and raises hypotheses for evaluation.
The sixth major section is an attempt to grapple
with a portion of the problems raised in the integration of
the early chapters.

Chapters Four and Five offer the meth-

odology and results of a test of the hypotheses in a survey
of the reactions of mental health professionals, mental
health care recipients and Illinois State's Attorneys to
hypothesized situations where a psychotherapist either
discloses specific kinds of information to specific persons
without the client's clear consent or does not disclose
information because he/she does not have the client's clear
consent to disclose.

Chapter Six discusses these results

and offers conclusions for the professions of psychotherapists, particularly psychologists, based upon the survey
and literature review.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Confidentiality -

~

Recent Issue

The issues of confidentiality and privileged communication in psychotherapy are gaining increased interest
from lawmakers, psychotherapists and mental health care
r~cipients.

As will be seen in the section discussing con-

fidentiality from a historical and moral perspective,
interest in privacy is not new in our society, but it is
accentuated in recent times.

The growth of interest at

this time occurs for a wide variety of reasons including
the following developments:

(l) a growing number of people

receiving mental health care, usually in their horne community;

(2) an increasing interest in privacy by society in

general, due at least partially to sophisticated systems of
record keeping and fears of their potential abuse; and (3)
increasing requests for information or testimony from
mental health professionals by third party payers and the
courts.

This chapter will discuss each of these three

developments, how and why they have come to occur and how
they contribute to an increased interest in confidentiality
in psychotherapy.
Growth of Mental Health Care:

In the last 15 years

the number of people receiving mental health care has
7
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increased at a rate considerably greater than the rate of
population growth.

In June of 1963, the inpatient and

outpatient census of people receiving mental health care at
state hospitals, zone centers and state operated or state
aided mental health centers in Illinois was less than
54,000.

In June, 1978, the census was nearly 118,000.

This latter figure is considered a very low estimate of the
people actually receiving mental health care in Illinois
during all of 1978 as it represents only the number of
active cases, i.e., the number of people receiving mental
health care in the month of June, 1978 (Bronk, 1979).
A breakdown of these figures indicates a trend
toward seeking outpatient mental health care in one's own
community.

In 1963, over 34,000 of those persons receiving

mental health care in Illinois were inpatients in state
hospitals or zone centers, compared to less than 20,000
persons receiving outpatient services.

In June, 1978, less

than 5,000 of the active cases were residents in state
hospitals or zone centers.

Over 113,000 active cases were

outpatients at state operated or state aided mental health
centers (Bronk, 1979) .
Advances in the fields of psychiatric medicine,
psychotherapy and counseling have probably contributed more
than any one other factor to more people seeking mental
health care and to the trend toward outpatient treatment in
one's own community.

Discoveries in psychopharmacology and

9

new psychotherapeutic techniques have led to vast changes
in the entire mental health care delivery system.

With the

use of psychiatric medications, starting in the 1950's, the
need for long term confinement in asylums or mental institutions has been greatly reduced.

In the United States,

the number of patients in state and county mental institutions dropped from about 560,000 in 1955 to 350,000 in
1970 despite the fact that the population as a whole increased about 40%, from 166 million to 205 million (United
States Public Health Service, 1970).
Reports by the American Medical Association (1973)
state that psychiatric admissions to hospitals rose from
362,000 in 1960 to 602,000 in 1971, but the average daily
census of psychiatric patients dropped from 672,000 to
339,000, indicating a considerably shorter average length
of hospital stay.

More people are receiving psychiatric

treatment in hospitals, but they are recovering more quickly
and being released and treated on an outpatient basis.

In

addition, many patients can now entirely avoid psychiatric
hospitalization, remaining at home and functioning in a
number or all of their usual daily activities while undergoing treatment.
People with less serious emotional problems, who
would not have sought psychiatric help in the past, are
also seeking mental health care in their home communities
due to increased knowledge and awareness of the public that

10
something can be done to alleviate stress, depression and
other difficulties.

Problems that might have previously

been handled in the home or family doctor's office are
increasingly being referred to the mental health professional.

People are learning that the mental health profes-

sional can often be an important resource.
More people are also receiving mental health care
in their home communities because of the increased availability of such services to persons of all income levels.
The public was made more aware of mental health problems
during World War II when five million men were disqualified
from military service by the Selective Service, 40% of
these for neuropsychiatric defects.

Of those inducted and

later discharged for medical reasons, neuropsychiatric
disability was the most frequent cause (Beigel & Levenson,
1972).

The first National Mental Health Act was passed

just after the end of the war in 1946.

This awareness of

mental health problems and financial support by the government and charitable organizations have made it possible for
most anyone who desires mental health care to receive it at
costs they can afford.

In fact, mental health care has

become a significant part of government budgets.

In

Illinois, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities employs more workers than any other state
department.

Its budget for 1963 was-91.7 million dollars

11
and by 1978 had grown to over 400 million dollars (Flood,
1979).
Since the Community Mental Health Centers Act was
passed by Congress in 1963, the emphasis of government
funding has been on community facilities rather than large,
custodial-residential institutions.

Studies have shown

that when mental health care facilities are available
within a close distance of where people live, they will
make greater use of them (Babigian, 1977).

The growth in

the number of community mental health centers has made
mental health care more accessible.
Health insurance has also served to make mental
health care more affordable.

Comprehensive insurance

programs have increased their coverage of mental illness so
that many persons having medical insurance can afford
prompt psychiatric care in a hospital or on an outpatient
basis.
Increased involvement of professionals other than
physicians in the mental health care delivery system has
augmented the accessibility of mental health services.

In

1970, there were 8.35 mental health care workers and professionals in federally
one psychiatrist.

fun~ed

mental health centers for every

In 1975, this number had grown to 15.14

mental health workers and nonphysician professionals for
every one psychiatrist (Provisional Data, 1976).

Profes-

sionals such as psychologists and psychiatric social workers

12

are trained to handle most mental health problems that do
not involve medication.

With the limited number of psychia-

trists available, increased numbers of other mental health
professionals make it much easier to obtain mental health
care.
More people with problems are inclined to seek
mental health care due to increased enlightenment and
decreased stigma regarding mental illness.

Mental illness

is no longer considered to be associated with demonology or
witchcraft as in past centuries and the fears about it have
been greatly reduced.

Crocetti, Spiro and Siassi (1974) ,

in their extensive literature review and research on attitudes toward mental illness, go so far as to conclude that
the mentally ill are being shown

11

nearly total acceptance

in all but the most intimate relationships..

(p. 88).

As

age was negatively correlated with acceptance, they predicted that acceptance of the mentally ill will continue to
increase in the future.

Reduced stigma and increased know-

ledge have made seeking mental health care more acceptable
and less frightening.
All of the above developments, i.e., scientific advances in medication and therapeutic techniques, public
awareness of emotional problems, government funding of
mental health care, more outpatient mental health centers,
increased numbers of non-physician mental health professionals, payment of mental health care by health insurance
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plans and decreased stigma, have contributed to more people
receiving mental health care, most in their home communities.
These developments reflect broad social changes that have
resulted in a democratization of mental health care.

These

developments have also added to the problems of confidentiality in psychotherapy.
Prior to the last generation, for the majority of
people receiving mental health care, absolute confidentiality was not as important as today.

In times when mental

health treatment took place over extended periods in asylums, it was often common knowledge in a community as to
whom had been "sent away" and why.

People were labelled

because of their past behavior and confinement and were
treated accordingly, often very courteously, but as the
"odd" person in the community.

Few people sought mental

health care unless they had problems that were very obvious
to others.
Now, because of scientific advances in treatment
and changing attitudes, many people seeking mental health
care are not seriously emotionally disturbed.

And many of

those who are presently diagnosed as seriously emotionally
disturbed are

sub~tantially

helped with psychopharmacology.

Frequently they are helped to the extent that their neighbors or work colleagues may not be aware of the extent of
their mental illness.

Most patients receiving outpatient

mental health care are able to continue in their jobs and

14
daily activities.

Behaviors resulting from mental illness

and emotional problems may or may not interfere significantly with functioning in these areas.
Despite the evidence that there has been a reduction in stigma towards mental health care, this stigma
still does exist to some degree.

Regardless of a person's

real abilities or level of functioning, there are discriminating acts frequently practiced toward those who have
sought mental health care.

Applications for employment

frequently ask whether a person has a history of psychiatric care.

Life insurance companies frequently demand

case histories before considering a mental health care
recipient's application and the fact that a person has
received mental health care may influence the decision of
whether or not they are issued a policy and at what rate,
whether or not there is any indication that the individual
would have a shorter life expectancy than most people.
People who have been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons
are forbidden to have a gun permit in Illinois, whether or
not they have ever evidenced any behavior that would suggest they might be dangerous to themselves or others.
Public reaction to the news that Senator Thomas Eagleton
had received electric convulsive therapy forced him to
withdraw himself as a candidate for Vice-President of the
United States.

A negative stereotype of the mental health

patient not only still exists, but more importantly,
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enroaches on the right and privacy of former patients.
In times when many mental health care recipients
are not diagnosed as seriously emotionally disturbed and
are attempting to continue their usual daily activities,
the person who is labelled and discriminated against because
he is receiving mental health care and not because of
inappropriate behaviors resulting from psychopathology, has
much to lose in terms of finances, social relationships and
self-esteem.

The individual patient now has more reason to

desire confidentiality, but the growth of the mental health
care delivery system has made confidentiality more difficult.
Increased availability of mental health services
and financial support by the government raise concerns
regarding confidentiality since more mental health care and
funding have meant a greater need for records and accountability.

Accountability for receipt of funds and for

licensing has meant not only that a

minim~~

amount of

specific information must be in patient records, but that
outside evaluators must be permitted to review at least
some of the records to make sure that certain regulations,
intended to upgrade and maintain a good quality of patient
care, are being followed.

In Illinois, it is a requirement

that mental health centers receiving state funds submit
specific information to the Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities (DMHDD) on each mental health
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care recipient.

Outpatient facilities are not required to

submit names or other identifying information, but DMHDD
does keep a record of the name, diagnosis and other information of all persons who have been patients in state
hospitals or zone centers.

A policy on the length of time

this information is saved has not been clearly stated.
In a study by Noll and Hanlon (1976) 51% of mental
health programs responding to a questionnaire indicated
that they reported at least one piece of identifying
information, i.e., name, address or social security number,
to their state department of mental health or its equivalent.

Of those state mental health program directors

responding to the questionnaire (with an 87% return rate
for the 50 states and four territories) , 66% reported that
they received at least one kind of the above types of identifying information from mental health centers.

In addi-

tion 36% of mental health centers who submit identifying
information to their state departments reported that they
"did not inform their patients that they did so"

(p. 1287).

Needless to say, the more widely that such information is
disclosed, the less private and confidential it is.
Some minimal records are necessary for continuity
of care, both over a long period of time with one therapist
and if it is necessary to transfer to another therapist.
Records are especially necessary in documenting the progress and the effects of types of intervention, including
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medication.

As the number of patients and records in-

crease, there are more medical librarians, typists, file
clerks, i.e., more people outside of the therapist having
contact with and access to confidential information.

With

more people having access to such information, there is a
greater possibility of a breach of confidentiality.
Third-party payers add another source of difficulty
in confidentiality in psychotherapy.

Before health insur-

ance companies and other health care programs (e.g., Public
Aid) will reimburse for services, they require the diagnosis, type of treatment and dates of treatment for each
individual client.

This information is frequently given

without the client's knowledge and/or formal consent.
Professionals other than psychiatrists becoming
involved as therapists in the delivery of mental health
care have also added to concerns of confidentiality.

The

added concern was initially due to the fact that most state
laws in effect that protected the confidentiality of psychotherapy specifically stated that the therapist was a
physician.

Fortunately, psychologists and social workers

have worked to develop stringent ethical standards regarding confidentiality and have sought to have these standards
put into law.

For example, in Illinois, a psychologist can

disclose information only under very specific conditions.
However, there are many people who do not meet the licensing standards of the above professions who are directly
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involved as therapists in the delivery of mental health
care, but who are not covered by laws protecting confidentiality.

Illinois' new Confidentiality Act has possibly

resolved this problem by including in the definition of
"therapist", "any other person not prohibited by law from
providing such services or from holding himself out as a
therapist if the recipient reasonably believes that such
person is permitted to do so"
1979, p. 1489).

(Illinois Revised Statutes,

Regardless of the credentials of the

therapist, most patients receiving mental health care
probably assume that their statements will be kept private.
Under current law in most states this is not necessarily
possible.
The growth, development and advances of mental
health care have made confidentiality more important to the
individual patient, as well as more difficult to assure.
Increased Interest in Privacy:

A second major

development contributing to increased concern about confidentiality in psychotherapy is that society has become more
interested in the general issue of privacy.

This concern

for privacy has grown with our advanced technology that
allows for swift communication, easy and complete surveillance and efficient record keeping.

There is increased

public awareness of the extent to which private and government agencies keep records on numerous aspects of our lives
from the vital statistics of birth and death to vehicle

19
violations, medical records and political party affiliation.
In any ordered society there must be some measure
of restraint on individuals in order to keep them from infringing on the lives of others.

For example, in order to

keep people who do not pay their bills from abusing the
privilege of credit and loans, it is necessary for persons
applying for loans to give information and allow for investigations of their credit histories.

The price that all

members of society pay is a loss of some degree of privacy.
Such invasions of privacy, though not appreciated, are
generally viewed as necessary and therefore acceptable.
However, there is a growing concern that information such as that above is being used for purposes other
than that for which it was obtained and that much information is being obtained without sufficient purpose or
consent.

Incidents of record keeping and of observing

private citizens for malevolent purposes, not for efficiency or for the protection of society, have come to the
public's attention.

The wiretapping of Martin Luther

King's telephone (New York Times, 1969), the attempt to
steal Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric records, government
records of such things as the members of organizations
opposed to the Vietnam War and other abuses of privacy by
federal and local branches of law enforcement have raised
considerable alarm.

This alarm has led to state and fed-
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eral legislation, including the Public Information Act of
1966 (Public Law 89-554) and the Privacy Act of 1974
(Public Law 93-579).
The Public Information Act of 1966 sets procedures
for public access to records kept by the federal government
and for declassification of government information previously kept secret.

It is an irony typical of our varied

and ever stimulating society that at the same time when
there is an increase in concern about individual privacy,
there is increased public pressure for the right to ''know".
The Federal Privacy Act follows the Public Information Act
and has the purpose of giving individuals greater control
over the release of information about themselves by granting the right of individuals to find out what information
the government has recorded on them and by limiting disclosure of so-called public information without the consent
of the individual.

Included in this is the right to in-

spect, copy, correct and update records and to determine
what records pertaining to the individual are collected,
maintained, used and disseminated by the government.
Government is not the only offending invader of an
individual's privacy.

Insurance companies store and rou-

tinely share medical information regarding their applicants
and clients.

Any information attached to a social security

number through a computer can follow a person for life
without one even being aware of it.

Agencies for rating
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credit have been known to give out information without due
discretion and without always thoroughly checking for
accuracy.

Once incorrect information is stored in a com-

puter, it is generally a much more laborious task to have
it corrected or removed that it was to put it in or than it
is to retrieve it for examination.

In addition, big busi-

ness has been known to seek information on individuals whom
they view as antagonistic to their practices (Nader
General Motors, 1969).

~

Increased public awareness of the

amounts of information recorded with our computer technology and incidents of misuse of information or undue
investigation for information have led to increased demand
for the protection of privacy.
This increased demand is visible in the increased
attention given to the right of privacy in civil suits and
new laws.

Several state constitutions have included pro-

visions recognizing a right to privacy and several more
states have enacted comprehensive privacy statutes or fair
information practices laws.
As one of many areas where greater privacy is being
sought, confidentiality in psychotherapy has received its
share of attention.

Numerous suits and court cases have

raised the issue of the right to privacy in psychotherapy.
Federal laws, designed to protect the confidentiality of
persons in federally funded drug or alcoholism programs,
have been enacted.

In addition, individual states are

22
taking steps to insure the protection of confidentiality in
psychotherapy.

For example, in Illinois, a state which has

passed much reform legislation in recognition of patient
rights, a comprehensive Confidentiality Act to "protect the
confidentiality of records and communications of recipients
of mental health or developmental disability services" went
into effect in 1979.

This act very specifically limits and

defines the situations in which
may or may not be disclosed.

commu~1ications

and records

Whether or not the Confi-

dentiality Act accomplishes its stated purpose will be
discussed in later sections.
This federal and state legislation reflects the
growing concern with privacy in our society.

These laws

and court cases that pertain to privacy in psychotherapy
will also be discussed in later sections.
Increased Requests for Information:

A third factor

contributing to increased professional and legal concern
regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy is that mental
health professionals are receiving a greater number of
requests for information or testimony about clients from
outside sources such as third-party payers, the courts and
employers.

The trends and advances that have led to greater

numbers of people seeking mental health care have also
enhanced the prestige of psychiatry and psychology.

Mental

health professionals are increasingly viewed as experts
having special insight, training and ability to understand
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and describe an individual's personality and suitability
for employment, parole, etc.

Mental health professionals

are called upon to give opinions on a wide variety of
matters including those related to the courts

(child cus-

tody, juvenile cases, insanity and more), education and
industry.

In addition, mental health problems have gained

increased respectability as an illness and their treatment
is covered by an increasing number of health insurance
companies.
Third-party payers, including health insurance companies, are one of the biggest requesters of information
about mental health clients.

Grossman (1971)

reports that

in a survey of Northern California District Branch psychiatrists, 89% reported that they received requests from
health insurance companies for information about clients.
As mentioned previously, third-party payers require a
minimum disclosure of the psychiatric diagnosis, the dates
of therapy sessions and the kind of therapy involved before
giving compensation for mental health care.

Occasionally,

they will request additional information including case
histories, medications prescribed and even a review of the
patient's entire record which may contain highly personal
thoughts and feelings that the patient has expressed to a
psychotherapist.

This information is similar to that

requested by health insurance companies when processing
claims for any type of health disorder and does not suggest
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an attempt to obtain psychiatric "secrets" about a client.
Rather, it is an effort on the part of the insurance company to make sure that reimbursement is paid only for those
conditions covered by the policy and that the frequency of
treatment is justified by the existing condition.

However,

as Grossman (1971) points out, such information usually
becomes a part of a permanent record, often in a clearinghouse where insurance companies exchange information.

He

cites possible areas of abuse and states, "There is no
predicting the ultimate use and misuse of permanent records
of this nature"

(p. 65) .

Third-party payers are an area of

concern for the mental health professionals who are interested in the best welfare of their clients, yet need to
receive a fair payment from persons who might otherwise not
be able to afford their services.
Mental health professionals have established themselves as specialists in the areas of human behavior and
mental illness and their expertise is frequently requested
for testimony in a court of law.

In cases of court requested

examinations and evaluations there need be no conflict regarding confidentiality if the person is agreeable to the
evaluation and is aware of its purpose at the time of the
evaluation.

However, many times, a psychotherapist whom a

person has been seeing with no intention that the therapist
will be called as an expert witness, is requested to provide information such as an opinion of a client's

effectiv~-
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ness as a parent, suitability for various choices of criminal sentencing (e.g., probation versus incarceration) or
stability in general.

The legal aspects of these requests

will be discussed in greater depth in later sections.
These requests by the courts present a significant
threat to confidentiality in psychotherapy and to its value
to society as a whole.

Obviously, divulging such informa-

tion as mentioned above will interfere with the progress of
the specific client; it could also interfere with the value
of psychotherapy as a whole.

People in need of treatment

because of the stress of such things as marital disharmony
or the fact that they engage in anti-social activities may
not seek treatment if they have reason to fear that information they discuss with a psychotherapist may later be
used against them in a court of law.

Needless to say,

these are probably some of the very same people for whom
society has a strong interest in seeking mental health
care.
In addition to requests for information by thirdparty payers and the courts, mental health professionals
are asked to provide expert information, recommendations
and opinions to a host of other sources including schools
(especially when children are involved in treatment) ,
Social Security offices (for evaluating disability claims) ,
employers (especially as to whether a person is ready to
return to work, but sometimes with less honorable ques-
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tions) and friends and relatives (some with good intentions
and some with not so good intentions).

The list of people

requesting information and their varied reasons could go on
and on.
In summary, the mental health professionals have
established themselves as specialists and now others want
to make use of their expertise.

This position is very

flattering and would be quite comfortable were it not for
some of the ethical dilemmas that may arise.

This disser-

tation is devoted to further exploring these dilemmas.
Confidentiality -

~Moral

and Historical Perspective

Confidentiality and privacy in our Western culture
have been respected for centuries in certain specified relationships such as husband-wife, client-attorney, patientphysician and penitent-clergyman.

Although confidentiality

in the patient-physician association, based upon the Hippocratic Oath dating from the fourth century B.C., is the
oldest of the nonfamily relationships, historically and
philosophically, privacy has been most thoroughly discussed
in the writings of the 13th through 17th century Roman
Catholic theologians.

These theologians debated the cir-

cumstances under which the seal of confession, which protects the privacy of confession, should be applied and
whether there could or should be any exceptions to the
obligation of the seal.
These discussions and the issues they address are
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remarkably similar to modern day debates regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy.

A review of the philosophical

and historical writings related to confidentiality, secrets
and privacy is helpful to understand the foundations of the
moral right to secrecy and privacy, to explore how others
have handled the conflicts and dilemmas inherent in the
concept of a private individual in society, to provide a
background of ethical decision making and to demonstrate
how similar struggles have gone on for hundreds of years
despite the fact that privacy is a relatively new legal
issue.
The discussions regarding the seal of confession
are additionally pertinent as "confession'', though often
called by other names, is usually considered a significant
part of the therapeutic process.

Mowrer (1961) compared

the psychotherapeutic process with the sacrament of confession and expiation.

He noted that psychotherapy allowed

for a confession of one's errors, but did not encourage
atonement or reparation.

Jung (1975) directly compared the

role of the priest with that of the psychotherapist and
stated, "The first beginnings of all analytic treatment of
the soul are to be found in its prototype, the confessional"

(p. 55) .

The Roman Catholic church also recognizes

the commonality of these roles.

Religious writers refer to

confessors as "spiritual physicians" and state that they
have a duty to become knowledgeable in mental hygiene and
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psychiatry (Halligan, 1967, p. 144).
~

Brief History of the Seal of Confession:

In

modern day practice, the seal of confession is the strictest obligation to maintain absolute secrecy regarding all
information learned from a penitent during the sacrament of
penance.

The Code of Canon Law, the body of laws of the

Roman Catholic church, states:
The sacramental seal is inviolable.
Consequently, the
confessor must exercise all diligent care not to betray the penitent in any degree by word, sign or in any
other way or for any cause whatsoever (c. 889; as
quoted in McCarthy, 1967, p. 133).
The phrase "any cause whatsoever" emphasizes the absolute
nature of the seal, whether there be risk of death, harm to
others or treason.
In light of modern day practices, it seems anomalous that some historians report it was the custom among
early Christians to have public confession (McCarthy,
1967).

This may be true as early Christians lived in very

closely knit communities.

Their zeal and enthusiasm for

following the teachings of Christ and making reparation in
many circumstances outweighed their concern with the consequences of public confession and penance.

It is also

thought that confession by the earliest Christians was
practiced only once, when they converted from paganism;
therefore, it was not a frequent practice or an integral
part of Christian life.

Confession did not receive much

attention from theologians during the first few centuries,
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A.D., and it is difficult to know precisely how the early
Christians practiced confession and penance, especially as
the word that has frequently been translated to mean "confession" can also refer to the entire rite involved in
gaining absolution, not just the specific part of confession (Harrington, 1950).
Church historians to this day disagree on whether
public confession was actually practiced or required by the
early church and it is believed that the practice of rites
varied greatly from place to place (Barton, 1961; Harrington,
1950; Jungmann, 1959).

Most of the evidence from early

theologians suggests that private confession was available
for sins that were committed in secret (Origen, Homily on
Psalm 37, ii, St. Cypian, De Lapsis, xxviii, as reviewed
and discussed in Harrington, 1950; Epistle of Barnabas, 1st
century, Bishop Aphraates of Syria, 4th century, St. Ambrose,
4th century, as reviewed and discussed in Kurtscheid,
1927).

Although strong evidence of public confession in
the early church is lacking, public penance seems to have
been customary, usually even for sins committed in secret.
Often this was exercised only in the gravest of secret sins
(murder, apostacy or adultery) and consisted of a form of
excommunication (Barton, 1961; Jungman, 1959).

However,

there developed an awareness of the impact society can have
on the individual when a public penance gives clues as to
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what sins may have been confessed.

For example, the

churches of Asia Minor had very specific lengths of time as
penance for various sins, thereby making it possible to
figure out one's sin from the public penance the person was
required to perform (Palmer, 1963).

St. Basil (4th cen-

tury) made a statement against the use of such public
penance that might suggest the specific sin, especially in
the case of women who confessed to adultery as, if exposed,
they would be subject to capital punishment under civil law
(Kurtscheid, 1927).
Greater awareness and concern about the effects of
public penance on one's reputation, as well as potential
punishment under civil law, seems to have arisen around
this same time as others were demanding secret confession
and penance and silence on the part of the confessor for
secret sins so that people were not hated or exposed to
contempt (Aphraates, 4th century, St. Ephraem, 4th century,
as reviewed and discussed in Kurtscheid, 1927).

Pope Leo

I, in a protest against the public reading of each penitent's list of sins in the year 459, demanded secret confession and silence on the part of the confessor so that
shame

a~d

fear of legal prosecution would not deter many

from seeking absolution (Leo's Epistle 168, Denz 145, as
discussed in Barton, 1961; Kurtscheid, 1927).

Modern day

psychotherapists also have an interest in seeing that
clients are not deterred from seeking psychotherapy because
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of the fear of being subject to public humiliation or legal
problems.
The above theologians recognized how social pressure and fear of civil law could deter individuals from
seeking absolution if confession were not private.

Cul-

tural pressures for privacy, from the Celtic branch of the
church, also influenced the practice of confession and
penance.

In the Irish and Anglo-Saxon churches, public

penance had never been customary.
marily to two reasons.

This is attributed pri-

First, due to the nature of nation-

al customs and the character of the people, missionaries
found it easier to convert the Anglo-Saxons if they did not
insist on the humiliation of public penance.

Second, the

Celtic churches were isolated_and did not experience the
same influences as the continental church (Barton, 1961).
When the Anglo-Saxon branch of the church became stronger
and sent its own missionaries back to the continent during
the 6th century, they influenced the already growing trend
toward a simple, less rigorous and private confession and
penance.

In addition, the Celtic church brought the prac-

tice of repeated confession and penance, possibly resulting
from monastic influence, to the continent (Barton, 1961;
Palmer, 1963).
This trend toward privacy of confession continued
until the Council of Douzy (874) which decreed that:
Penitents, whether clerics or laymen or women, who con-
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fess their sins in secret to the priest are in no way
to be betrayed. By no indication whatsoever are their
sins to be revealed to anyone save God alone (as
quoted in McCarthy, 1967, p. 135).
At this period in time the details of the obligation of
silence were not yet uniformly regulated and there continued to be discussions and controversies.

The seal of

confession received considerable attention at synods and
numerous theologians addressed the various issues related
to it.
It was at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 that
the obligation of the seal of confession was put into
ecclesiastical law.

In this ordinance there is " ... a

strict command to the confessor not to betray the sinner in
the least in whatever manner, either by word or sign or in
any other way"

(Kurtscheid, 1927, p. 116).

The purpose of

the seal was to safeguard the sacrament of penance and the
obligation rested solely on the confessor.

The Fourth

Lateran Council allowed for a priest to consult with a
superior concerning the confession of a penitent if the
identity was not disclosed.

It also specified that a

confessor who broke the obligation of the seal of confession would be "deposed from his priestly office •.. [and]
incarcerated in a monastery to discharge a penance all his
life"

(Denz 814 as quoted in McCarthy, 1967, p. 135)

indicating the gravity of such an offense.
However, questions about the seal of confession
continued to be debated.

What constituted a sacramental

33
confession?

Were interpreters or persons who overheard a

confession also bound by the seal?

What if breaking the

seal would be beneficial to the penitent?

What if breaking

the seal would prevent potential harm to the penitent or
others?

What does one do about information learned during

the confession that does not pertain directly to the penitent's sins?

Can one use confessional information if the

seal is not broken?

In what ways?

Similarities in the Discussions on Confidentiality
and the Seal of Confession:

It is at this point in the

historical and theological discussions and writings on the
seal of confession that there develops a remarkable similarity to the present day debates on confidentiality in
psychotherapy.

Presently, psychologists have an ethical

code, comparable to ecclesiastical law, that states:
Safeguarding information about an individual that has
been obtained by the psychologist in the course of
teaching, practice or investigation is a primary obligation of the psychologist.
Such information is not
communicated to others unless certain important conditions are met (American Psychological Association,
1979, p. 4).
This allows for a breach of confidentiality under some circumstances, but is vague about what these circumstances
might be.

Many believed that the urdinance of the Fourth

Lateran Council was also intended to allow for exceptions,
a belief which was not absolutely refuted until the phrase
"for any cause whatsoever" was added in 1917 when the obli-
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Before discussing how the early debates and writings regarding the possible exceptions to the seal compare
to those regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy, it is
necessary to understand the bases of the seal and the types
of secrets defined by moral theologians.

There are three

levels on which the seal is justified and protected.

The

highest level of protection for the penitent is that of
divine positive law.

Divine positive law is based on the

authority of God and is viewed as pertaining to the seal by
interpreting Christ's statement, "if you forgive the sins
of any, they are forgiven; if you retain the sins of any,
they are re·tained"

(John 20:23, RSV), as implicitly grant-

ing the right to have one's confession heard secretly.
Otherwise, the faithful would be deterred from participating in the sacrament of penance and having their sins
forgiven, something that the theologians believe that
Christ would not have intended. "The obligation of the seal
follows from the very nature of the Sacrament of Penance as
instituted by Christ"

(McCarthy, 1967, p. 134).

St. Thomas

Aquinas adds that a confessor cannot repeat a penitent's
sins as he cannot "know" as a man those things that he has
heard as God's minister (McCarthy, 1967).

The discussions

by the theologians of divine positive law will not be
covered in any greater depth here as this level of justification of privacy does not have a parallel in psychotherapy.

Most would agree that there is no implied command of
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God for believers to seek psychotherapy!
The second level of protection provided to the
penitent is that of natural law.

Natural law is that which

the average man, using observation and reason, would recognize as a principle of God's will (Marshall, 1960).

The

utilization of natural law involves taking the principles
of justice and charity and applying them in the circumstances of daily living.

Confession would be governed

under natural law as a natural secret.

Regan (1941)

states:
This type of secret is designated natural because the
obligation of secrecy which it imposes arises directly
from the natural law; no contract, express or implied,
is needed to make it binding (p. 5).
Haring (1966) states that the revelation of a natural secret "by the very nature of the case would here and now
violate justice and charity"

(p. 568).

Duns Scotus

(around

1300 A.D.) states that there are three reasons for the
natural obligation to keep the seal of confession:

(1)

it

is best for the general welfare not to be deterred from
seeking penance,

(2) because of the lines in Matthew 7:12

and Luke 6:31 that instruct people to do unto others as
they would have done unto themselves, and (3) confession
has the characteristics of a secretum commissum, which is
covered by natural law (Kurtscheid, 1927).
Secretum commissum, or committed secret (also
called "entrusted secret"), is that knowledge "which is
obtained under the explicit or implicit condition of se-
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crecy"

(Haring, 1966, p. 569).

Regan (1941) notes that

"the distinguishing note of the entrusted secret is that
I

the agreement of maintaining secrecy is made anterior to,
and is the sine qua non condition for, the disclosure"
7).

(p.

This is in contrast to the "promised secret" in which

a promise to keep the secret is made after obtaining the
secret knowledge.

The committed secret therefore carries a

heavier burden of obligation and is a greater sin to violate as the secret information may very well not have been
revealed were it not for the prior understanding that it
would not be disclosed.
The

mos~

common example of the committed secret is

the professional secret, i.e., information told to a doctor, lawyer or other professional with the understanding
that it will be kept confidential.

The professional secret

may be explicit, as when a promise of secrecy is directly
requested and given, or it may be implicit, as when no
promise is asked for or received in so many words but the
position or function of the person to hear the secret
information clearly indicates that the secret will be
vigorously protected, an assumption that is frequently made
by persons seeking psychotherapy.

The discussions of the

theologians regarding how natural law, justice and charity,
which obligate one to the professional secret, also obligate one to the seal of confession are therefore very
pertinent to confidentiality in psychotherapy.

For a thor-
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ough discussion of the relationship between natural law and

'
confidentiality in psychotherapy,
see Alves (1959).
Ecclesiastical or church law is the third level of
protection of the privacy of the penitent.

The Code of

Canon Law includes the obligation of absolute secrecy by a
confessor.

The law allows no exceptions and there are

severe punishments for breaking it.

If the seal is broken

knowingly, under present day church law the confessor would
be excommunicated immediately.

If a disclosure is indirect

and accidental, the punishments are less severe.
This third level of protection is comparable to
both the "laws" of a professional code of ethics and to
civil law, although professional codes and civil laws do
have exceptions, both specified and implied, in regard to
confidentiality in psychotherapy.

Also, punishments are

not so severe as those specified in Canon Law, yet an
intentional and unwarranted disclosure of confidential
information by a psychologist can result in the psychologist receiving consequences from professional organizations
and under civil law.

Indirect and accidental disclosures

would probably not result in any punishment unless the
psychologist was grossly negligent.

The discussions re-

garding the possible exceptions to ecclesiastical law,
prior to 1917 when it was made clear that there were no
exceptions, are comparable to present day discussions of
possible exceptions to professional codes and/or laws
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regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy.
One of the major sources of conflict that arose regarding the seal of confession, and which has a direct
~

parallel regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy, concerned the issue of preventing the penitent from committing
future sins and from harming others.

Huguccio, writing

shortly'before the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), proposed
that if a person confessed a sin but refused to do penance
or planned to commit another sin, persons who would be
helpful in persuading the penitent to refrain from evil
without causing harm to him could privately be told about
the confession (Kurtscheid, 1927).

He made it clear that

past sins are covered by the seal of confession.

Huguccio

based his opinion on the thinking that a priest would
essentially be an accomplice in sin if he silently stood by
and allowed it to occur.

Additionally, he stated that if

the authorities are informed, this may cause great injury
to the penitent and thereby by a sin against the natural
law of charity.

The solution is to tell someone in a

position to prevent the sin without harming the penitent.
This opinion is shared by many theologians in the 13th to
15th centuries, some of whom further suggested that under
some circumstances it would also be appropriate to warn a
person whom the penitent has threatened to harm (without
revealing the penitent's name) and advise this person to
make amends with all enemies so that he/she does not get
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hurt.

William of Rennes (Apparatus, 1241, as reported in

Kurtscheid, 1927) states that a priest has a duty to discreetly inform potential victims when it can be done without sin or scandal.

Great emphasis is given by all writers

to the point that this should be done without injury to the
penitent.
This exception to the seal of confession that
Huguccio and other canonists suggested is indicative of the
human emotion and conflict of the confessor.

This same

conflict occurs in psychotherapists when clients speak,
while in psychotherapy, of harming someone.

Psychothera-

pists may feel irresponsible or like accomplices if they do
not make efforts to prevent clients from committing dangerous acts.

It may also subject clients to undue harass-

ment and punishment to report them to criminal authorities
for acts that they have not actually committed.

Psycho-

therapists, under current Illinois law, are permitted but
net required to warn potential victims as was suggested by
several theologians of the Middle Ages.

They have the

additional option of working with other mental health
professionals and a noncriminal portion of the legal system
to have people committed to psychiatric hospitals to prevent harm to themselves or others.

This latter option

might be compared with disclosing to a person who can
persuade a penitent to stop sinning, the solution suggested
by Huguccio which would be in line with natural law.

Other
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states have not all given the psychotherapist as much discretion as Illinois (Tarasoff v. California Board of
Regents).
There is one very definite difference between
present day discussions by psychotherapists about preventing clients from injuring themselves and/or others and
discussions by theologians of the Middle Ages.

This is the

definition of what constitutes an act planned with sufficient seriousness to warrant disclosure.

Sins, such as not

believing in the teaching of the Roman Catholic church
(heresy) , were considered important enough to be reported
to friends or relatives of the penitents who might be able
to help them.

Beavais in Speculum Historiale (1244, as

reported in Kurtscheid, 1927) went as far as to say that
the priest should warn others of heresy he has heard in
confession so that they may avoid the heretic and not be
perverted.

The only situations that psychotherapists can

report, according to the various ethical codes and to
Illinois state statutes, pertain to physical danger to
others or to the client and to abuse, physical or emotional, and/or neglect to children.
Another source of conflict discussed by theologians
regarding the seal of confession and paralleled today in
issues of confidentiality in psychotherapy concerns the
attitude of the penitent.

Attitude and intent of the peni-

tent is given much attention in the writings of the church
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canonists in the sense of asking whether or not a confession is sacramental and subject to the seal if a person
does not intend to try to stop sinning.

The question

arises as to whether or not a confession that is made
without remorse, but as a routine because confession is
required at least on an annual basis, should be given the
same privilege and privacy as a sincere and contrite confession.

In the interest of encouraging the faithful to

continue to participate in the sacraments, canon law does
not allow for the confessor to make the above discrimination in regards to the seal although the priest is allowed
to use judgment in so far as whether or not absolution is
granted.
This conflict regarding attitude and intent might
be compared to that experienced by psychotherapists who
have clients who are forced to participate in psychotherapy
for any number of reasons (e.g., a condition of probation,
in order to keep a job after some unusual behavior or to
placate a spouse who is thinking about divorce) but do not
make appropriate use of the therapy time because of such
matters as missed appointments, arriving consistently late
or refusing to talk.

This is the kind of behavior that can

make psychotherapists feel inadequate, frustrated and
angry, feelings that may interfere with a clear perception
of what is the most therapeutic and ethical response
to the question of whether or not others should be informed
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that the client is merely qoing through the motions of
seeking mental health care.
Even without these feelings a psychotherapist may
question whether confidentiality in these types of cases is
in the best interest of society or even in the best interest of the individual.

Obviously, professional codes of

ethics and statutes in many states forbid such disclosures
and serve to protect psychotherapists from their own feelings and conflicts, just as the Code of Canon Law protects
confessors from revealing information they have heard in
confession.

Just as granting privacy to all confessions,

whether sincere or not, serves to encourage people to
participate in the sacraments of the church, granting
confidentiality to people who may fail to use or misuse
psychotherapy, may benefit society and enhance the profession of psychotherapy by offering encouragement and a
trusting environment for these same people to make better
use of psychotherapy and by demonstrating to others that
psychotherapists are serious when they say that psychotherapy is confidential.
Another issue of increasing concern is the client's
right to

infor~ed

consent.

In the case of psychotherapy,

it has been suggested that informed consent includes being
advised of the limits of confidentiality (Siegal, 1979).
This means that, if clients do not have this information,
they cannot validly consent to be patients in psychother-
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apy.

A parallel proposal was made by William of Rennes

(Apparatus, 1241, as reported in Kurtscheid, 1927) in a
discussion of whether future sins are protected by the seal
of confession.

He states that when a confessor decides he

has a duty to disclose information from confession, he also
has a duty to inform the penitent that the confession is
not protected by the seal.

In the situation discussed by

William of Rennes, the informing was done after a confession was found to be unreceivable.

Under the present Code

of Canon Law this would no longer be an issue as it allows
for no exceptions to the seal.
Some psychotherapists are currently proposing that
a potential client be explicitly advised of the limits of
confidentiality before therapy starts so that the client
very clearly understands the relationship.

Siegal states:

"The initial interview should incorporate a straightforward
sharing with a client of whatever limits may exist in the
confidentiality of the material presented"

(1979, p. 256).

This concept of warning the client is gaining popularity.
On the one hand it presents the

psychotherapist-clie~t

re-

lationship in a realistic and honest manner and assures
that clients will not disclose

informa~ion

ledge of the possible ramifications.

without know-

The clients will also

not feel so deceived if the psychotherapist must later
disclose information.

On the other hand, this approach may

sensitize clients to such an extent that they have greater
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difficulty (both conscious and unconscious) exploring and
relating their thoughts and feelings.
The question of gaining client consent to disclose
information also has parallels in the writings on the seal
of confession.

In a discussion of whether a confession can

be revealed to prevent sins, Henry of Segusia (Summa, 1253,
as reported in Kurtscheid, 1927) states that general warnings can be given in order to prevent great crimes, but
that the penitent must not be identified, no matter what
misfortune may occur, unless the confessor has the permission of the penitent.

The major ethical means that psy-

chotherapists have for disclosing information, should it be
deemed necessary, is to obtain the permission of the
client.

This practice has since been changed as regards to

confession as it was generally assumed, especially in cases
regarding court testimony, that if penitents refused to
grant permission to the confessor to disclose information,
they were probably guilty or had something to hide.

A

priest can still disclose information, with consent, when a
parishoner talks to him outside the confessional.
It is frequently assumed that, if a client refuses
to grant permission to a psychotherapist to disclose information, the client is guilty or has something to hide.
This is a major reason why some psychotherapists will not
reveal any information, positive or negative, even with the
consent of the client.

The contention of these psychothera-
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pists is that any pertinent information could be obtained
from another source where confidentiality was not assumed
to be inherent in the relationship.

For example, if a

decision regarding the stability of a second marriage was
needed in a child custody case, neighbors, co-workers,
friends and relatives or the use of an expert witness who
does an evaluation for the court with the consent and
knowledge of those involved, could provide sufficient data
upon which to make this decision.
Political pressures also had an effect on the
interpretation of the seal of confession.

The Gallicans,

an order which had declared independence from the authority
of Rome were officially recognized as leaders of the French
national church from the late Middle Ages to the French
Revolution.

With no separation of church and state, the

Parlement (the highest legal court in the country) at that
time reviewed all papal decrees and only accepted them if
they were consistent with the teachings of the Gallican
Church (Harney, 1941).
In France, civil law required the public denunciation of any individual who expressed murderous intent
against the King.

This civil law was supported by the

Gallicans but opposed by the Jesuits, who, as leaders in
moral theology, used the strictest interpretation of the
seal of confession.

The Gallicans were bitterly opposed to

the Jesuit attempts to establish colleges and universities
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in France and used all their influence to limit and denounce the Jesuits.

They had even been successful in

having the Society banished from France following an attempt
on King Henry IV's life in 1595.

The Jesuits were per-

mitted to return to France in 1603 and when they sought
permission to open a college in 1611, the solicitor-general
urged the Parlement to refuse permission on the grounds
that the Jesuits did not follow certain laws and teachings,
among them those concerning the seal of confession.

It was

demanded that the Jesuits subscribe to the rule regarding
the safety of the monarchy.

Although the Jesuits did not

agree to divulge the name of any penitent, they did agree
to report any murderous intention on the King they heard in
confession, making an accommodation to civil law in order
to receive permission and funding for their colleges in
France (Kurtscheid, 1927).
Political and financial pressures are present in
the practice of psychotherapy as well, especially when a
psychotherapist is working in an agency that receives
public funding.

These pressures are probably more acutely

felt by those in the position of making administrative and
policy decisions than by the individual psychotherapist.
For example, although the State of Illinois does not request the names or identities of clients seeking only
outpatient mental health care, it is required that state
funded community mental health agencies release informa-
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tion, including identities and dates of visits, about
clients who have received recent inpatient care in a state
facility to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (DMHDD). This information is required
so that DMHDD can monitor the care that former inpatients
receive with the hope that this will prevent their reentry
into a state mental hospital.

Refusal to comply with such

a requirement by the department that recommends how much
funding each agency receives could have negative ramifications.
Financial pressures are present for the psychotherapist who receives reimbursements for services from
health insurance companies.

These companies require speci-

fic information, including diagnosis, before they will pay
the psychotherapist.
In summary, any time when there is a situation in
which a psychotherapist receives funding from someone other
than the client for providing services, there is the likelihood of laws and/or accountability interfering with confidentiality.
One interesting aspect of the seal of confession is
that all persons hearing the actual confession are bound by
the seal just as much as the confessor.

This might include

anyone from an interpreter to other pentitents waiting
their turns to see the confessor.

In psychotherapay, there

are parallels in terms of the clerical help who keep track
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of billings and records as well as in a group therapy
situation.

In the case of clerical help, it has been held

in the courts that secretaries are an extension of their
professional employers and are bound by the same laws of
privilege and privacy as those professionals.

The Illinois

Confidentiality Act also provides that clerical help are
bound to confidentiality by law.
Group therapy has been a source of problems for the
mental health professional.

Although the psychotherapist-

client relationship has held privileged status in some
states, group therapy has allowed for loopholes as fellow
group members have generally not been considered able to
claim the privilege. Illinois law has attempted to remedy
this problem by including the phrase "or in the presence of
other persons"

(Illinois Revised Statutes, 1979, p. 1489)

in the definition of a "confidential communication" or
"communication" and states that "All records and communications shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed
except as provided in this Act"

(Illinois Revised Statutes,

1979, p. 1489), allowing clients to have only the same
avenues of disclosure of information regarding other clients as do psychotherapists.
In summary, many of the same problems and conflicts
discussed by early theologians in regards to possible
exceptions to the seal of confession, including the dilemma
when a crime could be prevented, when the attitude of the

49

penitent is insincere, the issue of disclosure with consent, political pressures and occasions when others overhear a confession, have parallels in modern day problems
and conflicts in regard to confidentiality in psychotherapy.

Psychotherapists also have some of the same motiva-

tions in keeping the two acts, confession and psychotherapy, confidential, i.e., the desire to not do anything
that would deter people from seeking participation in these
acts and a concern for the consequences of these people if
information is revealed.

The confessor and the psychothera-

pist are additionally both bound by natural law and ecclesiastical or civil law.

The seal of confession has the

additional basis of divine law.

In the opinion of this

author, divine law removes any conflict or question and
makes the moral responsibilities of the confessor clearer
and easier to handle than those of the psychotherapist.
Even though the psychotherapist may be said, as
above, to be bound by natural law, this is not generally in
the conscious awareness of psychotherapists who tend to
look to their ethical codes and civil law in making decisions regarding confidentiality.

The approach to decision

making used by moralists and the Roman Catholic church is
to take the principles of natural law and apply them to the
situation.

As will be discussed in following sections,

ethical codes and civil law, while having input from natural law, approach decision making in a different manner.

50

Confidentiality -

~

Psychotherapeutic Perspective

The purpose of this section is to explore the judgments of several major theorist-practitioners with reference to confidentiality in psychotherapy.

It will also

discuss the development of professional codes of ethics for
psychotherapists, particularly psychologists.
Major Theorists-Practitioners:

Openness and trust

in the treatment setting have been viewed as a necessity by
early and modern theorists-practitioners (e.g., Cautela,
1977; Freud, 1959; Jung, 1961; Maslow; 1954; Rogers, 1961).
Many techniques have been developed to help the client be
more open and self-disclosing, including Freud's "free
association", Jung's "dream recall" and Adler's "earliest
memory." It is generally assumed by those who study the
major theorists that any information revealed by a patient/client to a therapist will be kept confidential;
however, the specific concepts of privacy and confidentiality are seldom mentioned.

Privacy seems to have been

automatically assumed as present and essential by theoristspractitioners and has rarely been discussed as an issue.
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), recognized by psychotherapists as developing the first comprehensive theory of
personality and technique of psychotherapy, did not give
confidentiality very much attention in his writings; however, the small amount of attention he did give is direct
and to the point.

For example, he stated " ... we [the
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psychotherapist and the patient] make our pact, complete
candor on one side and strict discretion on the other"
(Freud, 1949, p. 31).

A very brief explanation of a part

of his theory will explain why Freud believed that this
"candor and discretion" were essential elements for the
process of psychotherapy.
A major thesis of Freud's theory of psychopathology
is that the ego, in an attempt to deal with the demands of
reality, the id and the superego, and to preserve its own
organization, will repress a great deal of its memory and
experiences into the unconscious.

This repression is done

with the purpose of protecting the ego and alleviating
stress, but it may backfire in that the ego may be altered
or disorganized by the intrusion of these same repressed
and unconscious elements.

The psychoanalyst assists the

patient by helping to discover conflicts and interpreting
material that is influenced by the unconscious, thereby
giving the ego greater awareness of the unconscious elements that may intrude.

He provides knowledge to the

patient so that his ego may gain control and organization
over the parts of the psyche.
Freud (1949) stated that the patient must agree "to
put at our disposal all the material which its selfperception yields it"

(p. 30) and that "what we want to

hear from our patient is not only what he knows and conceals from other people; he is to tell us too what he does
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not know"

(p. 31) .

He is to tell us not only what he can say intentionally and willingly, what will give him relief like a
confession, but everything else as well that his selfobservation yields him, everything that comes into
his head, even if it is disagreeable for him to say it,
even if it seems to him unimportant or nonsensical
(p. 31, Freud's emphasis).
Because the ego has repressed experiences, thoughts
and feelings that may be a source of anxiety, it is resistant to the discovery of this material and the risk of
stress it may cause.

The ego is reluctant to let this

material into the preconscious (available to the conscious)
or the conscious awareness of the patient, and even more
reluctant to make this material available to the awareness
of the psychotherapist.

Another source of interference

with complete candor in psychotherapy is the fact that the
unconscious does not operate by logical rules.

Freud

refers to the unconscious as the "realm of the illogical."
Conflicting urges can independently exist side by side.
The workings of the unconscious seem nonsensical at times.
This lack of sense may be a source of embarrassment for the
client - a deterring force to openness in the therapeutic
setting.
Freud repeatedly emphasized that the fundamental
rule a patient must follow in psychoanalysis is complete
candor.

Freud also recognized that the rule is very diffi-

cult to follow and emphasized the necessity of strict
discretion by the psychotherapist in order to make the
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patient's task possible.

Despite the fact that Freud's

theory was in a continual state of growth and change while
he was alive, the assumption of professional discretion is
made throughout his writings.

It is clear from his writ-

ings that the basic concept of confidentiality is essential
to the therapeutic process.
Although varying in theory and approach, other
major theorist-practitioners have followed Freud's lead in
finding an important place for confidentiality in psychotherapy.

Alfred Adler (1870-1937), an associate of Freud's

who later broke away from him viewed emotional problems in
a social context and developed a cognitive and educational
approach to psychotherapy.

In discussing his approach to

psychotherapy, Adler noted that the client must feel trusting enough to divulge private thoughts and implied a need
for confidentiality:
All cases of failure which we have seen involve a lack
of cooperation. Therefore cooperation between patient
and consultant, as the first, serious scientifically
conducted attempt to raise social interest, is of
paramount importance, and from the start all measures
should be taken to promote the cooperation of patients
with the consultant. Obviously, this is only possible
if the patient feels secure with the physician
(Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956, p. 341).
Adler

~lso

demanded confidentiality directly,

stating matter of factly and without further explanation
that" .•. the physician must promise and keep strictest
secrecy"

(Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956, p. 345).

His writings

indicate an assumption of privacy without any discussion or
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question that it will most certainly be present.

Like

Freud, Adler clearly stated a need for confidentiality for
successful psychotherapy, but did not elaborate or discuss
possible exceptions to the rule.
Carl Jung (1875-1961), another early associate of
Freud's who later came into some conflict with him, does
not address confidentiality as directly as Freud or Adler,
although his writings lea.ve the clear impression that he
assumed confidentiality in psychotherapy to be necessary
out of respect for the client and for the process to work.
Jung repeatedly noted the role of the psychotherapist as a person whom the client/patient must trust in
order for psychotherapy to work.

He stated that the "per-

sonal contact is of prime importance, because it is the
only safe basis from which to tackle the unconscious"
(1970, p. 97).

He believed that the recounting of a past

traumatic event was helpful at least partially because the
client/patient "does not stand alone with these elemental
powers, but some one whom he trusts reaches out a hand,
lending him moral strength to combat the tyranny of uncontrolled emotion"

(1975, p. 132). In another discussion he

stated, "The patient •.. can win his own inner security only
from the security of his relationship to the doctor as a
human being"

(1975, p. 116).

All of these statements point

to a view of trust and safety being essential in the therapeutic setting and the fact that the psychotherapist must
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set such an atmosphere.

Despite this, in his discussions

of theory and technique, Jung does not directly address the
issue of confidentiality.
Abraham Maslow (1908-1970), a theorist, teacher and
practitioner, like Jung, did not directly address the issue
of confidentiality in his writings on psychotherapy.
Maslow is generally viewed as representing humanistic
psychology.

With a more optimistic attitude than Freud,

Maslow viewed the basic inner nature of man as being good,
or at worst neutral, rather than bad, and stated that
people would profit from bringing this suppressed or
repressed material out and nurturing it so that it would
add to the happiness of their lives.
Maslow went on to describe psychoanalysis as an
"uncovering therapy" and noted that in psychotherapy, the
patient will continue to try to avoid becoming conscious of
painful truths and will actually " .•. fight the efforts of
the therapist to help us see the truth"
phenomena called resistance.

(1968, p. 60), the

Maslow stated that "All the

techniques of the therapist are in one way or another truth
revealing, or are ways of strengthening the patient so he
can L2ar the truth"

(1968, p. 60) and that "Self-knowledge

seems to be the major path of self-improvement, though not
the only one"

(p. 165).

Maslow recognized that the client needs to be able
to speak frankly and openly in psychotherapy and that it is
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the task of the therapist to help the client be more open,
but he did not directly address confidentiality as a way of
providing this help.
Harry Stack Sullivan's (1892-1949) theoretical
approach emphasized interpersonal relationships.

Sullivan

(1970) noted that the psychotherapist has a need for certain kinds of information about the client.

He stated that

the leaving out of thoughts or ideas by the client "may
cause the therapeutic process to miscarry"

(1970, p. 84).

He added that the client wants to talk frankly, but has
deeply ingrained cautions about doing so.

He discusses an

important aspect of the task of the psychotherapist as
being that of understanding the dynamics of the psychotherapist-client relationship and acting in a way that uses
this understanding to reduce anxiety (not suppress, repress
or totally alleviate as mild to moderate anxiety can be
educative) so that the client will be able to speak more
candidly.
Although Sullivan does not use Freud's concept of
the unconscious in discussing his therapeutic approach, he
is still very much aware of the fear, anxiety and

sh~me

that people may feel when discussing their behavior, thoughts
and experiences and how these feelings may interfere with
the process of psychotherapy.

With this awareness, he

addresses the concept of confidentiality in psychotherapy.
A person who consults anyone with the idea of estab-
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lishing a frank relationship with him has already
overcome some pretty heavy inhibitions laid down by
the culture.
If the interviewer then chooses to violate the confidential relation, he must be very skillful in doing it, and quite sure that he has adequate
cause for so doing (1970, p. 66).
As stated above, Sullivan believed confidentiality to be
necessary for psychotherapy, but he explicitly added that
the psychotherapist may come upon occasions when it is in
the client's best interest to breach confidentiality.
Carl Rogers (1902-19

) , who originated the non-

directive or client-centered approach to psychotherapy,
viewed the person-to-person relationship between the therapist and client as the significant element in the psychotherapeutic process.

He believed that a major task of the

therapist is to set an atmosphere of trust, acceptance
and unconditional positive regard.

He did not directly

address issues of confidentiality in his writings, but his
emphasis on the trusting therapeutic environment implied
a belief in discretion, except when the therapist has the
client's permission to have students observe or to record
psychotherapy sessions.

Rogers (1951), like Jung (1961),

seemed to assume that confidentiality was a part of the
therapeutic relationship, but did not address it directly.
The behaviorists have found confidentiality to be
an important issue in treating clients as more concern is
expressed about the privacy of a behavioral analysis.
describing his methods, Cautela (1977) states:
The client is assured that the information will be

In
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kept completely confidential and that even the secretary does not look at the files ..• Additionally they
are informed that six months following termination
case records will be destroyed unless otherwise requested (p. vii).
Cautela goes on to explain that the procedure for destroying records is based upon the assumption that should new
symptoms occur or old ones recur after successful therapy,
then a new behavioral analysis is needed.
This approach is used to help the client be more
frank in disclosing information of which he is conscious,
in contrast to the analytic rational of helping to explore
unconscious material.

Confidentiality is assumed by the

behaviorists for practical, common sense reasons.
Ellis (1973), the innovator of rational-emotive
therapy, stated that people want to talk about themselves
but are afraid to because of what others may think of them.
He noted that psychotherapy progresses when a person can
reveal "shameful" things to the therapist and believed
further progress occurs when the client also self-discloses
outside the therapy setting.

This opinion regarding the

importance of self-disclosure is similar to Jung's statements regarding secrets.

Like Jung, Ellis does not direct-

ly address confidentiality.
The issue of confidentiality is not addressed as an
important component of psychotherapy in the literature on
the Gestalt oriented approach, but is viewed as a necessity
during the initial stages of psychotherapy as many people

59

need, or at least want, the assurance of privacy (Polster &
Polster, 1973).
All of the major, traditional theorist-practitioners
surveyed, with the exception of Maslow who does not even
indirectly address the issue, suggest in their writings
that confidentiality is necessary for successful psychotherapy in that it sets a trusting environment where the
client can allow thoughts, images and feelings to emerge
from the unconscious for exploration and understanding
and/or where the client can freely explore the interpersonal relationship.
As the behavioral, rational-emotive and Gestalt
approaches of therapy all focus on conscious awareness and
behavior rather than the unconscious, confidentiality is
not viewed as so necessary for therapeutic reasons, but
more for practical reasons, i.e., so that clients will seek
therapy in the first place and so that they will be more
honest in the therapeutic setting.
Basic Texts and Manuals:

Psychotherapists, in

their training and practice, have traditionally assumed the
concept that confidentiality is a necessary component of
psychotherapy with little or no further discussion of the
topic.

This is demonstrated not only in the works of the

major theorist-practitioners noted above, but also in basic
texts and manuals on how to do psychotherapy.

Even though

a number of such works have been published since the in-
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crease in interest and legal intervention in confidentiality in psychotherapy, very few go beyond a simple statement regarding the importance of confidentiality.
For example, Bruch (1974), in a basic text titled
Learning Psychotherapy, stated:
The patient, when agreeing to such a conference, should
have the privilege of outlining which problems can be
taken up with a relative and of deciding what he considers definite "privileged communications" not to be
divulged to others (p. 41).
Bruch did not elaborate on any situations or laws that may
lead a psychotherapist to question whether there might be
an exception to absolute confidentiality.

She emphasized

that even the fact that a person is a client should not be
divulged.
Walberg (1977), in his extensive work, The Technique of Psychotherapy, stated:
It is usually advisable to explain to the patient that
any information revealed to the therapist is completely
confidential and will, under no circumstances, be divulged. This allays the patient's fear that the therapist will discuss him with others. The same reassurance may be given the patient about his case record,
and he may be told that it will not be released, even
to the patient's personal physician, without his permission (p. 508).
Walberg did not even refer to possible exceptions or legal
conflicts regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy.
Neuhaus and Astwood (1980) in a recent book on the
basic techniques and practical issues of psychotherapy also
emphasized the importance of confidentiality in the therapeutic relationship.

They stated:
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Maintaining and respecting confidentiality is nowhere
more crucial and mandatory that in a therapeutic relationship.
In our age where individual privacy is constantly threatened, invaded, and infringed upon by
society's mania for record keeping, psychotherapy
stands as one of the few professions that must maintain
the individual's confidences. For without trust between the therapist and patient little will be accomplished. The authors subscribe to the idea that no
information, which the patient has provided the therapist, can be divulged to anyone unless the patient
gives permission ... Therapists must, at all costs,
respect a person's confidences. To betray a confidence is a violation of trust. And such violations
will only impair the ability of the therapist to help
a suffering human being (p. 29).
Once again, no exceptions to absolute confidentiality but
patient permission were discussed.

Confidentiality was

assumed without further elaboration.
While most basic texts and manuals on psychotherapy
either do not mention confidentiality at all or make a
simple statement that it is necessary, a few texts mention
situations under which confidentiality cannot be guaranteed.
For example, Reid (1980), in a recent book on intensive
psychotherapy, noted that in cases of clear danger to the
client or others, it may be necessary to release information to others.

He added, "An understanding of the concept

of confidentiality and the circumstances under which infermation will be released should be reached during the first
session"

(p. 46).
Parry (1975), in a guide to basic psychotherapy,

listed several situations in which it may be necessary to
disclose information.

He stated that, although the thera-

pist should assure the client that information would be
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disclosed only under exceptional circumstances, "absolute
confidentiality cannot, and should not be guaranteed"

(p.

82) •

As with the major theorist-practitioners, most
basic texts and manuals on psychotherapy simply assume confidentiality to be present and necessary for successful
work to be accomplished.

Many basic books address the

issue directly, but do not discuss confidentiality or
possible exceptions in any depth.
Research Pertinent to Confidentiality:

Just as the

major theorist-practitioners seldom directly stated that
privacy was essential in psychotherapy or discussed the
concept of confidentiality, there is little or no research
that directly assesses the effect of privacy or a lack of
privacy on success in psychotherapy.

However, just as the

theorists implied a need for privacy in their therapeutic
rationale and techniques, there is some significant research that suggests that factors requiring an understanding of privacy in psychotherapy are important.
Recently, theorists and researchers have been
investigating self-disclosure and some have proposed that
self-disclosure is related to good mental health (Gorman,
1973; Hyink, 1975; Jourard, 1959, 1963; Keller, 1976; Mayo,
1968; Taylor, 1965).

Other studies have suggested that

self-disclosure is positively related to progress in psychotherapy (Braaten, 1958, as reported in Truax, 1961;
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Peres, 1947; Steele, 1948, as reported in Truax, 1961;
Tomlinson, 1959, as reported in Truax, 1961).

Some studies

have not found a consistent relationship between selfdisclosure and adjustment (Himelstein & Lubin, 1966;
Pedersen & Breglio, 1968; Stanley & Bownes, 1966), but
each of these studies used a self-report questionnaire as
the measure of self-disclosure.

Other studies (Burhenne

& Mirels, 1970; Himelstein & Kimbrough, 1963; Himelstein

& Lubin, 1965; Hurley & Hurley, 1969) have found no significant relationship between self-report questionnaires of
self-disclosure and actual self-disclosure in a variety of
settings.

These latter studies suggest that self-disclosure

questionnaires may not correlate with actual self-disclosure
in psychotherapy or other situations and may be inadequate
for exploring whether good adjustment is related to selfdisclosure.

The research data on self-disclosure, adjust-

ment and success in psychotherapy suggests that, as postulated by the major theorist-practitioners, self-disclosure
is a necessary and beneficial part of the psychotherapeutic
process.
In addition, a number of situational factors or
conditions, including the characteristics of the person to
whom a self-disclosure is made

(Hime~stein

& Lubin, 1966;

Jourard, 1959a; Jourard & Lasakow, 1958), reciprocity of
self-disclosure (Chittick & Himelstein, 1967), perceived
liking of and/or similarity to the target person (Cozby,
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1972; Fitzgerald, 1963; Gitter & Black, 1976; Halverson &
Shore, 1969; Jourard, 1959b; Jourard & Lasakow, 1958) and
privacy (Derlega, Chaikin & Easterling, 1973, as reviewed
in Strassburg, Roback, D'Antonio & Gabel, 1977; Holahan &
Slaiken, 1977), all affect self-disclosure.

These studies

suggest that situational factors may be very influential in
self-disclosure.
Although the research on the relationship between
privacy, self-disclosure and success in psychotherapy is
sparse, it appears that greater self-disclosure takes place
under conditions of greater privacy (e.g., Holahan &
Slaiken, 1977).

Confidentiality is a way of assuring

greater privacy in psychotherapy.

It logically follows

that this should increase self-disclosure and frankness,
leading to progress in psychotherapy.
Codes of Ethics:

In exploring the psychothera-

peutic perspective on confidentiality it is important to
examine the standards or codes of ethics that psychotherapists have set for themselves.

Psychiatrists find the

origin of their code of ethics in the Oath of Hippocrates
(about 400 B.C.) which stated, among other things:
Whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of
men, in my attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom which ought not to be noised abroad, I will keep
silence thereon, counting such things to be sacred
secrets (as quoted in DeWitt, 1958, p. 23).
Social workers explored the concept of a code of
ethics at their national meetings in the 1920's, but the

65
national association did not finally adopt a code of ethics
until 1951.

It stated, in part:

The American Association of Social Workers believes
that the social worker should:
Respect and safeguard the rights of persons served to
privacy in their contacts with the agency, and to confidential and responsible use of the information they
give (as quoted in Alves, 1959, p. 113).
Psychologists adopted their first code of ethics,
Ethical Standards of Psychologists, just one year after
social workers, in 1952.

The American Psychological Asso-

ciation (APA) had been formally working on the development
of a code of· ethics since 1957 when the Committee for Ethical Standards for Psychologists was established.

This com-

mittee elected to formulate a code of ethics based on the
conflicts and difficulties that psychologists had actually
experienced rather than based simply on what mature professionals believed a code of ethics should say.

In accom-

plishing this task, the committee solicited the 7,500 members of the APA and requested that they submit descriptions
of actual ethical problem situations which they had encountered.

Principles were drawn up to cover the actual

incidents submitted and in 1950, a tentative code was published.

After review and revision, the final draft of the

code was adopted in 1952.

The first code was viewed as too

complex and lengthy (171 pages, 106 general principles) and
has had two major revisions so that it is presently reduced to nine general principles that are described in an
eight page pamphlet.
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Principle 5 addresses the issue of confidentiality
and states:
Safeguarding information about an individual that has
been obtained by the psychologist in the course of his
teaching, practice, or investigation is a primary obligation of the psychologist. Such information is not
communicated to others unless certain important conditions are not [sic] met (American Psychological
Association, 1979, p. 2).
This is followed by further explanation which specifies
that information is only revealed when there is a ffclear
and imminent danger to an individual or to

s01~iety,

and

then only to appropriate professional workers or public
authorities"

(p. 2).

Under Principle 5, the code also

addresses issues of the handling of professional and/or
evaluative reports, disguising the identity of clients for
the purpose of classroom teaching, the handling of communications from other professionals, the confidentiality of
identities of research subjects and provisions for the
ultimate disposition of confidential records.
The approach of psychologists used in the development of their code of ethics sharply contrasts with the
approach of moral philosophers and theologians.

Moralists

take the principles of natural law and apply them to situations in coming to a decision as to what is proper or
improper.

Psychologists approached decision making in an

almost opposite manner by using an empirical and inductive
approach.

Psychologists took actual incidents and situa-

tions, and formulated principles that would address these
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situations and assist the individual psychologist in making
a decision when similar situations were encountered.
The Ethical Standards of Psychologists (1979) differs from recent laws regarding confidentiality as the former
was written with the intention of allowing latitude for differing situations and professional judgment.

It was intended

to be specific enough to provide adequate and meaningful
guidelines for psychologists, but general enough to avoid
regimentation.

Recent laws regarding confidentiality, as

well can be seen in the following sections, attempt to
address every situation possible and allow little room for
professional judgment.
Confidentiality -

~

Legal Perspective:

Privacy

The right to privacy is a relatively recent legal
issue in the common law.

An article by Warren and Brandeis

titled "The Right to Privacy", published in 1890, is the
first clear formulation of the subject and is considered a
milestone in legal history.

Warren and Brandeis stated

that political, social and economic changes with the advancement of civilization have led to the recognition of
new rights involving man's emotions, sensations and intellect.

They describe how the concept of "the right to

life", once meaning only the protection of one's body, has
grown to mean "the right to enjoy life, --the right to be
let alone"

(p. 289-90).

This chapter reviews the legal

highlights of the right to privacy as they relate to con-
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fidentiality in psychotherapy.
In the last twenty years, the right to privacy has
been a legal issue in a number of different types of cases
including the use of contraceptives
abortion (People

~

(Griswold~

Belous, 1969; Babbitz

Conn., 1965),

~McCann,

1970),

early Sunday morning investigations of beneficiaries receiving Aid to Dependent Children (Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, 1967), publicity regarding debts (Tollefson

~Price,

1967) and investigations of private citizens by corporations
(Nader v. General Motors Corporation, 1969).
The word "private" is derived from the Latin "privatus", meaning "belonging to oneself, not to the state"
(Webster, 1970, p. 1131).

This definition has generally

held so that the "right to privacy", in the legal sense, is
frequently used to refer to "a sphere of personal autonomy
which is protected from governmental interference"
1976, p. 1).

(Morrow,

It is also used to refer to aspects of per-

sonal autonomy not necessarily related to the state.
Reubhausen and Brim (1965) stated:
The essence of privacy is no more, and certainly no
less, than the freedom of the individual to pick and
choose for himself the time and circumstances under
which, and most importantly, the extent to which, his
attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are to be
shared with or withheld from others {p. 1189) .
This definition is most appropriate when examining the
issue of privacy as related to psychotherapy.
Tort Law:

Warren and Brandeis took the first step

in legal history by proposing privacy as a right under
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common law that serves to protect the individual.

Prosser

(1960), a highly esteemed professor of tort law, went a step
further and divided privacy into four distinct and loosely
related torts, i.e., he stated that there are four different kinds of wrongful acts involving privacy, which are:
1.

Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.

2.

Public disclosure of embarassing private facts
about the plaintiff.

3.

Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye.

4.

Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage,
the plaintiff's name or likeness.
(p.

389)

The latter two torts are primarily concerned with issues
related to slander, libel, defamation of character and advertising and are not relevant to the present discussion.
Prosser's first privacy tort, hereafter referred to
as the privacy-intrusion tort, is generally concerned with
being searched and/or observed.

The issues involved may

range from the use of elaborate electronic surveillance to
Peeping Toms and includes such acts as harassing a person
who owes you money or simple eavesdropping.

The privacy-

intrustion tort is pertinent in regards to the providing of
mental health care in a number of regards, e.g., a health
insurance company's request for more explicit information
regarding a patient's treatment and illness, the observation of interviews and/or therapy sessions by students and
the sharing of information involved in the team approach
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may all be construed as an intrusion on one's privacy.
Prosser's second privacy tort, referred to here as
privacy-disclosure, is self explanatory and is probably the
most pertinent tort regarding privacy in receiving mental
health care.

Prosser adds some criteria that must be met

for there to be a privacy-disclosure tort, including:

(1)

the disclosure must be public and not private (therefore
telling the details about a client's case at a small cocktail party would not be a tort),

(2) the facts related must

be private (therefore, the fact that a person has appointments at a mental health center, the dates of the appointments and the number of appointments would not be protected
from disclosure as these occurrences would be considered
public acts), and (3) the matter made public must be of a
nature that would be "offensive and objectionable to a
reasonable man"

(p. 396).

Obviously, these criteria,

serving as a guide to issues of privacy, would not offer
sufficient common law legal recourse to the patient who
feels that confidentiality in the therapy setting has been
betrayed.
A secondary weakness involved in the common law
tort approach to the right to privacy is that not all
states have accepted the right to privacy as common law.
At a time when many states had already established the
right to privacy by statute, one case, Yoeckel

~

Samonig

(1956), offers an example of the inconsistency of this
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concept from state to state and the ludicrous results that
can occur when the court decides to follow the letter of
the law.

In Yoeckel v. Samonig, a woman was photographed

while using the ladies' room in a public tavern and the
picture was openly shown to other customers.

The Supreme

Court of Wisconsin dismissed the woman's complaint as an
earlier state Supreme Court ruling (Judewine

~

Benzies

Montanye Fuel and Warehouse Company, 1936) stated that
there was no common law right to privacy and that it was
not the responsibility of the court, but of the legislature
in the form of statutes, if it chose, to create a right to
privacy.

In the twenty years between these two decisions,

bills proposing a right to privacy had been defeated in the
Wisconsin legislature (Hofstaeder and Horowitz, 1964),
giving the courts sufficient reason to uphold the earlier
Judewine decision.
Regardless of the correctness of the reasoning that
the court used to arrive at their decision in Yoeckel v.
Samonig, the defendant's behavior is clearly a violation of
the privacy-intrusion tort and there was adequate basis,
using the decisions of courts in other states, for arriving
at the opposite conclusion.
Constitutional Law:

An alternative to the proposal

of a common law basis for the right to privacy is the argument of a constitutional basis to this right.

The right to

privacy is not explicitly stated in the U.S. Constitution.
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However, several amendments imply a right to privacy, and
it is frequently claimed as a "constitutional right".
The First Amendment right to free speech and assembly has been interpreted to mean that a person has the
right to "association privacy"

(Morrow, 1976, p. 2) in that

it has been found unconstitutional to require that private
associations reveal names of their members (NAACP
bama., 1958).

~

Ala-

It was thought that such forced revelations

would indirectly infringe on free expression, especially
when as association is advocating unpopular beliefs and
that "privacy in one's associations is indispensable to
freedom of association"

(Morrow, 1976, p. 2).

The Third Amendment provides a limited protection
of the privacy of one's home by forbidding the quartering
of soldiers in homes.

The Fourth Amendment protect.s th1:=

individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, but
allows searches when there is a warrant, probable cause, or
in the case of census questionnaires, when there is a
reasonable relation to governmental purposes and functions.
The Fifth Amendment protects disclosure-privacy in that
individuals cannot be required to provide testimony for use
in their own criminal prosecution; however, when information is not incriminating, its disclosure is not protected.
Written records kept by an individual, whether incriminating or not, are not subject to protection under the Fifth
Amendment.
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The Fourteenth Amendment is probably the most
heavily relied upon in cases concerning the right to privacy.

In Roe

~

Wade (1973) the Supreme Court found the

right to privacy in certain areas to be implicit in the
concept of personal liberty as guaranteed in the Fourteenth
Amendment.

This case involved the desire of a pregnant,

single woman to obtain an abortion at a time when Texas
state statutes forbade such acts unless the life of the
mother was in danger.

The concept of personal liberty

certainly seems involved in terms of the right to make this
choice, but the concept of privacy seems to be thrown in as
an attempt by the court to justify what was perhaps an
unpopular decision.

This impression is supported by the

fact that the Supreme Court, in previous cases, had rebuked
the too free and liberal use of the concept of personal
liberty.
As an additional argument that the right to privacy
may be construed to be implied in the constitution, the
Ninth Amendment states, "The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
There are numerous cases cited in the legal literature claiming a right to privacy or having been decided on
such a constitutional right (several making questionable
judicious use of the concept of the right to privacy).
This paper will focus on those cases most directly related

74
to medical and psychiatric care.
One startling, because it occurred so recently, and
oft cited case is Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

in which

the Acting Director of a Planned Parenthood Center and a
physician were found guilty, respectively, of giving advice
to married women regarding methods of contraception and
prescribing contraceptives.

The state laws which the

Acting Director and physician were to have broken were
passed in 1879 and read as follows:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year
or be both fined and imprisoned (sec. 53-32).
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires
or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender
(sec. 54-196, General Statutes of Conn., as reported in
Mayer, 1972, p. 40).
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the guilty verdict of the
Connecticut court in 1965 on the basis that such a law
interfered with the privacy and sanctity of the marital
relationship, and therefore personal liberty, of the individual citizen.

The right to privacy in this case is more

obviously abused than in Roe

~

Wade, especially when one

considers the intrusions of privacy that would be necessary
to try to enforce a law against the use of contraceptives.
In cases directly related to privacy of the physicianpatient relationship, the courts have included it as one of
those areas of privacy implied in and protected by the
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constitution, but only insofar as the government does not
have sufficient justification to obtain information.
Doe

~

In

Bolton (1973), a case challenging the New York

Controlled Substances Act which required that the names of
patients prescribed certain drugs be given to the State
Department of Public Health, it was found that the state
did not show just cause for obtaining this information.
However, in Schulman v. New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation (1975), the New York Court of Appeals ruled
that the state had a compelling interest in obtaining the
names and addresses of abortion patients so that adequate
monitoring of city abortion facilities could be accomplished, presumably through random inquiries of those who
had used the services.

In both cases, the court's "assumed

that disclosure privacy has constitutional protection, but
reached different results"

(Morrow, 1976, p. 4).

With respect to how these decisions affect confidentiality in psychotherapy, one would assume that it would
depend on how adequately the state was able to convince the
judiciary as to its compelling interest in obtaining certain information.

If the state convinced the judiciary

that it had just cause to keep a listing of all persons
seeking mental health care, their diagnosis and their
personal problems, there would be no constitutional protection of privacy in this matter.

It comes down to a

definition of "just cause'', which depends upon statute,
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legal precedent and the individual judge making the decision.

Whereas the courts and legislatures may want to

avoid too specific of a definition of what is and is not
private so that unwise precedent is not set for future,
unanticipated situations, the legislature, in the judgment
of many, has the responsibility to establish some guidelines so that, as Morrow (1976) states, "decisions need not
depend on the predilections of individual judges"
Illinois Law:

(p. 6).

In the Constitution of the State of

Illinois, effective July 1, 1971, the sixth section of the
Bill of Rights briefly states the right against "invasions
of privacy".

The first statute related to the privacy of

the psychotherapist-client relationship in Illinois was a
general physician-surgeon statute enacted in 1959 which
prohibited the disclosure of information learned in a
professional capacity except in trials of homicide, malpractice suits, personal injury suits, civil suits involving insurance policies where physical or mental condition
was in issue, will contests, trials of abortion, reports of
child abuse or when the patient expressly consented to
disclosure (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1977, ch. 51, sec.
5.1; see Appendix A for a copy of this law).

This law

served to protect against a breach of confidentialtiy only
in cases where the psychotherapist was a physician and did
not include any consequences of such a breach, such as
termination of license or possible criminal prosecution.
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Additional legislation providing a psychiatrist-patient
privilege, with three exceptions (a fourth exception was
added in 1971), was enacted in 1963 (Illinois Revised
Statutes, ch. 51, sec. 5.2; see Appendix A for a copy of
this law) .
Ths Psychologist Registration Act of 1963 included
a provision that psychologists could not disclose information learned in a professional capacity except in trials of
homicide where disclosure related directly to the facts or
circumstances, in proceedings to determine mental capacity
or where a defense of mental incapacity was raised, in
malpractice suits against the psychologist, in will contests or when the client had expressly consented to the
release of information (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1977,
ch. 111, sec. 5306; formerly ch. 91 1/2, sec. 406; see
Appendix A for a copy of this law) .

The Abused and Neg-

lected Child Reporting Act of 1975 provided for an additional
exception.

The Psychologist Registration Act states that

the ''violation of any provision of this Act" may be grounds
to suspend or revoke any certificate of registration,
adding a potential consequence for the breach of confiden~iality.

The Social Worker's Registration Act of 1967 provides an even stronger consequence for a breach of confidentiality (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1977, ch. 111, sec.
6324; formerly ch. 23, sec. 5320; see Appendix A for a ccpy
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of this law) .

This act states that a social worker may not

disclose information learned in a professional capacity
except to his employer, in a criminal trial where disclosure relates directly to the facts or circumstances of
the crime, in malpractice suits or with written consent of
the client and adds that the violation of any of the provisions of the Act constitutes a Class B misdemeanor.
All of the above statutes regarding confidentiality
with specific professions have been amended by the Illinois
Mental Heath and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality
Act which went into effect January 1, 1979 (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1979, ch. 91 1/2, sec. 801).
reproduced in its entirety in Appendix A.

This act is

This act defines

"therapist" as:
A psychiatrist, physician, psychologist, social
worker, or nurse providing mental health or developmental disabilities services or any other person not
prohibited by law from providing such service or from
holding himself out as a therapist if the recipient
(of services] reasonably believes that such person is
permitted to do so (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1979,
p. 1489).
Thus, although the individual professions may maintain an
additional statement on confidentiality in their respective
acts of registration, the Confidentiality Act is the authoritative law for all mental health professionals and, as
such, provides guidelines and consequences that are the
same for all psychotherapists.

This consistency across

professions aids in the understanding and implementation of
the law.
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The Illinois Confidentiality Act delineates numerous exceptions to absolute confidentiality in psychotherapy.

The situations in which information may be disclosed

according to the Act include:
(1)

an unlimited disclosure of "any and all confidential
communications and records'' when there is a general
consent for the release of information to insurance
companies that are evaluating an application for a
policy or a claim on a policy;

(2)

a limited disclosure to enable a person to apply for
and receive benefits;

(3)

an examination of records, from which personally identifiable data have been removed, for the purposes of
funding, accreditation, audit, licensure, statistical
compilation, research, evaluation or similar purposes;

(4}

an investigation by a regional human rights authority
of the Guardianship and Mental Health Advocacy Commission;

(5)

when the purpose of disclosure is for supervision,
case consultation, peer review, clerical maintenance
of the record, or therapist consultation of an attorney;

(6)

when the client introduces, in civil or administrative
proceeding, his/her mental condition or any

aspe~t

of

the mental health care services received;
(7)

certain civil proceedings following a recipient's death;
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(8)

a malpractice suit;

(9)

a court ordered examination or treatment ordered to
render a client fit to stand trial;

(10) the determination of competency or need for guardianship;
(11) a civil or administrative proceeding involving the
validity of insurance benefits;
(12) when an action is brought to a matter under this Act;
(13) child neglect or abuse;
(14) in order to initiate or continue civil commitment proceedings;
(15) in order to provide emergency medical care to a recipient;
(16) to protect the client or ther person against a clear,
imminent risk of serious physical or mental injury or
disease or death;
(17)

limited disclosure when the United States Secret Service requests information about a specific client and
it is determined that this information is necessary
to protect the life of a person under Secret Service
protection;

(18)

limited disclosure to the Department of Law Enforcement as to whether applicants for a Firearm Owners
Identification Card have had a psychiatric hospitalization in recent years;

(19) when a recipient of mental health care or his/her
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guardian gives written consent as specified in the
Act.
Throughout each exception of the Confidentiality
Act, it is repeatedly emphasized that only that information
which is directly relevant to the purpose for which it is
disclosed should be released.

Several of the disclosures

limit the kind of information to be released to the fact
that a person received mental health care, the type of
treatment and the date of such treatment.

In several

places, especially when a civil or administrative proceeding is involved, the code suggests how confidential
communications may be examined by the court in order to
determine what is appropriate and relevant for disclosure.
The Illinois Confidentiality Act states that "any
person who knowingly and willfully violates any provision
of this Act is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor", therefore
adding some strength and motivation for following the law
strictly.

Under Illinois law, Class A is the most serious

misdemeanor and is punishable by a prison sentence of up to
one year and/or a fine not to exceed $1,000.
Since the Illinois Confidentiality Act went into
effect, there have been numerous attempts to modify and
change it.

One example of an amendment proposed in 1980

(HB 2960) requires the disclosure of the location of a
person receiving mental health care to any peace officer
requesting the information if an arrest warrant has been
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issued for that person.
Another recently proposed amendment (SB 1453)
requires that psychotherapists, who determine that a client
is a probable danger to a third party, inform such third
party of the danger and be civilly liable for any injuries
incurred should they fail to do so.

The Confidentiality

Act currently allows psychotherapists to use professional
judgment in this regard and states:
Records and communications may be disclosed ... when,
and to the extent, a therapist, in his sole discretion, determines that such disclosure is necessary to
initiate or continue commitment proceedings under the
law of this State or to otherwise protect the recipient or other person against a clear, imminent risk
of serious physical or mental injury or disease or
death (p. 1492).
The proposed amendment would require such disclosure without allowing for professional judgment and because of this
rigidity is likely to die in the Senate Rules Committee.
Tarasoff
California:

~

The Regents of the University of

The case that set a precedent for the above

proposed amendment is that of Tarasoff
the University of California (1976).

~

The Regents of

In this case, a suit

was brought against the university regents, psychotherapists and campus police for negligence that resulted in the
murder of Tatiana Tarasoff by a psychiatric patient.
Reportedly, two months prior to her murder, Prosengit
Poddar had seen a psychologist employed by the University
and informed him of his intent to kill Ms. Tarasoff when
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she returned to he United States from a trip abroad.

The

psychologist took Poddar seriously enough to contact the
campus police in order to initiate the psychiatric commitment of Poddar.

The police released Poddar after they

concluded that he was adequately rational.

The psycho-

logist's supervisor then stepped in and directed that no
further action be taken and that records of the action that
was taken thus far be destroyed.

Neither Ms. Tarasoff nor

her family were notified of Poddar's threat.
Ms. Tarasoff's family sued after the murder on the
basis that the University, the psychotherapist and the
campus police were negligent in their duty to use reasonable care to protect an intended victim against danger.
The court found that no cause of action could be taken
against the psychotherapist for failure to have Poddar
committed as a state statute expressly protects public
employees from liability for "any injury resulting from
determining in accordance with any applicable enactment
whether to confine a person for mental illness"

(Government

Code, sec. 856 as quoted in Tarasoff, 1976, p. 351).
However, the majority opinion of the court was that
the Tarasoff family did have a cause of action against the
therapist as the therapist had found Poddar to be a danger
to Ms. Tarasoff, but had "failed to exercise reasonable
care to protect her from danger"

(Tarasoff, 1976, p. 353)

in that no warning of the potential danger to Ms. Tarasoff
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was given to her or her family.
The thinking of the court was based on earlier
cases, not involving psychotherapists, that concluded that
when a special relationship exists, there is a responsibility to use ordinary care and skill in order to prevent
the occurrence of foreseeable harm.

These cases include

situations in which a cause of action was upheld when
parents failed to warn a babysitter of the violent proclivities of their child, when the State failed to warn
foster parents of the dangerous tendencies of their ward,
and when a doctor, after diagnosing a contagious disease,
failed to warn members of the patient's family.
The court concluded:
In our view, however, once a therapist does in fact
determine, or under applicable professional standards
reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses
a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable
victim of that danger (p. 345).
The defense argued that communications between a
potentially violent client and the therapist must be kept
confidential if violent-prone persons are not to be deterred
from seeking psychotherapy.

The defense noted that the

legislature had recognized that disclosing confidences
impairs effective treatment of emotional disturbance, and
thus is contrary to the best interest of society; therefore, the legislature enacted statutes to protect the confidentiality of psychotherapy.
The court responded that one must weigh the public
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interest of supporting effective treatment of emotional
disturbance, protecting the rights of patients to privacy
and the importance of safeguarding confidential communications against the public interest and safety from violent
assaults.

They stated:

We conclude that the public policy favoring protection
of the confidential character of the patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to
which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others.
The protective privilege ends where the public peril
begins (p. 347).
The Tarasoff decision has resulted in proposals for
new laws and additional court cases based on the same or a
similar premise.

A case in which an action was brought

following Tarasoff involved parents suing a psychiatrist
for negligence as he did not inform them that their daughter
was suicidal and she ultimately killed herself (Bellah v.
Greenson, 1977).

The plaintiffs in this case cited Tara-

so££ in support of their cause of action; however the court
noted that Tarasoff specifically addressed the issue of a
duty when there is a danger to a third party and ruled that
the psychotherapist does not have a similar duty, at least
for which he can be held liable, when the person intends to
injury him/ herself.

The court held that in inflicting

injury to oneself, society's interest in confidentiality in
psychotherapy was not sufficiently counterbalanced so that
there should be a breach of confidentiality.
Confidentiality - Legal Cases:

Most cases that

have come before the court regarding confidentiality in
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psychotherapy relate to the issue of whether psychotherapy
communications are privileged, i.e., whether they can be
used as evidence in a legal proceeding.

Very few cases

relate to the issue of privacy of psychotherapy outside of
privileged communications or when the client is dangerous
to himself or others.
One that does is Doe

~Roe

(1973).

In this case,

an action was filed by a client of a psychiatrist to prevent publication of a book of her case history in which,
although her name was disguised, information such as approximate age, religious affiliation, schools attended, profession and interest were not changed.

The client was a

social worker by profession and felt that she would be
readily identified.

The psychiatrist claimed the client

had given consent to the publication of the case history
eleven years previous, when she was still in psychotherapy,
and that the book would advance scientific knowledge.

The

court found this prior consent to be inadequate as the
client was still in psychotherapy and therefore may have
been subject to unspoken pressures, if in fact this consent
did exist, and indicated that the psychiatrist's commercial
advertising of the book contradicted her claims of advancing scientific knowledge.

The Supreme Court of New York

ruled that the plaintiff had sufficient cause for a preliminary injunction to prevent publication and distribution
of the book.

The court stated that, although they were not
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urging a common law right to privacy, every patient, and
particularly those in psychotherapy, has the right to
expect privacy (Stecher, 1977).
Another mental health privacy case of a vastly
different nature involves the monitoring of the quality of
mental health care.
pital, Inc.

In Carey v. Affiliated Mid-West Hos-

(1977), a case originating in the circuit court

of Cook County, Illinois, the State's Attorney's office
sought access to the names and addresses of former patients
at Chicago Lakeshore Hospital and insurance billings of
these patients in order for the Grand Jury to investigate
charges regarding the quality of care that patients received and possible violations of the Insurance Code.

The

State's Attorney wanted the names and addresses of former
patients so that they could be contacted and asked about
the quality of care they received while in Chicago Lakeshore Hospital.

Records of insurance billings (which

includes psychiatric diagnoses) would allow an evaluation
of whether patients were hospitalized for inordinately long
lengths of times for the purpose of "milking" the health
insurance companies.
Attorneys representing two former patients of
Chicago Lakeshore Hospital and a psychiatrist who saw
patients at the hospital filed a petition to quash a subpoena for the above information.

They stated that the

release of such information would be a gross violation of
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the right to seek psychiatric care in private.

John Doe,

one of the patients, is quoted as saying, "When I went in
[Chicago Lakeshore Hospital], I had two main concerns; One,
naturally, was to get well.

The other, and almost as

important, was that no one find out that I was there"
(Chicago Tribune, Oct. 2, 1977, p. 5).

Several other

former patients contacted the Chicago Tribune and stated
that, if they had experienced any abuse by their doctors or
the hospital, they were quite capable of reporting it
themselves.
The petitioners did not argue against the responsibility of society to see that patient abuse and/or insurance fraud do not occur and offered several alternative
methods of conducting the investigation without infringing
on the right to privacy in the psychiatrist-patient relationship, including,

(1) having the hospital write all

former patients, inform them of the investigation, and
advise them to contact the State's Attorney's office if
they wished,

(2) interviewing past and present employees

regarding hospital care and practices, and (3) conferring
with investigators from the Department of Public Health and
the Chicago Board of Health, two agencies already entrusted
by the law to investigate patient abuse in mental health
facilities.
The Circuit Court of Cook County sustained the motion to quash the subpoena.

The State's Attorney took the
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case to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District.

The

Appellate Court dismissed the case, meaning that the State's
Attorney's office was unable to gain access to the hospital records through a subpoena.
This author was able to locate very few cases where
either a client had sued for a breach of confidentiality or
where confidentiality, rather than privileged communication
was a significant issue.

It should be noted that, in

general, only cases that are appealed to a higher court are
reported in the legal literature.

Even those cases appealed

may not be reported if they do not represent a new or
different interpretation of the law or a reaffirmation of a
rather significant point of law.
~Affiliated

tion on Carey

For

exw~ple,

the informa-

Hid-West Hospital, Inc.

(1977)

was obtained through a newspaper story and the Illinois
Association of Community Mental Health Agencies.

This

-

author could find no summary or discussion of this case in
the legal literature.
One reason for the lack of cases regarding confidentiality may be that, once'clients have informed their
psychotherapists that they have learned of a breach of confidentiality and that they are displeased with it, unless
the psychotherapists persist in divulging information, the
clients would probably draw more attention to those very
facts or items that they want kept private by suing in a
court of law than by remaining silent.
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Summary:

The law regarding the privacy of psycho-

therapy is still in the making.

Recent trends by legis-

latures and the courts have been toward greater awareness
of the role of confidentiality in the therapeutic relationship, resulting in strict laws of confidentiality, but.with
a large number of carefully delineated exceptions.

With so

many exceptions, one wonders whether or not the privacy of
psychotherapy has any real protection under the law.

The

laws would appear to protect clients from the unscrupulous,
gossiping psychotherapist, but in other situations the
legislature has allowed much leeway for individual judges
to make decisions regarding confidentiality.

The legis-

lature has not allowed mental health professionals the same
degree of professional judgment.
There is continuous legislative and court activity
as to the validity of the exceptions to absolute confidentiality.

It will take careful monitoring by mental health

care professionals to see that the exceptions to confidentiality are not increased, stretched or abused so as to
make the concept legally meaningless and at the same time
not make the laws of confidentiality so rigid as to not
allow room for professional, moral and ethical judgment.
Confidentiality - A Legal Perspective:

Privileged Communi-

cation
The previous section focused on the legal development of the general concept of privacy in psychotherapy.
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This section focuses on one specific aspect of privacy in
psychotherapy, privileged communication.

Privileged com-

munication refers to those communications that are protected from use as evidence in a legal proceeding.

Priv-

ileged communication is put into a separate section from
privacy in psychotherapy as it represents the area under
which there is likely to be the most public attention and
conflict between the right of the individual to confidentiality in psychotherapy and the right or need for society
to have certain information.

It thus involves many issues

in addition to the individual's everyday right to privacy.
History of Privileged Communication:

Privileged

communication was not formulated as a concept under common
law until the 16th century because prior to that time, no
person could be required to testify in a court of law.
Soon after the enactment of the law requiring all persons
to testify as ordered by a court, the attorney-client
privilege, the oldest of the privileged relationships, was
accepted into common law.

Cases in the latter part of the

16th century prohibited an attorney from testifying as a
witness, unless he had his client's consent.

DeWitt (1958)

notes that:
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage the employment of professional advisors by persons in need of
their services and to promote absolute freedom of consultation by removing all fear on the part of the client that his attorney may be compelled to disclose in
court the communications made to, or the information
acquired by, him in the course of his professional
employment (p.7).
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This attorney-client privilege is generally accepted as
common law and is protected by statute, as well, in nearly
every state.
Confidential communications between a clergyman or
priest and a parishioner are not considered privileged
communications under common law and thus are only protected
from disclosure in a legal proceeding by virtue of custom
and/or statute.

One reason offered to explain why communi-

cations in the attorney-client relationship were privileged, but not those in the clergyman-parishioner relationship, is that there was conflict between the Roman
Catholic and the Anglican churches in England.
Catholic church considered priest-penitent

The Roman

co~~unications

to be absolutely confidential and priests frequently refused to testify regarding their parishioners.
can church was not so strict in this regard.

The AngliIt was gen-

erally considered that clergyman-parishioner privilege
would show support for the Roman Catholic church and this
was thus avoided.

Roman Catholic priests still refused to

testify or report what they heard in confession to authorities.
One of the first court cases involving the issue of
privileged communication was the trial of Father Garnett, a
Jesuit priest, who had been aware of a conspiracy known as
the Gun Powder Plot, against King James and the members of
Parliament in the early 1600's.

He had learned of thj.s
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plot when hearing the confession of one of the conspirators
and had not reported it to the authorities, thereafter
being implicated as being a party to the treasonous plans.
His defense was that he was bound by moral law not to
disclose what he had learned from a penitent in confession.
The judges found the act of the crime so immoral that they
refused to accept a defense based on morality and Father
Garnett was hanged (Stern, 1959).
Today the clergyman-parishioner relationship is
generally accepted as privileged in the United States.
Most of the states have statutes providing for this privilege.

Those states that do not have such statutes have

generally accepted the clergyman-parishioner privilege by
custom.
The physician-patient relationship, like that of
the clergyman-parishioner relationship, is not accepted as
privileged under common law.

The first recorded court case

in which the issue of privileged communication was raised
in regard to the physician-patient relationship was the
trial of the Duchess of Kingston in 1776.

She had been

placed on trial for bigamy and when her physician was
quebtioned, he had replied, "I do not know how far anything
that has come before me in confidential trust in my profession should be discussed consistent with my professional
honor"

(Stern, 1959, p. 1074).

In response, the judge

ruled that it was indeed indiscrete to disclose secrets
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learned in a professional capacity in most circumstances,
but not when called to do so in a court of justice.
The question has frequently arisen as to why privilege is considered necessary for communications in the
attorney-client relationship but not in the physicianpatient relationship.

Some have pointed out that, after

all, many legislators and most judges are trained as attorneys and they are the ones who make this decision.

DeWitt

(1958) cites other authors who point out that the attorneyclient privilege is intended to aid in the administration
of justice, and that, although inviolable secrecy of communications between physician and patient may be in the
interest of good and reliable medical care, it is not
necessary in the interest of justice.

He notes that most

statutes in court cases regarding the physician-patient
privilege see its primary purpose as:
To envoke and encourage the utmost confidence between
the patient and his physician and to preserve inviolate, so that the patient will freely and frankly reveal to his physician all the facts, circumstances,
and symptoms of his malady or injury, or lay bear his
body for examination, and thus enable his physician
to make a correct diagnosis of his condition and treat
him more safely and efficaciously (p. 27).
There has been much controversy as to whether or
not this is adequate cause for a physician-patient privilege.

Wigmore, renowned for his monumental work on the

laws of evidence, was strongly opposed to the physicianpatient privilege.

He stated that the following funda-

mental conditions must be present before communication may
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be considered to have privileged status:
1)

The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed.

2)

The element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties.

3)

The relation must be one which in the opinion of
the community ought to be sedulously fostered.

4)

The injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
(1940, p. 527)

Wigmore viewed the physician-patient relationship as meeting only the criteria that the relationship should be
encouraged.

He noted that people have sought medical care

for years without the privilege and he saw nothing to be
gained and much to be lost, in terms of truth and justice,
if a physician-patient privilege was established.
During Wigmore's time privilege in psychotherapy
was not examined as a legal issue distinct from the physician-patient relationship.

He has been deceased for more

than thirty years, and since his death, the practice of
psychotherapy has grown and privilge in the psychotherapeutic relationship has been presented as a separate legal
isssue.

Although Wigmore would not doubt still oppose a

general physician-patient privilege, others have found the
psychotherapist-patient relationship as meeting the criteria
he set for privilege to exist.
Numerous states have enacted statutes providing for
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privilege in the physician-patient relationship.

In 1828,

New York became the first state to establish the physicianpatient privilege by statute.

It stated simply that:

No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery shall be allowed to disclose any information
which he may have acquired in attending any patient,
in a professional character, and which information
was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such
patients as a physician, or to do any act for him,
as a surgeon (New York Revised Statutes, 1828, as
quoted by DeWitt, 1958, p. 15-16).
Most states have since enacted statutes granting the physician-patient privilege, but there is considerable variation between states.

The statutes provide for a number of

different kinds of exceptions, and each state varies in the
particular exceptions that it provides.
Lifschutz:

A case which challenges these excep-

tions and raises several constitutional and therapeutic
questions regarding confidentiality and privileged communication in psychotherapy is that of Lifschutz (1970) .

In

this case, a man sued for damages in compensation for
physical injuries, pain and suffering, and severe emotional
stress as a result of an alleged assault.

The plaintiff

stated that he had received psychiatric treatment from Dr.
Lifschutz about ten years earlier.

Lifschutz was called in

for a deposition and refused to give any information, even
refusing to state whether or not the plaintiff had been a
former patient of his.

Lifschutz claimed a constitutional

right as a psychotherapist to refuse to divulge such infermation.

He was jailed for contempt of court.

97

Lifschutz then sued for a habeas corpus, i.e., a
legal explanation of why he was jailed.

The primary ques-

tion at issue was whether the legislature had surpassed
their constitutional limits by requiring that the right to
privilege in psychotherapy is waived, in relevant matters,
when a plaintiff brings his mental condition as an issue in
litigation. This patient-litigant exception was very clearly
spelled out in California statutes at the time and the
court elected to follow the statutes; however, Lifschutz's
arguments and the court's responses command attention.
One of the arguments of Dr. Lifschutz was that he
was denied equal protection under the law as the legislature had allowed that clergymen were permitted to claim a
privilege as above and he, as a psychiatrist, was not.

He

argued that given the purpose of clergyman-parishioner
privilege, i.e., fostering a "sanctuary for the disclosure
of emotional stress", that there was little real relevant
ditinction between the two professions on which to base a
distinction in the law.

The court found this argument

reflected an inadequate understanding of the foundation of
the privilege and cited Wigmore in support of the denial of
the privilege:
Does the penitential relation deserve recognition and
countenance? In a state where toleration of religion
exists by law, where a substantial part of the community professes a religion practicing a confessional
system, this question must be answered in the affirmative (1940, p. 878).
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The court noted that a toleration of religious forms and
practices is the foundation of this privilege.

Obviously,

the similar toleration for mental health care is not in the
law.

In addition, although psychotherapists may be strong-

ly committed to the ethics and tenets of their professions,
the court stated that this is reasonably distinguishable
from religious conviction on which the clergyman-parishioner
privilege is based.
Lifschutz also argued that, as a psychotherapist,
he had a constitutional right to claim privilege based on
the psychological needs and expectations of all patients,
regardless of the wishes of a particular patient.

He

stated that he had the right to claim the privilege himself.

The court noted that all prior cases dealing with

physician-patient privilege have found that a constitutional right to privacy exists for the patients, but not
for the physicians.

They add that it is the patient's

intimate revelations, even though the treatments may involve communication between the psychotherapist and the
patient, that give rise to an interest in the privacy of
the psychotherapeutic process.
Lifschutz also argued that any requirement that he
reveal confidential communications between himself and a
patient unconstitutionally impaired the practice of his
profession.
tions,

He based this argument on two legal conten-

(1) that the limitation on the capability to prac-
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tice psychotherapy would be so severe that it represented a
"taking" of valuable property, i.e., the psychiatrist's
practice of psychotherapy, and (2) that since being required to testify would severely limit psychotherapy, it
unconstitutionally limited the availability of medical
care.

The court indicated that they found Lifschutz's

arguments in this regard to be somewhat exaggerated.

They

doubted that the profession of psychotherapy would be
significantly impaired by his being required to testify,
especially as in this and similar cases involving the
patient-litigant exception, the only times the privilege of
psychotherapeutic communications would not be followed are
when the patients themselves introduce the issue of emotional distress and/or condition.

The court added that

"the practice of psychotherapy has grown, indeed flourished, in an environment of a nonabsolute privilege"

(p.

11) •

As to the statutes regarding the patient-litigant
exception, the court upheld the statutes by requiring that
Dr. Lifschutz testify regarding any communications relevant
to the present suit.

They found the statute to be a sound

balance between the accepted need for confidentiality in
the psychotherapeutic setting and the interest of the state
to ascertain the truth in legal proceedings.

The court

noted that it is not fair to allow a plaintiff to make a
claim, and then limit inquiry into the facts of the claim.
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However, they very clearly asserted that all psychotherapeutic communications are not required to be disclosed
under the patient-litigant exception and that any communications not directly relevant to the suit are considered
privileged.

The court briefly mentioned methods of evalu-

ating the relevancy of confidential communications which
would maintain respect for the plaintiff's privacy, including reviewing such materials in the judge's chambers or
obtaining protective orders during discovery.

They also

concurred with the United States Supreme Court opinion
(Griswold

~

Connecticut, 1965) that the Constitution

doe~,

guarantee "zones of privacy" and that psychotherapy falls
into one of these zones, but that this does not guarantee
an absolute privilege which would allow for no exceptions.
The court concluded that:
Under a properly limited interpretation, the litigantpatient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, at issue in this case, does not unconstitutionally infringe the constitutional rights of privacy
of either psychotherapists or psychotherapeutic patients.
As we point out, however, because of the
potential of invasion of patients' constitutional
interests, trial courts should properly and carefully control compelled disclosures in this area
in light of accepted principles (p. 8).
An ironic fact about Lifschutz's case is that when
it was decided that the psychiatrist did have to testify,
once he stated that he had indeed seen the plaintiff ten
years earlier, he was excused from any further testimony on
the basis that it was irrelevant as it had taken place so
many years previous to the suit (Grossman, 1978}.
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Illinois Law:

In Illinois, the privilege of the

psychotherapist-client relationship was apparently first
recognized as based on common law in a trial court decision to excuse a psychiatrist from testifying (Binder v.
Russell, 1952).

This case involved an alienation of

affections action by a husband whose wife was a client of
the psychiatrist.

The psychiatrist responded to questions

with, "I can not reply in good conscience"
University Law Review, 1952, p. 384).

(Northwestern

He was excused

from testifying on the basis that psychiatrist-patient
communications were privileged.
Since then, in Illinois, privacy in

psychoth~rapy

and the right to claim the privilege for communications in
psychotherapy have followed parallel paths in state statutes.

The general physician-surgeon statute enacted in

1959 (Appendix A) does not expressly state a privilege, but
imposes an obligation of privacy except in specified situations, none of which is a subpoena or court order to testify.
The psychiatrist-patient statute of 1963 (Appendix
A) expressly states a privilege in the psychiatrist-patient
relationship, with three exceptions including relevant
communications when,

(1) a patient is determined to be in

need of hospitalization,

(2) there is a court ordered

psychiatric examination, and (3) a patient or his/her heirs
introduce the patient's mental condition as an element of
claim or defense in a civil or administrative proceeding.

102
Cases of malpractice or when the patient is a complaining
witness against a psychiatrist were added as a fourth
exception in 1971.

The wording of this statute would

appear to grant the privilege to the psychiatrist as well
as to the patient so that the psychiatrist could refuse to
testify even if given permission or requested to do so by
the patient.
That same year the Psychologist Registration Act
(1963; Appendix A), which included a section on the prohibition and exceptions for disclosure of information by a
psychologist, was passed.

Although this act did not explic-

itly use the word "privilege" as did the act for the psychiatrist-patient relationship, it did not include a subpoena or court order in the five conditions under which
a psychologist could diclose information.
served to provide a strong
client relationship.

privi~ege

This act thus

in the psychologist-

It stated as one of its exceptions

that information may be disclosed with the express consent
of the client and did not state that the psychologist may
refuse to disclose when given this consent, so the privilege belonged strictly to the client and not to the psychologist.

This act did not allow psychologists to testify

when clients introduced their mental condition as an element of claim or defense in a civil suit unless the psychologists had the express consent of the client, i.e.,
there was no patient-litigant exception for psychologists.
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The Social Worker's Registration Act of 1967 provided for a different kind of privilege than the acts for
psychiatrists and psychologists.

It allowed no privilege

when there was a criminal trial and disclosure of information related directly to the facts or circumstances of
the crime, but in civil cases it did not allow for a
patient-litigant exception unless a client gave written
consent to disclosure of information.
The variations in the laws for the different mental
health professions certainly presents a confused picture.
If their psychotherapist was a psychiatrist, clients could
apparently discuss criminal acts, even murder, without fear
that their psychiatrist would be forced to testify regarding these acts; however, a kleptomaniac could not seek
help for habitual shoplifting from a psychotherapist who
was a social worker without fear that the social worker may
be required to testify to these discussions in the future.
Regarding civil suits, clients whose psychotherapists were
social workers or psychologists could merily sue and introduce their mental condition as part of a claim without
allowing their psychotherapists to testify while clients
whose psychotherapists were psychiatrists would automatically waive such a privilege.
As discussed in the previous section, the Illinois
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1979; Appendix A),
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which went into effect January 1, 1979, clears up a considerable amount of confusion by setting forth the same
laws for privacy and privilege for all mental health professions.

The Confidentiality Act provides for a large

number of exceptions to the privilege of communications in
the psychotherapist-client relationship.

Upon close exami-

nation, one sees that each exception is very carefully
delineated in order that communications may be kept as
private as possible and so that the absence of the privilege is not abused by the client's adversary.
For example, in the section dealing with the patientlitigant exception, information may only be disclosed in a
civil or administrative proceeding if the clients introduce -·
their mental condition or any aspect of their mental health
care as an element of their claim or defense.

The Act adds

that such disclosure may be made,
If any only to the extent the court ... finds, after in
camera [i.e., in the judge's chambers] examination of
testimony or other evidence, that it is relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory, or
otherwise clearly admissable; that other satisfactory
evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory as evidence
of the facts sought to be established by such evidence;
and that disclosure is more important to the interest
of substantial justice than protection from injury to
the therapist-recipient [of mental health services]
relationship or to the recipient or other whom disclosure is likely to harm (Illinois Revised Statutes
1979, p. 1491).
This section adds that no information other than the fact
that a person received treatment, the cost of such treatment and the diagnosis may be disclosed unless a compelling

~
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need is established for further disclosure.

This section

further limits the patient-litigant exception by providing
that in any action brought in a marriage dissolution proceeding or any other action in which pain and suffering is
an element of the claim, mental condition is not to be
considered to be introduced unless a client or a witness on
his behalf first testifies about the client receiving
mental health care.
The above delineation of the patient-litigant
exception prevents abuse of the privilege by allowing
relevant information to be disclosed; however, it prevents
abuse of the exception by limiting the information to be
disclosed and defining the circumstances under which it may
be disclosed.

The other exceptions to the privilege, such

as civil commitment, malpractice suits, or court ordered
examinations are likewise very carefully explicated so that
the interests of society can be served by allowing disclosure under specific conditions with minimal infringement
on the privacy of the individual.
Even with the seemingly very clearly formulated law
of the Illinois Confidentiality Act, controversies and
disagreements still occur.
Laurent

~

An example is the case of

Brelji (1979) in which the Illinois Department

of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities sought to
discharge an employee for allegedly abusing a patient.
the civil service administration hearing, the patient

In
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testified against the employee.

The employee then requested

that the patient's records be subpoenaed for use in his
defense.

Dr. Brelji, speaking for the Department of Mental

Health and Developmental Disabilities, appealed the court
order to bring the patient's records for in camera inspection on the basis that the Illinois Confidentiality Act
does not allow for the disclosure of confidential information in an administrative hearing unless the recipient of
mental health care introduces his mental condition or any
aspect of his services received for such condition as an
element of his claim or defense.

Dr. Brelji noted that the

patient was not making a claim, strictly defined as a cause
of action, against the employee.

If the employee was being

sued on a personal injury action in the circuit court on
the same charges, he could request an in camera investigation of the records for relevant information, but this was
not the case.
The court ruled that a "claim" could be more broadly defined than as just a "cause of action."

They stated

that it was inconsistent that the records could be subpoenaed in a personal injury action, but not in an administrative procedure which was considering the same issueb and
allegations.

The court added that this was especially true

in light of the fact that the potential loss of the employee
from the administrative proceeding is possibly greater than
that in a civil suit.
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A sidelight of this case was the fact that the
legal brief prepared by the Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities, which sought to protect the
confidentiality of the patient, contained the patient's
name, while the legal brief prepared by the attorneys of
the employee very carefully referred to him as "Patient X"
throughout.
Summary:

The laws and practices regarding the

privilege of communications between psychotherapists and
clients vary from state to state.

The current trend is

toward increased acceptance by statute of such a privilege,
but with carefully delineated exceptions.
careful delineations, conflicts will arise.

Even with these
There are some

who contend that there are so many exceptions as to make
the privilege meaningless.

Ohters contend that the amount

of privilege granted by the statutes interferes with the
administration of justice.
In attempting to come to a determination that is
just to both the individual and society, the legal approach
to decision making uses the principles of natural law as
embodied in the common law.

In addition, the legal approach

considers and accommodates to other views including the
principles of the Constitution, what is reasonable for the
purposes and functions of the government and the practical
needs of society.

The courts operate on a case-by-case

basis that does not facilitate an orderly or scientific
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development of principles similar to the approach of psychologists.

In the legal approach to decision making, the

principles of moral absolutism are tempered by the mores of
changing society.

CHAPTER III
INTEGRATION AND HYPOTHESES
Thus far we have explored the rationale for confidentiality in psychotherapy from a moral, theoretical and
ethical perspective and the attempts of the legal system
and the professions of psychotherapists to deal with this
concept in

~n

ordered society.

As was discussed in the

review of the literature, both theory and research regarding the practice and dynamics of psychotherapy suggest a
central role for confidentiality in psychotherapy.

The

section on historical and moral aspects of confidentiality
explicates how the Roman Catholic church, over a period of
several hundred years, grappled with the controversy of
absolute privacy and came to the decision that absolute
secrecy in the confessional was essential to the maintenance of the sacrament of confession and therefore for the
well-being of the church.

The sections which discuss the

laws and court rulings regarding privacy and privileged
communication present sound social and legal arguments
opposing absolute confidentiality and privileged communication in psychotherapy and serve at least partially to
explain how the current laws came to be.

This chapter is

an effort to integrate these previous sections in a discussion

o~he

effects of legal intervention on the tradi109
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tional practice of psychotherapy.
In order to explore the effects of legal intervention on the practice of psychotherapy, one must look at a
number of variables including, but not limited to,

(1) the

overall effect of laws on confidentiality on the attitude
and/or approach of the psychotherapist,

(2) the effect of

specific laws on the attitude and/or approach of the psychotherapist,

(3) the effect of having revealed information

on the subsequent attitude and approach of the psychotherapist,

(4) the overall effect of the laws on confidenti-

ality on the client's attitude and/or response in psychotherapy,

(5) the effect of individual laws on the client's

attitude and/or response in psychotherapy, and (6) the
effects of having information revealed on the client's
subsequent attitude and/or response in psychotherapy.

The

basic questions underlying each of the above variables
involve:

l) a determination of whether the legal attempts

to resolve issues of confidentiality help or hinder the
practice of psychotherapy; 2) a determination of whether
any resultant hinderance is in the best interest of society.
Psychotherapist Reaction
Overall Effect of Laws:

As a whole, the laws on

confidentiality must cause a mixed reaction in psychotherapists.

On the positive side, they often offer def-

inite, conerete guidelines for the psychotherapist to
follow in deciding whether or not, and in what circum-
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stances, information should be released.

Such guidelines

can certainly be a relief amongst all the controversy and
ambivalence that surround disclosures of information.
Jagim, Whittman and Noll (1978) and Mariner (1967) point
out that a therapist who does not disclose confidential
information to colleagues or other agencies may be viewed
as uncooperative.

The possibility of appearing uncoopera-

tive may inappropriately influence a decision regarding the
release of confidential information.
The laws on confidentiality also serve to offer a
means of protection, for both the client and the psychotherapists, from irresponsible or unreasonable requests for
information.

The psychotherapist in many cases now has the

force of the laws to back up his ethical standards.
Slovenko (1975) notes that "as in all areas of life, specific black letter rules [on confidentiality] are sought as
though they were holy grail.
of security"

(p. 125).

They offer comfort and a sense

It is much easier to refuse to dis-

close information when the law states that you cannot.
Then psychotherapists do not have to be concerned with the
risks of appearing unreasonable or uncooperative as they
are merely being good citizens and obeying the law.
The laws of confidentiality also reduce the possibility of misinterpretation when therapists refuse to
release information.

Mariner (1967) notes that many par-

ties will assume that psychotherapists have negative infor-
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mation if they refuse to disclose confidential communications.

With strict laws on confidentiality such mis-

interpretation may be the exception rather than the rule.
Laws regarding confidentiality, however, do not
only make the psychotherapist's job easier; they also complicate it.

The laws very clearly spell out the fact that

psychotherapy is not completely confidential, but the myth
that it is still remains amongst both professionals and
clients.

Many psychotherapists wonder whether, in order to

be totally ethical and responsible, they should give their
clients Miranda type warnings at the onset of psychotherapy
so that it is very clear to all parties what information
will be confidential, and under what conditions, and what
information will not be.

Bersoff (1976) expresses concern

that the failure of the therapist to fully inform a client
of the limits of confidentiality, while the therapist has a
duty to disclose certain kinds of information, may constitute entrapment.

Freedman (1959) refers to disclosure

of information after the client has been assured that
psychotherapy would be confidential as "psychic entrapment."

He states that a psychotherapist should either

"warn his patient beforehand of the reservations he has
concerning confidentiality or, having committed himself to
secrecy he should maintain it"
to

reques~~ull

(p. 1080).

Needless to say,

disclosure from clients on the one hand,

and advise them that full disclosure may not be wise on the
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other, must cause some discomfort in the psychotherapist.
Another fact about laws on confidentiality that can
complicate the job of the psychotherapist is that the laws
increase the awareness of the legal environment, with its
increasing number of malpractice suits, in the therapy
setting.

Psychotherapists may feel a need to inform

clients about the limits of confidentiality in order to
protect the clients; they may also feel the need to do so
in order to protect themselves from future law suits.

An

atmosphere in which a client is viewed as a potential adversary, which in these times may be the wisest approach
for the legal protection of the psychotherapist, is probably not conducive to the most successful practice of
psychotherapy.

Roth and Meisel (1977) are concerned that

an explanation to every patient of the limits of confidentiality "might prevent meaningful psychotherapy or even deter
patients from therapy"

(p. 510).

The laws very clearly define those conditions under
which psychotherapists must release information, without
any allowance for professional judgment, whether it is for
the good of the individual and society or whether it
actually serves no fruitful purpose.

The psychotherapist,

despite all his training, has lost the right to use professional expertise in deciding whether it is appropriate or
in the

in~est

of anyone to release information.

This

power now lies with the legislature and the courts, bodies
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that do not necessarily have an understanding of the importance of confidentiality to the process of psychotherapy.
Putting the power of decision-making into the hands of the
court changes the disclosure of information from a therapeutic to a legal decision.
Many mental health professionals refuse to accept
clients where it appears at all likely that the psychotherapist will be subpoened to testify in court.

This is

not merely a matter of time, convenience and money as
those who testify as expert witnesses can generally charge
and collect quite high fees for such testimony.

Rather, it

is a matter of being reluctant to enter a situation in
which one is requested to offer professional judgment, but
in the particular situation is limited in using professional judgment, i.e., in deciding what information is
appropriate or not appropriate for disclosure, by the power
of the court.
Even the client, by providing consent for the
release of information, may interfere with the psychotherapist's professional judgment.

Mariner (1967) proposes

that psychotherapists not release information, even with
client consent, except under very well considered circumstances.

He notes that the client may inadvertently or

unconsciously sabotage the therapeutic situation by trying
to controL/What the psychotherapist says and to whom he
says it.

He believes that conflict regarding who is in
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control of the therapeutic information may lead psychotherapists to do things they would ordinarily not do.
Mariner offers the example of the nondirective psychotherapist, who would generally not give direct advice in the
therapeutic setting, giving opinions and recommendations in
response to a request for information from another agency
or other source, when the client has provided written
consent for the disclosure of information.
As a whole, the laws of confidentiality offer both
relief and discomfort for psychotherapists as they provide
clear guidelines, but may compel psychotherapists to act
contrary to their professional and ethical training and
judgment.

Siegel (1979) notes that "It seems clear that

in attempting to help people, psychotherapists have less
difficulty with their principles, their patients, or their
work than they do with the law"

(p. 245).

The laws thus,

overall, may be viewed as both helping and hindering the
practice of psychotherapy, depending on the particular law
and the particular case.
Effects of Specific Laws:

Specific aspects of the

laws on confidentiality have distinct ramifications on how
the psychotherapist conducts his/her practice.
particular concern is written records.

One area of

There are signifi-

cant questions, both legal and ethical, as to whether the
record
public.

bel~gs

to the client, the psychotherapist or the

Several courts have ordered psychiatrists to bring

116
all records containing psychiatric history, as well as the
thoughts, feelings, and fantasies of the client and the
impressions and hypotheses of the psychotherapist, for in
camera examination by the court (e.g., In re Lifschutz,
1970; Roberts

~

Superior Court, 1973).

Keeping total records in psychotherapy has definite
advantages.

A primary purpose is to follow the progress of

the client.

Most progress takes place over a period of

time.

If one is forced to rely on the therapist's or the

client's memory alone in order to assess progress or note
patterns associated with extra- or intra-therapeutic events,
much may be forgotten and the therapeutic process may be
delayed.

It can be quite helpful for the understanding of

the client for psychotherapists to keep detailed records of
sessions as well as their interpretations and hypotheses
regarding the client's psychotherapy.
Complete records are also necessary when medication
is used, when more than one professional at a clinic is
involved with a client and for purposes of research.
However, in keeping complete records one may also run the
risk that such records will be subpoenaed for examination
by a court or that clients or their guardians will demand
to see the records.

The Illinois Confidentiality Act,

which is stricter than the statutes of most states, has
several

e~eptions

under which an in camera review of

records by the court may be required.

The court may decide
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that information which is found to be relevant and/or
necessary as evidence must be disclosed.

In addition, the

Confidentiality Act requires that clients and/or their
guardians have complete access ·to their mental health
records.
Client access to mental health records has been a
significant issue in debates of the rights of mental health
care recipients.

It is discussed in the context of confi-

dentiality as it seems only just and fair, to many, that
clients should have the right to review and be aware of all
information about them which is kept in records to which
other people may have access.

Many psychotherapists believe

that keeping records open to clients enhances the feeling
of psychotherapy being a cooperative project where the
clients have certain rights and responsibilities (e.g.,
Brodsky, 1972; Fischer, 1972).

These psychotherapists be-

lieve that such an atmosphere is conducive to progress in
psychotherapy.
However, the fact that records may be subject to review by a court or the client certainly affects how a psychotherapist keeps records and what material is placed in
these records.

Freedman (1959) suggested that laws may be

forcing psychotherapists "to keep scientifically inadequate
records in order to be certain they will, under any circumstances,

~able

to maintain the patient's trust"

(p. 1079) .

A negative impact of client access or public and/or
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client ownership of records may be that therapists, for the
benefit of the well-being of their clients, may greatly
limit the information, hypotheses and thinking that they
put in their notes.

Aware that clients would be humil-

iated, embarassed or otherwise harmed if such hypotheses as
they may be latent homosexuals or they have love-hate
relationships with their mothers were mentioned in a court
proceeding or read by clients before they had come to the
point of exploring these concepts in their therapy, ethical
therapists would be greatly reluctant to write such hypotheses in their notes.

They would, in justness and fair-

ness, limit their notes to quotes or vague or benign comments.

This limiting of notes is viewed as a danger to the

practice of traditional psychotherapy as when people are
limited in what they write on a subject, the result may be
a limiting of what is thought on the subject.
The Illinois Confidentiality Act tries to surmount
the problems which could lead to a psychotherapist having
very sparse records, for example dates and appointments
only, be defining records as excluding "the therapist's
personal notes, if such notes are kept in the therapist's
sole possession for his own personal use and are not disclosed to any other person, except the therapist's supervisor, consulting therapist or attorney"
Statutes, __J-979, p. 1489).

(Illinois Revised

This solution may be sufficient

for psychotherapists in private practice who do not provide
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medication or have other people cover when they are unavailable.

In such cases, "personal notes" could constitute the

entire record of therapy sessions and would all be absolutely confidential.

When a record was needed for any

reason, the psychotherapists could submit only the fiscal
records (record of appointments, dates, and payments) or
sift through their "personal notes" and establish an
official record for that particular case.
However, for psychotherapists who work in a mental
health center or need to keep records

to which other

people have access, this calls for keeping two sets of
records.

One would be considered "personal notes" and

could include conjecture, thoughts and hypotheses as well
as facts about the client.

The other official "record"

would include appointments, diagnosis, medication, an any
other information that another professional may need if the
psychotherapist is not available.

As most clinics, agen-

cies and psychotherapists also have a fiscal record, this
really means that to totally protect the confidentiality
and still be able to think through a client's conflicts on
paper, one would actually be required to keep three records.
Most psychotherapists would agree that the paperwork required for the fiscal and official record alone is overwhelming, without the added burden of a third record.
If~sychotherapists

in a mental health clinic

setting are constrained to keep more records that can be
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viewed by a court or other party as allowed by law than a
psychotherapist in a private practice, it would then appear
that only the wealthy are in a position to receive psychotherapy in a truly private therapeutic relationship.

It is

not the intent of the law to allow for a different and
possibly better kind of treatment for the wealthy than
for the poor or middle class, but this certainly appears to
be a possible result of recent laws on confidentiality.
Records present many thorny issues.

With the new

laws governing public, court and client access to records,
it is possible that the results will be poor records which
may lead to a poorer quality of treatment.
Another specific area of law on confidentiality
that may have significant impact on the practice of psychotherapy is that addressed in Tarasoff
University of California (1976).

~

The Regents of the

In this case the court

ruled that a psychotherapist has a duty to protect a potential victim from foreseeable danger from a client, even if
such a duty would require a breach of confidentiality.

The

decision in this particular case sent shockwaves through
the mental health community, particularly as many clients
have, in a moment of anger or frustration, expressed the
wish to harm another person.
been raised including:

A number of questions have

How is the psychotherapist to

differentiate between a wish or a plan of action?

How is a

psychotherapist to predict how dangerous a client is?

If a

121
client is not sufficiently dangerous to warrant commitment, how can a psychotherapist justify a breach of confidentiality?
As there are no clear answers to the above questions, Bersoff (1976) suggested that psychotherapists might
feel compelled to avoid the risk of civil liability, i.e.,
being sued, by warning potential victims even when the
likelihood of harm is negligible.

If only the occasional

psychotherapist responds in this way, the general public
may still hear of the response.

The knowledge that a

person with whom one is upset may be told of angry feelings
expressed to the therapist would certainly cause people to
be reluctant to seek psychotherpay if they had any interpersonal difficulties at all (and what client does not
have some problems in relationships?) and definitely cause
people to be reticent in discussing certain kinds of feelings once in psychotherapy.
Roth and Meisel (1977) express concern that requiring the psychotherapist to give a warning may "lower the
threshold of dangerousness that will evoke actions from
therapists, thereby compromising the patient's confidentiality and possibly his treatment"

(p. 509).

Another approach psychotherapists may take to
protect themselves and the confidentiality of their clients
would be to interrupt ar.d remind

~~e

clients of the limits

of confidentiality each time it sounds as if the clients
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would be starting to say something very hostile or potentially violent towards another person.

Such behavior would

most definitely interfere with a client's train of thought
and could approach a level of absurdity with a client who
verbally expresses a lot of angry feelings.
Noll (1976) and Roth and Meisel (1977) raise a
concern that a psychotherapist who breaches confidentiality
by warning a potential victim of the threats or plans of a
client may later be sued for invasion of privacy or defamation of character.

In those cases where the psychothera-

pist decides that a client is not sufficiently dangerous to
warrant warning a potential victim, Roth and Meisel note
that the psychotherapist may still successfully be sued for
failing to warn.

They state that:

The vagueness of the standards determining when the psychiatrist must warn, taken in combination with the unpredictability of violence and the vagueness of the meaning of the term "dangerousness", may make the psychiatrist's decision appear questionable in retrospect no
matter how he acts (p. 509).
The primary accomplishment of the Tarasoff rule
against confidentiality seems to have been to raise the
anxiety level of psychotherapists.
such a rule will save lives.

It is doubtful that

It seems much more likely

that it will add a deterrent to psychotherapy for potentially violent people, possibly resulting in greater loss
of life.

The only way the Tarasoff rule against confidenti-

ality could save lives is if it were worded so that psychotherapists were Eermitted, not required, to warn potential
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victims if, in their professional judgment, such a warning
was necessary, appropriate and therefore therapeutic.
Another specific aspect of the Illinois Confidentiality Act which may cause difficulties is the one concerned
with the enforcement of the rules for obtaining a Firearm
Owners Identification Card.

The Confidentiality Act allows

the Department of Mental Health to verify whether or not
individuals applying for such an identification card have
been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons within recent
years.

The application of a person who has had a psychi-

atric hospitalization may be refused.

This exception

appears to be quite logical and in the interest of safe
society.

However, a possible result of this exception may

be that people who have the desire or need to carry a
weapon may be deterred from seeking mental health services.
Some psychotherapists who work in the area of law
enforcement report great difficulty in providing adequate
mental health care to police officers.

A major source of

this difficulty is found in the fear of the officers that
psychotherapy or a psychiatric hospitalization could lead
to the loss of their Firearm Owners Identification Card and
therefore their job (Kelly, 1980).
Anyone who owns a gun should receive all the mental
health care they need rather than be deterred from such
care.

It seems that character references could serve a

comparable purpose to finding whether a person has had a
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psychiatric hospitalization without the consequence of
deterring some persons from seeking mental health care.
Another exception of the Illinois Confidentiality
Act involves cases of child abuse or neglect.

The law

states that these must be reported to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services.

The Child Abuse

Reporting Act adds the loss of professicnal license and/or
registration as a consequence of the failure to
child abuse or neglect.

repor~

Many mental health professionals

have encountered the situation where a parent hit a child,
realized the wrong and immediately sought help.

Since the

parent is already seeking help, embarassment, inconvenience
and loss of trust in the psychotherapist would probably be
the only results of a report.

The therapists in such a

situation are put in a quandary.
prosecution for failure to report,

They may:

(1) risk legal

(2) interrupt and warn

clients if it sounds as if they are going to make statements that would legally require a report, or (3) make the
report and risk the therapeutic relationship.

Once again,

the law does not leave any room for professional judgment.
It does not allow the psychotherapist to report only when
i t appears likely that more abuse and neglect will occur,
but requires that the psychotherapist report all suspected
abuse or neglect.
Another specific exception to confidentiality
allowed by Illinois law is when the client consents to
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disclosure.

The law does not grant psychotherapists the

right to refuse to disclose information if they have the
client's consent for disclosure (except in a court proceeding where psychotherapists may request that the judge
hear their testimony in chambers even if the client has
given consent for full disclosure in court) .

This area

presents some issues related to those of records insofar as
the determination of who "owns" the psychotherapist's
impressions and evaluations of the client.

To many, it

seems only fair and just that people be able to determine
the events of their own lives, and therefore, have the
power to determine who is given what information about
them.

An unfortunate fact is that many people do not

exercise good judgment in deciding with whom they would
like their psychotherapist to talk openly.

It is not

unusual for clients to request that confidential and sensitive information be disclosed to such sources as employers
and family members.
The particular exception of disclosure with client
consent is generally easier for therapists to deal with
than situations where they are required to report information to the court or a government agency.

In the former

case, there is the opportunity to discuss the wisdom of the
consent to disclose with a client so that the consent may
be either withdrawn or modified so that only limited information may be disclosed.

All the other specific exceptions
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to confidentiality discussed above require that the psychotherapist disclose information and do not allow for a
compromise based upon professional judgment.
The specific aspects of the law on confidentiality
that do not allow room for professional judgment would seem
to hinder the process of psychotherapy.

Since there are

alternative ways of dealing with the situations in most of
the specific laws discussed above (the psychotherapist
using professional judgment to decide what aspects of
client records should be disclosed, character references
for the Firearm Owners Identification Card, involuntary
hospitalization with the option of warning potential victims in cases when the client may be dangerous to others,
professional judgment in reporting suspected child abuse) ,
the specific laws that require the psychotherapist to
disclose information appear not only to hinder psychotherapy but, in fact, are against the best interests of society.
Some ways that exceptions to the laws on confidentiality may be against the best interest of society are
defined by Noll (1976) in a discussion of the implication
of such laws on the practice of psychotherapy.

Noll states

(1) Greater numbers of patients will incriminate themselves and be subject to legal action, (2) psychotherapists may well have to defend themselves in courts of
law for making allegations about patients, (3) a basically antagonistic relationship may develop between
the patient and the psychotherapist, (4) psychotherapists acting in accordance with the principal of full
and informed consent will deter patients from seeking
their help, and (5) ultimately, fewer and fewer people
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will avail themselves of psychotherapeutic services
because of the fear that they may talk about the
"wrong'' things or express unacceptable feelings or
desires (p. 1453).
It should be added that there is a valid rationale
for each exception to the laws on confidentiality; however,
in most cases there appears to be an alternate solution to
the one which involves a breach of confidentiality.
Effects of Disclosing Information:

A third con-

sideration in this discussion of the effects of legal
intervention on the practice of psychotherapy is the effect
of having disclosed information on the psychotherapist's
subsequent approach and attitude.

This, logically, is

going to depend on the results of the disclosure.

An

unfortunate experience with disclosure, e.g., one in which
the disclosed material is handled inappropriately by others,
can result in all the various responses to the laws discussed above, i.e., Miranda type warnings to clients,
overly sparse records and/or interruptions and reminders of
the limits of confidentiality during the psychotherapy.
The only positive outcome of an unfortunate disclosure of
information would be that psychotherapists may become more
aware of the limits of confidentiality, warn their clients,
and therefore not inadvertently deceive them into thinking
that psychotherapy is totally confidential when it is not.
Psychotherapists who have had an unfortunate experience with disclosure of information may be more likely to
refuse to see clients about whom it is probable that infor-
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mation will have to be disclosed legally.

They may refuse

to disclose information on some occasions in the future.
Some psychotherapists are reluctant to disclose any information to particular agencies and individuals, even with
client consent, because of the lack of training of many
workers regarding confidentiality of mental health records.
The psychotherapist is in the very uncomfortable
position of wanting to promise abolute confidentiality, but
not being able to do so realistically.

One would expect

that the act of disclosing confidential communications
would result in the psychotherapist becoming more aware of
the legal limits of confidentiality and more sensitive to
the privacy of the

therape~tic

situation.

Most of the sources in the literature which address
the issues of the psychotherapist's attitude regarding and
reaction to laws on confidentiality are limited to speculation rather than research.

The present study explores the

attitudes of psychologists regarding confidentiality in
a number of situations.
Client Reaction
Overall Effect of Laws:

The client is also going

to have reactions to the fact that psychotherapy cannot be
guaranteed to be absolutely confidential.

Many psychother-

apists have noted that an increasing number of clients are
asking questions about confidentiality and mental health
records.

Frequently, a client will say "I would like to
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tell you something, but I don't want it to go into my
record."

Although there appears to be increased concern

expressed by clients about confidentiality, there are very
few studies directly surveying the client's feelings about
confidentiality or the lack of confidentiality.

Such

studies would be helpful in establishing ethical guidelines
as well as understanding the therapeutic process.
or not reassurances by the

psycho~herapist

Whether

and/or laws on

confidentiality, including the exceptions to the law,
affect the client's behavior in psychotherapy might be
another area of research.
Most clients who voluntarily seek mental health
care are very eager to disclose private thoughts, feelings
and behaviors in psychotherapy; this is generally their
first relationship where confidentiality is a key component
of the relationship and they are frequently ready to "tell
all."

Even with more questions about confidentiality,

clients are generally ready to be open and frank in the
therapy setting except when the client is a mental health
professional or student (therefore very aware of just how
unprivate records frequently are) or when the client anticipates legal involvement, either criminal or civil.

The

apparent willingness of clients to disclose private information has been noted in the literature by a number of
mental health professionals (e.g., Jung, 1975; Mowrer,
1961).
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Despite this apparent willingness of clients to
disclose private information in psychotherapy, there are
studies which suggest that clients would prefer that such
information not be disclosed beyond the therapist.

Rosen

(1976) divided clients at several different mental health
clinics into two groups, the first of which was instructed
to sign forms for the release of information to the state
agency for mental health.

The second group was addition-

ally given a clear explanation of the fact thay they would
receive services whether or not they signed the form.

In

the first group, 100% of the clients signed the form.

In

the second group, between 20% and 41% of the clients signed
the form, the amount varying among mental health clinics.
This study concluded that many fewer clients would sign
consent forms for the release of information if they clearly
understood that it was not necessary to sign in order to
receive services.
Most other studies regarding the clients' attitudes
about confidentiality have involved college students.
Lewis and Warman (1964), in a survey of college students
who had been divided into groups as to whether they had
received vocational counseling, personal counseling or no
counseling, found that only one of the 29 personal counseling subjects thought information should be shared with
housemothers, department heads or employers without consent
and none of the personal counseling subjects thought infer-
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mation should be shared without consent with .teachers or
fraternities and sororities.

Twenty-one percent of stu-

dents who had received personal counseling thought that
information should be given to such sources as parents or
advisors without the student's consent and only 34% of the
students receiving personal counseling thought information
should be shared with other counselors without the student's consent.

In an open-ended question inquiring about

the specific circumstances under which it might be all
right for a counselor to release a summary report of testing and counseling, the personal counseling subjects place
"considerable stress •.. on the importance of strict confidentiality of information"

(p. 10).

Students were asked what sources they would consent
to be given detailed information.

The only sources that

over half of the personal counseling students would allow
to have information were the counselors seen (97%), other
counselors (76%), advisors (62%), and parents (62%).

Only

17% of personal counseling subjects would consent to the
counseling center releasing information to teachers and 28%
would allow the release of information to employers.

The

personal counseling subjects as a whole were more concerned
with confidentiality than the vocational counseling or no
counseling subjects.
In a follow-up study at a different university,
Anderson and Sherr (1969) additionally inquired about the
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release of specific kinds of information.

They found that

their sample of college students was more willing to release information than the students in Lewis and Warman's
study.

They noted that the students discriminated among

the types of information which they would allow to be
released.

Students who had been in counseling did not wish

information about personal problems to be released to
employers without their consent (only 18% iadicated that
this was acceptable), but had much less objection to the
release of information regarding discipline/behavior (56%
indicated this was acceptable) or grades (67%) to employers
without their consent.
Students who had been in counseling were more
willing to have information released to their parents than
to employers without their consent, but still discriminated
between kinds of information.

For example, 65% of counseled

subjects indicated that it was acceptable to inform parents
of a student's personal problems without consent, compared
to 71% for discipline/behavior information and 89% for
grades.
Anderson and Sherr additionally note that students
were reluctant to allow information to be shared with other
counselors.

For example only 23% of counseled subjects

indicated that it was acceptable to release information on
personal problems to other

cou~selors

without their con-

sent, apparently unaware of the amount of supervision and
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consultation that takes place within a counseling center.
Anderson and Sherr suggest that this indicates a marked
difference between standard counseling practices and the
expectations of college students.
Simmons (1968) explored the approval that college
students at a counseling center would give if certain kinds
of information were released to certain people without
their explicit consent.

The material to be released in-

cluded vocational, personal adjustment and danger-to-selfor-others information.

The possible recipients of infor-

mation included parents, the dean's office, the student
health service or other counselors.

Simmons found that

two-thirds of the responses were favorable to the release
of information without explicit consent, many more than in
the previous studies.

However, Simmons did not report how

many clients were seen for personal counseling versus
vocational counseling.

Simmons also found that the kinds

of information as well as the potential recipient of
information had a significant relationship to approval of
its release without explicit consent.

He noted that there

was not an interaction between kind of information and
recipient, suggesting that college student counselees were
selective in both the kinds of information that they did
not want released to anyone and the people that they did
not want to receive any information about them.
The above studies suggest that clients are inter-
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ested, in varying degrees, in the maintenance of confidentiality in the therapeutic relationship.

Clients, for

the most part, experience relief from the laws in Illinois
on confidentiality and psychotherapy.

Most clients are

reassured by the fact that a psychotherapist must obey laws
regarding confidentiality and could be punished under the
law for disclosing information to the client's friends,
relatives or employers.
Effects of Specific Laws:

Clients, with some

exceptions, appear to be content with the specific aspects
of the law on confidentiality as well, primarily because
they do not anticipate having occasion to fall under one of
the exceptions to confidentiality.

Noll (1974, 1976) has

noted that even when clients are informed of the limits of
confidentiality, they are not fully aware of the consequences of the release of information.

It is logical to

assume that people who do fall under one of the exceptions
would be more hesitant to seek mental health care and have
greater difficulty being frank and open once in psychotherapy.
This is aptly demonstrated by the difficulty a law
eriforcement psychotherapist has in involving officers of
the law in psychotherapy.

The officers clearly state that

they fear that if they follow through when referred, they
could end up losing their guns and their jobs.

This is

true even when the referral for psychotherapy does not
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reflect on the officer's ability.

For example, if officers

kill a person in the line of duty, they may be referred for
psychotherapy so that they do not overreact, hold their
fire too long in a subsequent situation and end up getting
themselves killed (Kelly, 1980).
As discussed previously, the Tarasoff rule which
would require a psychotherapist to warn a potential victim
of possible danger may deter potentially dangerous people
from seeking mental health care to learn to deal with their
feelings and impulses.

Bersoff (1976) discusses this

concern and adds that such a law may result in mental
health professionals becoming more identified with law
enforcement,

therefore discouraging even clients who would

not be potentially dangerous from seeking professional
help.
There is the same concern that people may be discouraged from seeking mental health care in regard to the
exception to confidentiality that requires psychotherapists
to report all cases of suspected child abuse or neglect to
a state agency, regardless of the potential likelihood of
continued abuse or neglect.

Parents who abuse their child-

ren often view themselves very negatively.

The anticipa-

tion of telling the psychotherapist of these negative
qualities may already deter many from seeking help.

The

knowledge that a psychotherapist may then have to report
them seems likely to be an even greater deterrent to seek-
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ing professional help.

Some clients who are not very

likely to continue abusing or neglecting their children
have a psychological need to be reported so that they can
be "punished,"

cleanse themselves of past wrongs and start

a new life in terms of their identity as parents.

In such

cases, it is generally most therapeutic if the clients call
the state agency and report themselves rather than be
reported by the therapist.

The reporting then becomes a

constructive, responsible act that the client has taken on
the way to "good" parenting.
Clients are generally quite pleased to learn that
they have the right to examine their records.

However,

clients generally are not interested in actually reviewing
the record, but wish to maintain the right to do so.
It appears that the specific aspects of the laws on
confidentiality do not hinder the average person from
seeking psychotherapy; however, they do hinder those that
fall under the exceptions.

These people falling under the

exceptions would include those who have a need or desire to
carry a gun, people who have concerns about violent impulses
against others and parents who are concerned about how they
handle their children.

These are obviously three groups of

people that society would not want to deter from seeking
psychotherapy.

It seems that it is not in the best interest

of society to have specific exceptions in the laws on confidentiality that would add such a deterrent.
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Effect of Having Information Disclosed:

The final

point for consideration in examining the effect of legal
intervention on confidentiality is the effect of having
information revealed on the client's subsequent attitude
and/or response in psychotherapy.

Bersoff (1976), Noll,

(1976) and Roth and Meisel (1977) express concern that
statutory requirements that the psychotherapist disclose
certain kinds of information in certain circumstances will
not only deter people from seeking psychotherapy, but
create an antagonistic relationship between the client and
the psychotherapist.
One would expect that clients would feel betrayed
and angry about an unconsented disclosure, especially if
they were not informed that the release of information
would occur.

Although feelings of anger and betrayal can

be worked through by the psychotherapists, and this working through could even enhance the therapy, it seems likely
that such feelings would more often result in the client
becoming reluctant to be frank and open and/or dropping out
of therapy.
Clients generally are pleased when the psychotherapist refuses to disclose information without consent.
This seems to be especially true for low-income clients who
are involved in a number of other types of social service
agencies and who have come to accept the fact that information is often informally shared among these agencies with-
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out the client's consent.

These people frequently experi-

ence a lack of respect for their privacy and are pleased to
learn that the psychotherapist will not divulge confidential
information without consent.

The psychotherapist's refusal

to disclose information without consent for such clients
can be a real turning point in the therapeutic process in
that the clients may recognize new areas of responsibility
and control over their own lives.

This prospect of growth

when the psychotherapist refuses to disclose information is
also present for clients who have been overprotected by
others, such as family or friends, and the psychotherapist

is the first person to refuse to disclose confidential
information to the overprotectors.
It is recommended that the client's attitude and
response to psychotherapy following a disclosure of information be further explored in surveys of clients or surveys
of the experiences of psychotherapists.
Hypotheses
There has been minimal research in regards to psychotherapists' attitudes on confidentiality.

Jagim, Whitt-

man and Noll (1978) surveyed mental health professionals in
North Dakota.

They reported that 98% of those responding

to the survey indicated that they viewed confidentiality as
"essential to maintaining a positive therapeutic relationship."

When given explicit situations, the therapists

departed from the ideal of

a~solute

confidentiality, i.e.,
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only 20% responded that they would emphasize confidentiality in respect to state laws such as those requiring the
reporting of child abuse, only 14% responded that they
would emphasize confidentiality over the safety of a threatened third-party as in Tarasoff

~

Regents of the University

of California, and only 59% responded that they would risk a
citation for contempt of court before disclosing confidential information.

This survey only presented situations

involving potential danger or a contempt of court citation.
It does not address day-to-day situations such as those in
which an employer, family member or third-party payer requests the release of confidential information.
In addition to there being very few studies exploring the attitudes of psychotherapists regarding confidentiality, there are few studies exploring actual psychotherapists' practices in disclosing information.

Those studies

available explore the practices of school counselors (e.g.,
Boyd, Tennyson & Erickson, 1973, 1974) and therapists in
a college counseling center setting (e.g., Nugent & Pareis,
1968; Sherwood, 1974).

Nugent and Pareis found that about

40% of the 461 responding college counseling center directors (67% return rate) reported releasing information about
counselees without the student's permission.

Sherwood

found that only 76% of 4-year college counselors and 63%
of 2-year college counselors always obtained the student's
permission before releasing information.

Because of the
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college counseling center setting and the fact that these
results may reflect release of vocational and academic information as well as personal problem information, these
results cannot be generalized to other mental health professionals.
The present study is intended to fill in some of
the gaps in information noted above regarding client and
therapist attitudes about confidentiality in psychotherapy.
It surveyed opinions regarding the release of information
by psychotherapists when they do not have the permission of
the client in greater depth than previous studies by explicitly presenting the subjects with concrete situations
that do not involve a client who is an immediate danger
to self or others.

AdditionallyJ this study attempted to

replicate the findings of Jagim et al.
of their eleven questionnaire items.

(1978), using six
This survey was given

to mental health professionals, mental health care recipients and Illinois State•s Attorneys.

Illinois

State~s

At-

torneys were included in this study as they are in the
unique position of trying to discover and present the truth
in a court of law and at the same time must prosecute for
any breach of the Illinois Confidentiality Act.
Although this study is primarily exploratory in
nature, several hypotheses based on past experience and the
literature are offered.

A high Opinion Index on 35 Likert-

type questions will suggest disapproval of the release of
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information by a psychotherapist without the client's clear
consent.

A low Opinion Index will indicate approval of the

disclosure of information without the client's clear consent.
1} It is hypothesized that all three subject groups
agree with statements regarding the importance of confidentiality in psychotherapy and a therapist's professional/
ethical obligation regarding confidentiality.
2) It is hypothesized that fewer psychotherapists
(than in the first hypothesis) actually disapprove of the
release or approve of the nonrelease of information when
confronted with concrete situations, whether or not the
client is potentially dangerous.

This prediction is based

on the awareness that even in day-to-day decisions regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy, there does not always
appear to be a clear choice between right and wrong.
3) It is hypothesized that there is a significant
difference in the Opinion Index dependent on the type of
information to be disclosed.

Specifically, it is hypothe-

sized that disclosure of information directly related to
psychotherapy is most strongly disapproved by all subject
groups, i.e., personal problems and psychiatric

diagnos~s

have a significantly higher Opinion Index than the other
three types of information.
4) As educational and vocational information are
generally viewed as nonsecret, it is hypothesized that it
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has the lowest Opinion Index of all types of information.
5) It is hypothesized that there is a significant
difference in the Opinion Index dependent on the recipient
of information.

Specifically, based on studies in college

counseling centers, it is hypothesized that the release of
information to employers has a siginificantly higher Opinion Index than other possible recipients of information.
6) It is hypothesized that physicians have the
lowest Opinion Index of any of the possible recipients of
information.
7) It is hypothesized that in regard to confidentiality the mental health professional is more concerned
with ethical standards than the client, i.e., that the mental health professional has a significantly higher Opinion
Index than the mental health care recipient.

This hypo-

thesis is based on a study concerned with ethical standards
in research when using human subjects which indicated that
the research psychologist is generally far more concerned
with the protection and nondeception of the experimental
subjects than are the subjects themselves (Sullivan &
Deiker, 1973).

CHAPTER IV
METHODS
Subjects
The subjects were drawn from three populations,

(1)

mental health clients at the Springfield Mental Health
Center, Springfield, Illinois,

(2) registered psychologists

in central and southern Illinois, and (3) Illinois

St~te's

Attorneys.
Surveys were sent to the State's Attorneys in each
county in Illinois {N=l02).

Forty-two (41%) surveys were

returned by State's Attorneys.

Eight of these were not

used in the statistical analysis as they were not complete
(N=34; 33%).

Responding State's Attorneys ranged in age

from 25 to 70 years, with a mean age of 34.8 years and a
standard deviation of 9.33 years.

One State's Attorney was

female, 28 were male and five did not indicate their sex.
Registered psychologists with zip codes in central
and southern Illinois were randomly selected from a listing
provided by the Illinois Department of Registration and
Education (N=l02).

A total of 68 (67%) surveys were re-

turned, one indicating that the psychologist was deceased.
Two psychologists did not fill out the survey as they were
retired and no longer practicing.

Two other surveys were

not usable as they were incomplete, leaving a total of 63
143
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(62%) surveys for the statistical analysis.

Responding

psychologists ranged in age from 27 to 64 years with a mean
age of 43.6 years and a standard deviation of 12.53 years.
Fourteen responding psychologists were female, 45 were male
and four did not indicate their sex.
The first 102 mental health clients 18 years of age
or older keeping appointments at the Springfield Mental
Health Center during the week of October 22, 1979, were
selected as subjects.

Many clients request that mail from

the mental health center not be sent to their homes because
they do not wish others to know they are coming to the
mental health center.

Therefore, in the interest of pri-

vacy, the additional criterion of having previously been
sent a bill for services was used in selecting clients.
This may have eliminated some subjects who pay their bills
at each appointment and those who, due to poor financial
circumstances, are not charged a fee.
clients returned surveys.

Fifty-one (50%)

One was incomplete, leaving 50

(49%) surveys for statistical analysis.

Responding clients

ranged from 18 to 59 years of age, with a mean age of 33.8
years and a standard deviation of 8.63 years.

Thirty-three

responding clients were female, 11 were male and six did
not indicate their sex.
All responding subjects indicated that their race
was Caucasian.

Subjects were promised a copy of the results

if they indicated the desire for such on a separate card.
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Design Overview
The design for the analysis of the Survey of Opinion was a 3 x 5 x 7 (Subjects x Information x Recipients)
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two
factors.

The three subject groups were psychologists,

State's Attorneys and mental health clients.

The five

types of information were educational/vocational information, the fact that a person is a client, psychiatric
diagnosis, personal problems and financial information.
The seven recipients of information were the client's
physician, the Department of Mental Health, legal authorities, the client's relatives, the client's insurance company, the client's employer and the client's friends.

The

dependent variable was the Opinion Index, a measure of the
approval of the disclosure of information by a psychotherapist without client consent.
Materials
The primary source of data was the Survey of Opinion consisting of 35 Likert-type items designed to assess
attitudes about psychotherapists disclosing or not disclosing specific kinds of information to specific sources
about clients who are not an immediate danger to themselves
or others (see Appendix R).

The five kinds of specific

information addressed in the survey are educational/vocational, the fact that a person is a client, psychiatric
diagnosis, a client's personal problems and financial
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information.

Educational/vocational information was se-

lected as a variable as it is generally considered public
information that people disclose readily (Jourard, 19

).

Financial information was selected as a variable as such
information is usually not readily disclosed (Jourard,
19

) , but it is not directly related to psychotherapy.

The fact that a person is a client was selected as a type
of information because being a client is an open and public
act, but many people may still want such information kept
private.

Personal problems and psychiatric diagnosis were

selected for the survey as they are two kinds of sensitive
information directly related to psychotherapy.
The seven possible recipients of information on the
survey are the client's physician, the Department of Mental
Health, legal authorities, the client's relatives, the
client's insurance company, the client's employer and the
client's friends.

The Department of Mental Health was

selected as a variable as, in Illinois, a diagnosis and
demographic information must be submitted to the Department
for each client by agencies receiving Department of Mental
Health funding (it should be noted that no identifying
information, such as name or social security number is
required).

The client's insurance company was selected to

represent the category of third-party payers who require a
client's psychiatric diagnosis before paying for mental
health care services.

The other five possible recipients
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of information are included in the survey as they frequently request information about clients, with intentions
that may or may not be beneficial to the client.
Two forms of the survey were developed in order to
avoid response bias.

The like numbered items on each form

address the same combination of kind of information and
recipient of information, but on one form the item is
worded negatively and on the other it is worded positively,
i.e., on one form the item asks about a "psychotherapist
disclosing information without a client's clear consent"
and on the other form the item asks about a "psychotherapist not disclosing information because he does not have
a client's clear consent to disclose."

Form A was structured

by first pairing the kind of information and recipient in
random order and then flipping a coin to decide if each
item, 1 through 18, would be worded the positive or negative
way.

Items 19 through 35 were worded the opposite way of

items 1 through 17, respectively, so that each form is
balanced for the number of items worded each way.

The

items on Form B are in the same order as Form A but worded
in the opposite manner.
A value was assigned to each of the five points of
the 35 Likert-type questions so that a score of 1 indicates
that the subject strongly approves of the psychotherapist
releasing information without the client's clear consent
and/or strongly disapproves of the psychotherapist not
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releasing information because the client has not given
clear consent.

The value increases by one at each point

until at the other end of the continuum of opinion, a value
of 5 indicates that the subject strongly diapproves of the
psychotherapist releasing information without the client's
clear consent and/or strongly approves of the psychotherapist not releasing information because a client has not
given clear consent.
A total Opinion Index was tabulated for each subject by averaging the value of the responses indicated on
each of the 35 items.

A high Opinion Index indicates that

the subject disapproves of a psychotherapist releasing
information without the client's clear consent and a low
Opinion Index indicates that the subject approves of a
psychotherapist releasing information without the client's
clear consent.

An Information Opinion Index was tabulated

for each type of information by averaging the value of the
responses on items regarding the release of each respective
type of information.

The Information Opinion Index was

tabulated for all subject combined, for each group of
subjects and for each possible recipient of information.

A

high Information Opinion Index indicates that subjects
disapprove of the release of the particular type of information without the client's clear consent and a low Information Opinion Index indicates that subjects approve of the
release of the particular type of information without the
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client's clear consent.

A Recipient Opinion Index was

tabulated for each recipient of information by averaging
the value of the responses on items regarding the release
of information to each respective recipient.

The Recipient

Opinion Index was tabulated for all subjects combined, for
each subject group and for each type of information.

A

high Recipient Opinion Index indicates that subjects disapprove of the release of information to the particular
recipient without the client's clear consent and a low
Recipient Opinion Index indicates that subjects approve of
the release of information to the particular recipient
without the client's clear consent.
The Survey of Opinion was followed by a form requesting demographic information including age, sex, race, religion, education and occupation.

This form included six

Likert-type questions used by Jagim et al.

(1978) in a

survey of the attitudes of mental health professionals
regarding confidentiality and four additional questions
regarding the subject's personal experience with psychotherapy and regarding confidentiality.

A sample question-

naire is included in Appendix B.
Procedures
All subjects were sent the same letter of explanation, Survey of Opinion, form requesting demographic information and additional questions (see Appendix B).

A stamped,

self-addressed envelope was enclosed for returning the
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survey.

A stamped, self-addressed postcard was included so

that subjects could indicate the fact that they had completed the survey as well as their desire for a copy of the
results.
On the Survey of Opinion subjects were requested to
mark the space on a five point Likert-type scale from
"Approve" to "Disapprove" that best reflected their opinion
about the situations presented in the survey items.
In order that subjects could be assured anonymity
and their surveys could be divided readily into the three
groups, State's Attorneys were sent surveys printed on blue
paper, clients on yellow paper and psychologists on white
paper.
1979.

The surveys were mailed out in early November of
A reminder letter with an additional survey was sent

out in February of 1980 to those who had not returned a
postcard following the first mailing.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Manipulation Check
A simple t-test indicates no significant difference
between the Opinion Indices of subjects completing Form A
and the Opinion Indices of subjects completing Form B, t
(144)

=

1.00, E > .30.

This

resul~

suggests that both

forms measure the same variable and that wording half of
the questions positively and half negatively effectively
eliminated bias due to response style.
Evaluation of Hypotheses
The first hypothesis is that a majority of all
three groups of subjects agree with statements regarding
client's expectations of confidentiality in psychotherapy,
the therapist's professional/ethical obligation regarding
confidentiality and the importance of confidentiality in
psychotherapy (see Appendix B, items A, B, C).
diction is supported by data.

This pre-

As the three statements ad-

dress general issues of confidentiality, they are combined
for statistical analysis.

The three general statements re-

garding confidentiality are supported by an average of 96.8%
of the psychologists, 95.8% of the clients and 75.6% of the
State's Attorneys.

A one-way analysis of variance indicates

a significant difference between subject groups, F (2,144)
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9.870, E
the

thre~

< .001.

Due to an unequal number of subjects in

groups, t-tests are used for further analysis.

The t-test for differences between independent means indicates that psychologists supported the statements significantly more than State's Attorneys,

! (89) = 4.090, E <

.001 and that clients supported the statements significantly
more than State's Attorneys,

! (76) = 3.676, E < .001.

There was no significant difference between psychologists
and clients,

! (107) = .204, E >.50.

The second hypothesis is that fewer psychotherapists (than in the first hypothesis) actually disapprove of
the release or approve of the nonrelease of information
when confronted with concrete situations, whether or not
the client is potentially dangerous.

The data support this

hypothesis in situations where there is a legal requirement
to disclose information (28.1%) endorsed confidentiality),
where the client is potentially dangerous to others (15.8%
endorsed confidentiality) and where the psychotherapist is
in risk of receiving a contempt of court citation (49.1%
endorsed confidentiality; see Appendix C, items, G, H, I).
A simple sign test indicates that the endorsement of confidentiality was significantly stronger for the three general
statements regarding confidentiality than for the three concrete situations named above,

~

=

6.930, E

< .0001.

The second hypothesis is not supported by the data
in day-to-day situations in which the client is not an
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immediate danger to himself or others.

An average of 96.8%

of the psychologists endorsed each of the general statements while an average of 93.2% of the psychologists supported confidentiality in each of the concrete situations.
A test for the significance between two proportions indicates that this difference is not significant, z

=

1.305,

E_>.OS.

All main effects and interactions in the analysis
of variance are significant (see Table 1) .

All simple

effects analyzed are signifcant as well as most t-test
comparisons of means.

A close look at the data indicates

that very small differences are significant.

This is

attributed to an unusually high number of degrees of freedom and to the fact that the results are highly skewed.
For example, on a five-point scale, the average total
Opinion Index of the psychologists for the individual questions on the survey was 4.71.
The skewed distribution and high number of degrees
of freedom result in data that are numerically almost identical being statistically highly significantly different.
In order to limit the discussion to results that may be psychologically meaningful and significant as well as statistically significant, only those data which show a difference
of at least .5 (on the five-point scale) and are also statistically significant in their difference will be discussed.
The first part of the third hypothesis is that there
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Table 1
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for
Type of Information and
Recipient of Information for
Psychologists, Clients and State's Attorneys
df

Source

MS

F

Between Subjects

2

398.60

144

13.16

B

4

27.08

27.22**

AB

8

6.26

6.29**

576

1. 00

6

126.73

66.44**

12

28.36

14.87**

864

1. 91

BC

24

2.71

4.51**

ABC

48

1. OS

1. 74*

3456

.60

A
S (A)

30.29**

Within Subjects

S(A)B

c
AC
S(A)C

S(A)BC

Note.

Factor A refers to subjects, B to type of informa-

tion, C to recipient of information and S to error .

*

p

** p

. 005
.0001
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is a significant difference in the Information Opinion
Index dependent upon the type of information to be disclosed.

This hypothesis is supported by the data.

An

analysis of variance indicates that the type of information to be disclosed has a highly significant effect on
whether or not the subjects approve of the disclosure, F
(4,576)

=

27.22, E < .0001.

However, despite the high level of significance, an
examination of the data in graphical form indicates negligible differences for all subjects combined dependent upon
the type of information to be disclosed (see Figure 1) .
The biggest difference, between educational/vocational
information and financial information is less than .3.
This suggests that, for all subjects combined, the type of
information to be disclosed, while having some effect, does
not have a meaningful part in determining whether the
disclosure will be approved.

All subjects combined tend to

disapprove of disclosing and approve of not disclosing all
information regardless of the type of information.

The

first part of the third hypothesis is supported statistically, but not when the criterion of psychological significance is applied.
The second part of the third hypothesis is that the
disclosure of information directly related to psychotherapy
is most strongly disapproved in all subject groups, i.e,
it is hypothesized that personal problems and psychiatric
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diagnosis have a significantly higher Information Opinion
Index than the other three types of information.

The data

do not support this prediction using either statistical or
psychological criteria.

A planned comparison of the means

of the Information Opinion Indices of personal problems and
psychiatric diagnosis versus the means of the Information
Opinion Indices of information that a person is a client,
financial information, and educational/vocational information does not even approach significance, F (1,576)

=

.003,

E > . 20.
A post hoc comparison of means indicates that subjects approve of the disclosure of financial information
significantly less than the other four types of information,

~

(4,576)

=

2.37, E

< .05, but, as can be seen in

Figure 1, for all subjects combined financial information
differed from the other types of information by less than
.3.

All subjects combined did not discriminate between

financial information and the other four types of information to a meaningful degree.
The fourth hypothesis is that educational/vocational
information is generally viewed as nonsecret, i.e., it is
hypothesized that educational/vocational information has
the lowest Information Opinion Index of all types of information.

The data support this hypothesis statistically.

A

planned comparison of the mean Opinion Index of educational/
vocational information versus the mean Opinion Indices of

158
the other four types of information indicates that subjects
approve of the discloure of educational/vocational information significantly more than other types of information,
~

(1,576)

=

4.851,

E <.OS.

However, the negligible differ-

ence in Figure 1 suggests that this is not a meaningful
difference.

Apparently, all subjects combined did not

discriminate between educational/vocational information and
other types of information in deciding whether or not to
approve the disclosure of information.

The fourth hypo-

thesis is supported statistically, but not when the criterion of psychological significance is applied.
The first part of the fifth hypothesis is that there
is a significant difference in the Recipient Opinion Index
dependent upon the recipient of information.
thesis is supported by the data.

This hypo-

An analysis of variance

indicates that the recipient of information has a highly
significant effect on whether or not subjects approve of
the disclosure of information, F (6,864)

=

66.44, E

<

.0001.

An examination of the data in graphical form suggests that
the result is meaningful as well as statistically significant (see Figure 2).

The mean Recipient Opinion Index for

all subjects combined ranges from 3.81 when the recipient
is the client's physician to 4.78 when the recipient is a
friend of the client.

The order of the Recipient's Opinion

Index for all subjects combined ranging from lowest to highest is the client's physician (3.81), the Department of
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Mental Health (4.04), legal authorities (4.19), the client's
relatives (4.42), the client's insurance company (4.61), the
client's employer (4.69) and the client's friends

(4.78).

The first part of the fifth hypothesis is supported when
applying both statistical and psychological criteria.
The second part of the fifth hypothesis is that
subjects approve the least of releasing information to
employers, i.e., it is hypothesized that employers have a
significantly higher Recipient Opinion Index than other
possible recipients of information.
supported by the data.

This hypothesis is

A planned comparison of the mean

Recipient Opinion Index for employers versus the Mean
Recipient Indices of the other six recipients of information indicates that subjects approve of the disclosure
of information to employers significantly less than the
disclosure of information to the other six recipients,
(1,864)

=

13.270, E < .001.

~

Subjects approve the disclosure

of information to friends less than to employers, although
not meaningfully less.

As can be seen in Figure 2, employ-

ers as recipients differ from the client's friends, insurance company and relatives by less than .5, but differ from
legal authorities, the Department of Mental Health and the
client's physician by more than .5.

This suggests that

subjects approve of the disclosure of information to employers to a meaningfully lesser degree than to the client's physician, the Department of Mental Health and legal authorities.
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The sixth hypothesis is that subjects approve the
most of releasing information to physicians, i.e., it is
hypothesized that physicians have a significantly lower
Recipient Opinion Index than other possible recipients of
information.

This hypothesis is supported by the data.

A

planned comparison of the mean Recipient Opinion Index for
physicians versus the mean Recipient Opinion Indices of the
other six recipients of information indicates that subjects
approve of the disclosure of information to physicians
significantly more than to the other six recipients,
(1,874)

=

45.270, E < .001.

~

As can be seen in Figure 2,

for all subjects combined, physicians as recipients differ
from the Department of Mental Health and legal authorities
by less than .5, but differ from the other four possible
recipients of information by more than .5.

This suggests

that subjects are willing to have information disclosed to
physicians to a meaningfully greater degree than to a
client's relatives, insurance company, employer or friends.
The final hypothesis is that psychologists are more
concerned with confidentiality than clients, i.e., it is
hypothesized that psychologists have a significantly higher
Opinion Index than clients.
by the data.

This hypothesis is supported

The analysis of variance indicates a highly

significant difference between subject groups,
30.29, E < .0001.

~

(2,144)

A Newman-Keuls test of the difference

between all pairs of means indicates that psychologists

=
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approve of the disclosure of information significantly less
than clients.

The critical expected value at the .01 level

of significance is .329 and the observed value is .338, £<
.01.

The Newman-Keuls test additionally indicates that psy-

chologists approve of the disclosure of information significantly less than State's Attorneys.

The critical expected

value at the .01 level of significance is .373 and the
observed value is .677, E < .01.

Clients also approve of

the disclosure of information significantly less than
State's Attorneys.

The critical expected value at the .01

level of significance is .373 and the observed value is
1.015, E < .01.

As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the Opinion
Index of psychologists is consistently higher than that of
clients, although generally less than .5 different.

The

only variable on which the Opinion Index of psychologists
is more than .5 greater than the Opinion Index of clients
is when the recipient of information is a physician.
Clients approve of the disclosure of information to physicians without client consent to a meaningfully greater
degree than psychologists.
Despite the fact that the Opinion Index of psychologists is less than .5 higher than the Opinion Index of
clients, the fact that the Opinion Index of psychologists
was consistently higher than the Opinion Index of clients,
regardless of recipient or type of information, is regarded
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as a meaningfully significant result.

This finding adds to

previous research that suggests that psychologists are more
concerned than are clients or subjects in assuring that
clients or subjects are treated humanely and ethically.
The Opinion Index of psychologists is more than .5
higher than the Opinion Index of State's Attorneys for
all five types of information and for five out of the seven
recipients (client's physician, the Department of Mental
Health, legal authorities, relatives and the client's
employer) .

The Opinion Index of psychologists is less than

.5 higher than the Opinion Index of State's Attorneys when
the recipient is the client's insurance company or friends.
This result suggests that State's Attorneys are significantly more approving than psychologists of the disclosure
of information without client's consent except when the
recipient of information is the client's insurance company
or friends.

This finding suggests that in day-to-day

situations, State's Attorneys find more reason for information about psychotherapy to be disclosed without client
consent than do psychologists.
The Opinion Index of clients is more than .5
greater than the Opinion Index of State's Attorneys for all
types of information except financial

(Figure 1) and for

all recipients except the client's insurance company and
friends

(Figure 2).

This indicates that, as a whole,

clients approve of disclosing information to a meaningfully
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less degree than do State's Attorneys.

Clients and State's

Attorneys are not meaningfully different when the information is financial or the recipient is the client's insurance company or friends, primarily because in these three
situations State's Attorneys are more disapproving of
disclosing information than in other situations, so their
Opinion Indices are closer to the Opinion Indices of clients.
Other Findings of Interest
A 3 x 7 x 5 (Subjects x Information x Recipients)
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two
factors indicates that all main effects are highly significant (see Table 1).

Again, the three subject groups are

psychologists, State's Attorneys and mental health clients.
The five types of information are educational/vocational information, the fact that a person is a client, psychiatric
diagnosis, personal problems and financial information.
The seven recipients of information are the client's physician, the Department of Mental Helath, legal authorities,
the client's relatives, the client's insurance company, the
client's employer and the client's friends.
The analysis of variance indicates that there is a
Subjects x Information

interac~ion,

~

(8,576)

=

6.29,

~

<

.0001, a significant Subjects x Recipient interaction, F
(12,874)

=

14.87,

~

< .0001, a significant Information x

Recipient interaction,

~

(24,3456)

=

4.51,

~

< .0001, and a

significant Subjects x Information x Recipient interaction,
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~

(48,3456)

=

1.74, E

<

.005.

As all main effects and

interactions are significant, simple effects were explored.
Only those simple effects and differences between means
that meet the criteria of both statistical and psychological significance are reported below.
All simple effects related to the Subjects x·Information interaction are statistically significant.

Within

each group of subjects, there is a statistically and psychologically significant effect on the approval of disclosure
of information dependent upon the type of information to be
disclosed only for State's Attorneys,

E < .0001.

~

(4,132)

=

161.66,

For each type of information there is a statis-

tically and psychologically significant effect on the approval of disclosure depending upon the subject group;
educational/vocational,
that a client,
~

(2,144)

(2,144)

=

=

~

(2,144)

258.17,

196.15, E

E <

~

=

(2,144)

=

125.33,

E < .0001; fact

228.80, E < .0001; diagnosis,

.0001; personal problems, F

< .0001; financial, F (2,144) =

56.675, E < .0001.
The t-test was used to compare differences between
each subject group for each type of information.

Each

subject group is significantly different from both other
subject groups on each type of information.

The data is

presented in graphical form in Figure 1.
For educational/vocational information, psychologists have a significantly higher Information Opinion Index
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than State's Attorneys,

! (144) = -5.06, E < .0001, and

clients have a significantly higher Information Opinion
Index than State's Attorneys, t

(144)

=

-3.07, E

< .005.

For the fact that a person is a client psychologists have
a significantly higher Information Opinion Index than
State's Attorneys,

! (144) = -8.26, E

~

.0001, and clients

have a significantly higher Information Opinion Index than
State's Attorneys,

! (144) = -5.54, E < .0001.

For a

person's diagnosis, psychologists have a significantly
higher Information Opinion Index than State's Attorneys,

! (144) = -8.53, E < .0001, and clients have a significantly
higher Information Opinion Index than State's Attorneys,
(144)

=

-5.78, E

<

.0001.

!

For information about personal

problems, psychologists have a significantly higher Information Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, t

(144)

=

-8.44, E < .0001, and clients have a significantly higher
Information Opinion Index than State's Attorneys,
-5.45, E < .0001.

! (144) =

For financial information, psychologists

have a significantly higher Information Opinion Index than
State's Attorneys,

! (144) = -4.33, E < .0001.

In Figure 1, the curves for psychologists and
clients parallel the curve of all subjects combined and,
despite statistical significance, do not show a meaningful
difference in approval of disclosure dependent on type of
information.

For both psychologists and clients the

biggest difference is between educational/vocational infor-
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mation and financial information.
than .4 for both groups.

This difference is less

This indicates that psychologists

and clients endorse confidentiality in psychotherapy without regard to the type of information that may be disclosed.

This also suggests that psychologists and clients

expect a certain degree of privacy, clients expecting
somewhat less privacy than psychologists, of all communications in the psychotherapeutic relationship.
State's Attorneys have a meaningful difference in
approval of disclosure dependent upon the type of information, but only for financial information (see Figure 1).
State's Attorneys do not have a meaningful difference in
approval of disclosure among educational/vocational information, information ,that a person is a client, diagnosis
and personal problems.

State's Attorneys approve of not

disclosing and disapprove of disclosing financial information more than any other of the other four types of
information.
The analysis of variance indicates that there is a
highly significant Subjects x Recipients interaction, F
(12,864)

=

14.87, E < .0001, and the simple effects of this

interaction were explored.

Within each group of subjects,

there is a statistically significant effect on the approval
of disclosure of information dependent upon the recipient
of the information, but this effect is psychologically
significant only for clients, F (6,294)

=

82.27, E < .0001,
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and State's Attorneys,

~

(6,198)

=

300.98, E

< .0001.

An analysis of variance on simple effects shows a statistically and psychologically significant effect on the
approval of disclosure of information for five of the seven
recipients of information dependent upon the subject group;
physician,

~

(2,144)

Mental Health,

~

ities, F (2,144)

=

=

272.57, E < .0001; Department of

(2,144)

=

196.95, E < .0001; legal author-

= 221.74, E < .0001; relatives, F (2,144)

75,30, E < .0001; employer, F (2,144)

=

32.36, E <

.0001.
The t-test was used to compare differences between
each subject group for each recipient of information.

The

data is presented in graphical form in Figure 2.
When a physician is the recipient of information,
psychologists have a significantly higher Recipient Opinion
Index than clients, t
Attorneys, t

(144)

=

(144)

= -3.66, E < .0005, and State's

-8.20, E < .0001, and clients have a

significantly higher Recipient Opinion Index than State's
Attorneys,! (144)

=

-4.73, E

<

.0001.

When the Department

of Mental Health is the recipient of information, psychologists have a significantly higher Recipient Opinion Index
than State's Attorneys, !

(144)

=

-6.79, E

<

.0001, and

clients have a significantly higher Recipient Opinion
Index than State's Attorneys, !

(144)

=

-4.63, E

<

.0001.

When legal authorities are the recipients of information,
psychologists have a significantly higher Recipient
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Opinion Index than State's Attorneys,

!

(144)

=

-7.92,

E < .0001, and clients have a significantly higher Recipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys,
-5.58, E < .0001.

~

=

(144)

When relatives are the recipients of

information, psychologists have a significantly higher
Recipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, t

(144)

=

-5.61, E < .0001, and clients have a significantly higher
Recipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys,
-4.07, E < .0005.

!

(144)

=

When an employer is the recipient of

information, psychologists have a significantly higher
Recipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, t

(144)

=

-5.24, p < .0001, and clients have a significantly higher
Recipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, t
4.09, E

(144)

=

< .ooo5.
As can be seen in Figure 2, psychologists were con-

sistent in tending to disapprove the disclosure of information without consent regardless of the recipient.

The

biggest difference, between the physician and friends of
the client, was less than ;4, and did not meet the criteria
for psychological significance.
In Figure 2, the curve for clients closely parallels the curve for all subjects combined.

For clients,

physicians as recipients differ only from the Department of
Mental Health by less than .5, and differ from the other
five recipients of information by more than .5.

This

result suggests that clients approve of the disclosure of
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information to physicians to a meaningfully

g~eater

degree

than to legal authorities, relatives, the client's insurance company, the client's employer and the client's
friends.
State's Attorneys have the greatest variation in
response due to recipient of information.

The Recipient

Opinion Index ranges from a low of 2.64 for physicians as
recipients to a high of 4.74 for friends.

For State's

Attorneys, the Recipient Opinion Indices for physicians,
the Department of Mental Health and legal authorities are
less than .5 from each other, but more than .5 lower than
the other four recipients.

This result suggests that

State's Attorneys approve of the disclosure of information
to physicians, the Department of Mental Health and legal
authorities to a meaningfully greater degree than to the
client's relatives, insurance company, employer or friends.
For State's Attorneys, relatives are in the middle as
recipients of information, being more than .5 different
from all other recipients.

The client's insurance company,

employer and friends are over .5 higher than the other four
recipients of information indicating that State's Attorneys
approve of the disclosure of information to these three
recipients to a meaningfully less degree than to relatives,
legal authorities, the Department of Mental Health and the
client's physician.
The analysis of variance indicates that there is a
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significant Information x Recipient interaction, F

=

(24,3456)

4.51, E

<

.0001, and the simple effects of this

interaction were explored.

For each type of information

there is a statistically and psychologically significant
difference in approval of disclosure of information dependent upon the recipient of information; educational/vocational,

=

F (6,876)

=

30.95, E

22.39, E

~

~

.0001; fact that a client, F (6,876)

.0001; diagnosis,

.0001; personal problems,
financial,

~

(6,876)

=

~

~

(6,876)

(6,876)

=

=

31.36, E <

28.11, p < .0001;

8.689, E < .0001.

For each recip-

ient of information there is a statistically and psychologically significant difference in approval of disclosure
of information dependent on the type of information only
when the recipient is the client's physician, F (4,584)
24.42, E

=

< .0001.

Despite these levels of statistical significance,
an examination of the data in graphical form suggests
little meaningful interaction (see Figure 3).

Except for

when the recipient is the client's physician, the five
types of information differ by less than .5 for each recipient.

When the recipient is the client's physician,

financial information has an Opinion Index'over .5 higher
than the other four types of information.

This result

indicates that all subjects combined disapprove of disclosing financial information more than any of the other
four types of information to physicians.
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The analysis of variance indicates that there is a
significant Subjects x Information x Recipients interaction,

~

(48,3456)

=

1.74,

~

<

.005.

This interaction is

not considered meaningfully significant and will not be
discussed.

The F-value for this interaction was only

statistically significant because of the high number of
degrees of freedom in both the numerator and denominator of
the F ratio.

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
This survey demonstrates that psychologists, mental
health clients and, to a lesser degree, State's Attorneys
all support the basic concept of confidentiality being an
important component of the psychotherapeutic relationship.
In addition, all three groups agree that a client has
expectations of confidentiality and that a psychotherapist
has a professional and ethical obligation regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy.

This finding is in accord

with the moral obligation of natural law not to reveal a
committed secret, the emphasis put on confidentiality in
the psychological literature and the statements of the
courts regarding the importance of confidentiality in psychotherapy, whether or not the particular court ultimately
decided to allow absolute confidentiality.
Psychologists
When concrete situations involving a legal requirement to disclose information or the psychotherapist being
in risk of receiving a contempt of court citation are
introduced to psychologists, support for confidentiality
drops significantly.

This is viewed as representing a

conflict between the psychotherapeutic principle or ideal
of absolute confidentiality and the pressures of the out174
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side world or society.

Natural law and the Ethical Standards

of Psychologists suggest that absolute confidentiality in
the psychotherapeutic relationship must be maintained
unless there is a risk of danger to others.

The situation

in which the psychologist risks receiving a contempt of
court citation if he does not divulge confidential communication is generally not one in which there is a risk of
harm to others, yet only lt9.l% of the psychologists endorse
confidentiality in this situation.
The reasons for the apparent conflict between the
principle of confidentiality and the pressures of society
are numerous.

In situations where there is a risk of

danger to an individual or society, a psychologist may feel
morally bound by natural law to reveal information and
prevent harm.

In situations where there is not a risk of

danger to others, the response of divulging information may
indicate a lack of training in ethical practices and in the
importance of confidentiality in psychotherapy.

In situa-

tions where there is not a risk of danger to others the
psychologists may not view ethical principles as emanating
from natural law, but rather as basic rules of thumb from
which to operate, a breach of such rules being a "decision"
rather than an "immoral act."

It may be that some psychol-

ogists would choose to violate the confidence of a client
rather than suffer the consequences of society's reaction
by refusing to do so.
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It is most probable that many psychologists have
not adequately thought through the implications of divulging information, even under court order, on the practice of
psychotherapy and the profession as a whole.

Without a

thorough understanding of the importance of confidentiality
for psychotherapy and an incorporation of the natural law
that would require confidentiality into one's value system,
it would be expected that psychologists would follow the
will of the society of which they are members.
Psychologists additionally show less support for
confidentiality when the client is potentially dangerous to
others.

Although this decreased support may contradict the

ideal of absolute confidentiality, it is in accordance with
both the Ethical Standards for Psychologists and the teachings of natural law.
One must comment on the average of 3.2% of the
psychologists who did not endorse statements regarding the
importance of confidentiality in psychotherapy.

The fact

that any psychologist does not support confidentiality in
general should be of great concern to the profession as such
an opinion is a direct affront to the Ethical Standards of
Psychologists.

This 3.2% represents two out of the 63

psychologist subjects.

This small percentage and number

could hopefully be the result of misreading the question or
mismarking the item.

It may also be that all psychologists

do not accept all the principles of the Ethical Standards
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for Psychologists.
In situations that did not involve a legal requirement to disclose information, a contempt of court citation
or a potentially dangerous client, psychologists approve
quite strongly of not disclosing information or disapprove
quite strongly of disclosing information without the
client's clear consent.

This finding is interpreted as

indicating that psychologists agree with the principles of
their ethical code and natural law.

A number of the situa-

tions involved the disclosure of what might appear to be
harmless information to persons who were often likely to be
already in possession of such information.

Regardless of

the type of information or the recipient of the information, the psychologists strongly endorse confidentiality.
This is readily apparent in the graphs of Figures 1 and 2.
This endorsement of confidentiality in day-to-day
situations is much stronger than expected.

This finding

suggests that psychologists, contrary to what was previously suggested, have been well trained in ethical practices and/or follow the principles of natural law.

It also

suggests that psychologists have learned through training
and experience that confidentiality in psychotherapy, as
well as other ethical considerations, is important for the
profession and practice of psychotherapy.
A clue to a reason for the stronger than expected
endorsement of confidentiality may be found in the candid
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conunent of one psychologist subject who wrot·e,
I must respond in regard to my belief that information
should not be disclosed--my rating[s] respond to this
belief.
If you had asked if I had ever broken confidence [in these situations] my responses would have
been very different.
It is reconunended that future studies explore both opinions
and actual practices regarding confidentiality.
Type of Information
The results indicate that for psychologists, clients
and all subjects combined there is no meaningful difference
in approval of the disclosure of information dependent upon
the type of information.

Subjects as a whole simply did

not discriminate among types of information in deciding
what could be disclosed without consent and what could not.
This result suggests that psychologists, clients and all
subjects combined have a high regard for the confidentiality of all information in psychotherapy.
State's Attorneys had a significantly lower regard
for confidentiality in psychotherapy than all subjects
combined for all types of information except financial.
State's Attorneys endorsed the confidentiality of financial
information to a significantly greater degree than the
other four types of information.

There are several pos-

sible reasons as to why State's Attorneys apparently regard
financial information as more private than other types of
information.

Educational/vocational information is com-

monly regarded as nonprivate (Jourard, 1971).

Information
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related to mental health care, i.e., the fact that a person
is a mental health client, the person's diagnosis and
information on personal problems may provide important
facts for the State's Attorney to use in prosecuting a
criminal case and recommending a sentence.

A person's

financial status should have no effect on a criminal trial.
Another reason that State's Attorneys may disapprove of the
disclosure of financial information more than information
related to mental health care may be that attorneys, in
their schooling and practice, have more experience with
confidential financial information and understand the
reasons why a person would want to keep such information
private.

Although many attorneys are also engaged in

advocacy, the average attorney may not have such frequent
occasion to be aware of the reasons for confidentiality of
information related to psychotherapy.
Psychologists and clients also endorsed the confidentiality of financial information more strongly than
the other four types of information, but not to a significantly greater degree.

Although financial information was

intentionally included in the survey as it is considered
private, but not related to mental health, this finding was
unexpected.

A possible reason for the strong endorsement

is apparent in the graph of the Information x Recipient
interaction (Figure 3).

This graph suggests that several

of the recipients, for example, physicians and the Depart-
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ment of Mental Health, may have been deemed appropriate to
receive mental health information but not financial information, and there were not comparable recipients, such as
lending institutions, to be appropriate recipients of
financial information.
Recipient of Information
All subjects combined approve of the disclosure of
information to physicians to a meaningfully greater degree
than to the client's relatives, insurance company, employer
or friends.
finding.

There are several possible reasons for this

The fact that a person is a client, the psychi-

atric diagnosis and personal problems are an aspect of a
patient's health.

Physicians generally want and/or need to

be aware of all health problems of their patients.

Many

clients discuss their problems with their physicians first
and then are referred for mental health care.

In addition,

physicians are expected to uphold a certain degree of
confidentiality and may therefore be considered trustworthy
recipients of information.
The Department of Mental Health ranks second to
physicians in receiving approval as recipients for confidential information.

This finding is probably due to sub-

jects viewing such an agency as the appropriate keeper of
records of mental health information.

It may also be due

to the fact that it is standard practice for agencies
receiving funding from the Illinois Department of Mental
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Health to submit the diagnosis, financial in.formation and
other information (without identifying information) of each
client to the Illinois Department of Mental Health.

The

Illinois Department of Mental Health also keeps a central
record, with names and diagnoses, of all patients hospitalized in Department of Mental Health facilities and all
persons hospitalized in private facilities but for whom the
Illinois Department of Mental Health pays the hospital
bill.

These record keeping practices appear to meet with

the approval of most subjects in this survey.
The finding that all subjects combined approve the
disclosure of information to employers less than to

physi~

cians, the Department of Mental Health and legal authorities suggest that these latter three recipients are viewed
more as having good reason to need and/or want information
about a mental health client than are employers.

Physi-

cians may need information to provide adequate medical
care, the Department of Mental Health is the primary keeper
of mental health records and legal authorities may want
information to provide better protection to society.

It is

also possible that subjects fear repercussions from employers
more than from the other three named recipients.
Subjects least approve of the disclosure of information to friends.

This result is not a surprise as

friends would have less reason than any other recipient to
have access to confidential information.

Friends may
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request such information in an effort to help, but are
generally not in a situation to be making decisions regarding the client or the client's future, other than whether
or not they want to remain a friend.
The degree to which psychologists, clients and
State's Attorneys all disapprove of the disclosure of
information to the client's insurance company without clear
consent is of significance.

This is especially true when

one considers the fact that, according to the Illinois
Confidentiality Act, insurance companies are the only
sources who can legally obtain complete psychiatric records
with a general consent form.

With a general consent for

access to a client's medical records, insurance companies
have unlimited access to psychiatric records.

It is

obvious that the psychologists, mental health clients and
State's Attorneys in the present study disapprove of this
exception.

The degree of disapproval demonstrated in this

study may suggest the recommendation that the legislature
review the exception to confidentiality that allows insurance companies such relatively easy access to records.
Psychologists do not show a meaningful difference
in approval of disclosure of information dependent upon the
recipient of information.

Reasons for this finding may be

that psychologists have received thorough training in
ethics and the importance of confidentiality in psychotherapy and expect a certain degree of confidentiality in
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psychotherapy regardless of who may request .information.
Clients show a meaningfully greater degree of
approval of disclosure of information to physicians than to
legal authorities, the client's relatives, the client's
insurance company, the client's employer or the client's
friends.

A reason for this result is that clients may

regard their physicians as safe and trustworthy recipients
of information.

Clients may also view physicians as work-

ing collaborately with the mental health professional for
the client's best health or view the psychotherapist as a
specialist, not unlike the cardiologist, who routinely
sends reports to the primary physician.

It may be that the

concepts of physician and psychotherapist are not distinct
and separate categories in the minds of the clients.
Clients also show a significantly greater degree of
approval of disclosure of information when the recipeint of
information is the Department of Mental Health than when
the recipient is the client's friends or employer.

This

finding is probably due to clients viewing the Department
of Mental Health as the appropriate keeper of mental health
records, as discussed above.
State's Attorneys have the greatest variation in
response due to recipient of information.

State's Attor-

neys approve of the disclosure of information to physicians,
the Department of Mental Health and legal authorities to a
significantly greater degree than to the other four recip-
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ients of information.

There is probably greater approval

of the disclosure of information to physicians and the
Department of Mental Health for the same reasons as clients
and all subjects combined, discussed above.

However, the

relatively high approval of the disclosure of information
to legal authorities may reflect State's Attorneys' own
interest in obtaining psychiatric records to aid in their
work.
While psychologists appear consistently to follow
their ethical standards and the tradition of privacy in
confidentiality by not having a meaningful difference in
approval of disclosure of information dependent upon recipient, State's Attorneys appear to evaluate the appropriateness of each recipient separately.

The approach of

the State's Attorneys is viewed as reflecting the approach
of the legal system which, while setting laws to govern
behavior generally, in theory evaluates each situation
individually, based on its merits, regardless of ethical
codes or principles of natural law.

This approach also

does not try to establish scientific principles across a
number of situations as does that of the psychologist.
Subjects
The present study demonstrates that psychologists
consistently show more regard for confidentiality in psychotherapy than clients.

Although this finding os con-

sistent, and is therefore considered meaningful, the only
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condition in which the Opinion Index of psychologists was
more than .5 higher than clients was when the recipient of
information was the client's physician.
A reason for the finding that the Opinion Indices
of psychologists show less than .5 more support for confidentiality than the Opinion Indices of clients may be related to the subject pool from which clients were drawn.
Only those clients who had received a bill for services at
the Mental Health Center through the mail were sent a
survey.

This procedure eliminated client subjects whose

fees are paid by such sources as Public Aid and subjects
who, because of poor financial circumstances, are not
assessed a fee.

Assuming that income is correlated with

education, one might deduce that the client subjects were
more knowledgeable of the importance of confidentiality in
psychotherapy and sophisticated insofar as how confidential
information can be used and/or misused than an average
group of clients.

This deduction is supported by the fact

that the mean years of education for client subjects was
13.79, nearly two years beyond high school.
The fact that psychologists consistently support
confidentiality more than clients may be due to their
training in ethical principles and the experiences of the
psychologists that reinforce the importance of the concept
of confidentiality.

It may also be due to the psychologists'

awareness of state laws and the legal penalties they may
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incur by breaking the laws.
This study demonstrates that psychologists consistently show more regard for confidentiality in psychotherapy than State's Attorneys.

Reasons for the dif-

ference between psychologists and State's Attorneys may be
that the training and experience of psychologists have
given them a better understanding of the importance of
confidentiality in psychotherapy; psychologists may view
themselves as serving the individual client while State's
Attorneys may view mental health care as a service to
society, in which case State's Attorneys would see the
disclosure of information as benefiting society in many
circumstances; and psychologists and State's Attorneys may
have used a different approach in answering the survey
questions, psychologists asking themselves which response
best reflects their ethical principles and State's Attorneys asking which response is most helpful and fair for all
parties involved.
This study demonstrates that clients show more
regard for confidentiality in psychotherapy than do State's
Attorneys.

This finding makes sense in that clients have a

perso1:al stake in keeping information confidential which
State's Attorneys, except for those who have been clients,
do not have.

It is likely that in most circumstances,

clients are responding to items in terms of what is acceptable in their individual case while State's Attorneys are
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responding in terms of what would be most helpful and fair
to society as a whole.

This reflects a personal interest

in confidentiality on the part of the clients.
The finding that psychologists, of the three subject groups, show the highest regard for confidentiality in
psychotherapy indicates a high degree of awareness of the
importance of confidentiality and a knowledge of general
ethical principles and/or of the laws of Illinois regarding
confidentiality.

This finding also may reflect a vested

interest that psychotherapists have in maintaining confidentiality in psychotherapy, i.e., if psychologists are
not able to maintain confidentiality, they will probably
not be able to continue to practice psychotherpay in the
traditional manner and their livelihood may suffer.

Psy-

chologists have a personal interest in conducting themselves in a manner that benefits the profession as a whole.
The finding that clients strongly supported confidentiality, although to a lesser extent than the psychologists, suggests a strong desire for privacy in the
psychotherapeutic setting.

This finding adds support to

previous studies, all conducted using college student
counselees as subjects, which indicate that clients expect
confidentiality in psychotherapy.
The finding that State's Attorneys have the least
regard, of the three subject groups, for confidentiality in
psychotherapy indicates a lack of understanding of the
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essential role of privacy in the therapeutic setting.

This

conclusion is of utmost concern as State's Attorneys are
elected officials who have contacts and influence with
toher elected officials, e.g., legislators, who formulate
the laws.

State's Attorneys also frequently become judges

later in their careers, thereby being in a position to
interpret the law.
The responses of the State's Attorneys in the
present study also suggests either a lack of knowledge of
current Illinois law regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy or disagreement with the law.

Under current

Illinois law, releasing information in all 35 of the situations posed in the Survey of Opinion is illegal (except for
insurance companies when only a general consent to medical
records is required) .

The sutdy specifically surveyed

"opinion" and not knowledge.

However, one can not deduce

whether State's Attorneys answered in terms of opinion or
according to their knowledge of the law.

With either

approach to responding to the survey, the results are
disturbing.

State 1 s Attorneys, who have the responsibility

of determining whether or not there is adequate evidence
for prosecuting someone who has committed a criminal act,
such as divulging confidential communications, do not
strongly endorse confidentiality in psychotherapy.

They

are either not familiar with the law on confidentiality in
psychotherapy or disagree with it.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Recent Illinois legislation, designed to extend the
protection of confidentiality in psychotherapy, has at
least 19 separate exceptions and actually results in making
it more difficult for psychotherapists to assure confidentiality to their clients.

Psychotherapists have, in

nearly all cases, been stripped of the opportunity to use
professional judgment in deciding whether or not confidential information should be disclosed.

The results of

the Survey of Opinion indicate that, when allowed to sue
professional judgment, psychologists strongly favor refusing to disclose information without client consent
unless the client is a danger to himself or others.

How-

ever, nearly one-half of the psychologists indicated they
would disclose confidential information if there was a risk
of a contempt of court citation; such a citation would be
possible in most of the 19 exceptions to confidentiality.
One must conclude that the new Confidentiality Act will
result in more situations where confidential communications
will be disclosed.
One area of the law of particular concern is that
which allows insurance companies to use a general consent
form, which any person applying for a policy or making a
claim is required to sign, to obtain access to ''any and
all" psychiatric records.

The results of the Survey of

Opinion indicate that all subjects would be opposed to such
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a law.

It is recommended that further research explore

this particular exception to confidentiality.
Other areas of concern in the law are those which
require a disclosure of confidential information with no
allowance for professional judgment when there is no danger to the client or others, especially when other sources
are available for obtaining information.

The results of

the Survey of Opinion suggests that there is sufficient
opposition to the disclosure of information without client
consent when the client is not dangerous to self or others
to consider a reexamination of the exceptions to confidentiality.

For example, it is recommended that there be re-

search to explore the feasibility of the Department of Law
Enforcement requiring character references before issuing
Firearm Owner's Identification Cards rather than requiring
the Department of Mental Health to report whether individuals applying for identification cards have had a
psychiatric hospitalization.

It is recommended that stud-

ies examine methods that would allow the psychotherapist,
rather than a judge, to decide what confidential informa•
tion, if any, is relevant and necessary for disclosure in a
court of law.

It is recommended that the entire Confiden-

tiality Act be reevaluated so that decisions on confidentiality can be made in a therapeutic rather than legal
manner.
When there is the possibility of a client being
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dangerous to self or tohers, it is recommended that research investigate approaches that would permit the psychotherapist to use professional judgment in deciding how
to approach the problem.

This recommendation is made

with the philosophical and moral attitude that it is in the
therapeutic interest of clients to do whatever is necessary, but only what is necessary, to-keep them from hurting
themselves or others.

For example, when a client threatens

a third party, the psychotherapist should be permitted to
use professional judgment, 1) to decide if the threat is
likely to be carried out, and 2) to decide how to respond
to a serious threat.

Ennis and Litwack (1974) point out

that the psychiatric literature indicates that mental
health professionals are very poor predictors of dangerousness.

They cite numerous studies suggesting that mental

health professionals over-predict dangerousness, leading
one to conclude that, if permitted to use professional
judgment, psychotherapists would tned to err in the interest of society.

When making a decision as to how to re-

spond to a serious threat, psychotherapists need to be able
to sue alternatives that best fit the situations.

In some

cases, seeing a client for more frequent appointments will
be helpful.

In others, the psychotherapist may determine

that hospitalization is necessary.

Only in cases where the

law interferes with psychotherapists' efforts to do what is
best for their clients, e.g., Tarasoff would it be neces-
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sary to disclose information to a threatened third party.
It is recommended that studies explore the feasibility of psychotherapists being permitted to use professional judgment in reporting child abuse so that only cases
where there is ongoing abuse or a risk of danger to the
child would be required to be reported.

Reporting child

abuse can drastically disrupt the therapeutic relationship,
especially if such a report is not necessary.
It is recommended that further research be accomplished regarding ethical issues, specifically confidentiality.

Lewis and Warman noted in 1964 that, "a search of

the literature reveals few, if any attempts to clarify the
issues pertaining to the problem of confidentiality through
research rather than speculation"

(p. 7).

This statement

is still true today.
It is specifically recommended that there be research exploring both the opinions and actual behavior of
psychologists in regard to confidentiality.

Such research

could provide helpful information for use in planning
training programs in ethics for psychologists, for enumerating and clarifying ethical issues and for reaching a better
understanding of the concept of confidentiality in psychotherapy.

Some more careful exploration of the variety of

situations and pressures that are brought on psychologists
to disclose information would provide data that could aid
in the above as well.

In addition to assessing attitudes,
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it would be useful to do more assessment of psychologists'
knowledge of ethical codes and laws regarding confidentiality.

This information would be most helpful for training

and continuing education purposes.
It is recommended that there be more research
exploring client attitudes regarding confidentiality.

This

information would be useful in pinpointing areas of potential conflict, confusion or friction.

For example, the

results that clients strongly disapprove of the disclosure
of information to insurance companies without clear consent
provides information and data that may be useful in facilitating a modification of the general consent insurance
companies are not able to use.

A replication of these

results would provide reliability for the present data.
It is recommended that psychologists continue their
education and training in ethics and confidentiality in
psychotherapy.

It is also recommended that psychothera-

pists attempt to provide more and better training for
laymen regarding ethics and confidentiality in psychotherapy.

In view of the survey results, it is especially

recommended that psychotherapists attempt to educate attorneys and legal authorities regarding the role of confidentiality in the traditional practice of psychotherapy and
the importance of confidentiality in the psychotherapeutic
relationship.

SUMMARY
This dissertation explores the issue of confidentiality in psychotherapy from a moral and historical, psychotherapeutic and legal perspective.

The moral and histori-

cal section discusses the similarities between current
debates on confidentiality and the writings on the Seal of
Confession of 13th through 17th century Roman Catholic
theologians.

The works of major theorists-practitioners,

basic texts and manuals on psychotherapy, psychological
research and codes of ethics are discussed as they pertain
to confidentiality.

The legal section examines privacy in

terms of tort and constitutional law, current Illinois law
and recent legal cases regarding privileged communication
and confidentiality in psychotherapy.
The moral, scientific and legal approaches to the
resolution of conflicts are contrasted throughout the
dissertation.

The impact of legal intervention regarding

confidentiality on the traditional practice of psychotherapy is discussed in terms of possible psychotherapist
and client reactions to specific laws on confidentiality
and to the disclosure of confidential information.
The present study surveyed the opinions of psychologists, mental health clients and State's Attorneys on
psychotherapists disclosing specific kinds of information
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to specific sources about clients who are not an immediate
danger to themselves or others.

The five kinds of informa-

tion addressed in the survey are educational/ vocational,
the fact that a person is a client, psychiatric diagnosis,
a client's personal problems and financial information.
The seven possible recipients of information on the survey
are the client's physician, the Department of Mental
Health, legal authorities, the client's relatives, the
client's insurance company, the client's employer and the
client's friends.
The results indicate the psychologists, clients
and all subjects combined have no significant difference
in approval of disclosure of information dependent upon
type of information.

State's Attorneys have a higher

regard for financial information than for all other types
of information.

Psychologists show no significant differ-

ence in approval of disclosure of information dependent on
recipient of information.

Clients, State's Attorneys and

all subjects combined show a significant degree of difference in approval of disclosure dependent on recipient of
information.

The results demonstrate that psychologists

consistently show more regard for confidentiality than
clients or State's Attorneys.

State's Attorneys show the

least regard for confidentiality in psychotherapy.
Further research is recommended regarding ethical
issues, specifically confidentiality.
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5.1 Physician-patient relationship.]
§ 5.1.
No
physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any
information he may have acquired in attending any patient
in a professional character necessary to enable him professionally to serve such patient, except only (1) in trials
for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the
fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in
actions, civil or criminal, against the physician for
malpractice, (3) with the expressed consent of the patient, or in case of his death or disability, of his personal representative or other person authorized to sue for
personal injury or of the beneficiary of an insurance
policy on his life, health, or physical condition, (4) in
all civil suits brought by or against the patient, his
personal representative, a beneficiary under a policy of
insurance, or the executor or administrator of his estate
wherein the patient's physical or mental condition is an
issue, (5) upon an issue as to the validity of a document
as a will of the patient, (6) in any criminal action where
the charge is either murder by abortion, attempted abortion or abortion or (7) in actions, civil or criminal,
arising from the filing of a report in compliance with the
"Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act", enacted by the
79th General Assembly.
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5.2 Psychiatrist-patient relationship.]
§ 5.2.
In civil and criminal cases, in proceedings preliminary
thereto, and in legislative and administrative proceedings, a patient or his authorized representative and a
psychiatrist or his authorized representative have the
privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness
from disclosing, communications relating to diagnosis or
treatment of the patient's mental condition between patient and psychiatrist, or between members of the patient's
family and the psychiatrist, or between any of the foregoing and such persons under the supervision of a psychiatrist in the accomplishment of the objectives of diagnosis or treatment.
There is no privilege under this Section for any
relevant communications
(a) when a psychiatrist, in the course of diagnosis or treatment of the patient, determines that the
patient is in need of hospitalization, provided that such
communications shall be admissible only with respect to
issues relating to the need for such hospitalization;
(b) if the judge finds that the patient, after
having been informed that the communications would not be
privileged, has made communications to a psychiatrist in
the course of a psychiatric examination ordered by the
court, provided that such communications shall be admissible only with respect to issues involving the patient's
mental condition;
(c) in a civil or administrative proceeding in
which the patient introduced his mental condition as an
element of his claim or defense or, after the patient's
death, when his mental condition is introduced by any
party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of
the patient; the provisions of this paragrpah (c) shall
not apply to preclude the assertion of the privilege in
any action brought or defended under the "Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act", as now or hereafter amended, unless the patient or the psychiatrist on
behlaf of the patient first testifies as to such communications;
(d) in any proceeding brought by the patient
against his psychiatrist, including but not limited to any
malpractive proceeding, and in any criminal or license
revocation proceeding in which the patient is a complaining• witness and in which disclosure is relevant to the
claim or defense of the psychiatrist.
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5306.
Disclosure of information ey psychologist
--Prohibition--Exceptions.]
§ 6.
No psychologist shall
disclose any information he may have acquired from persons
consulting him in his professional capacity, necessary to
enable him to render services in his professional capacity, to such persons except only:
(1) in trials for
homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact
or immediate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in all
proceedings the purpose of which is to determine mental
competency, or in which a defense of mental incapacity is
raised, (3) in actions, civil or criminal, against the
psychologist for malpractice, (4) with the expressed
consent of the client, or in the case of his death or
disability, of his personal representative or other person
authorized to sue or of the beneficiary of an insurance
policy on his life, health or physical condition, or (5)
upon an issue as to the validity of a document as a will
of a client.
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6324.
Disclosures--Prohibition--Exceptions.]
20.
No social worker may d~sclose any information he
may have acquired from persons consulting him in his
professional capacity which was necessary to enable him to
render services in his professional capacity of those
persons except:
(1) to his employer, (2) in a criminal
trial when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or
immediate circumstances of the crime, (3) in actions,
civil or criminal, against the social worker for malpractice, or (4) with the written consent of the client, or in
the case of his death or disability, of his personal
representative or other person authorized to sue or of the
beneficiary of an insurance policy on his life, health, or
physical condition.
§
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MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
CONFIDENTIALITY ACT
AN ACf to protect the confidentiality of records and communications of
recipients of mental health or developmental disability services, and to
amend and repeal certain Acts and Sections herein named in connection
therewith.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the
General Assembly:

ARTICLE I
Section 1. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act".
Section 2. The terms used in this Act, unless the context requires
otherwise, have the meanings ascribed to them in this Section.
(I) "Confidential communicarion" or "communication" means any
communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist or to or in the
presence of other persons during or in connection with providing mental health
or developmental disability services to a recipient. Communication includes
information which .indicates that a person is a recipient.

(2) "Guardian·· means a legally appointed guardian or conservator of
the person.
(3) "Mental health or developmental disabilities services" or "'services" includes but is not limited to examination, diagnosis, evaluation.
treatment, trainmg, pharmaceuticals, aftercare, habilitation or rehabilitation.
(4)

"Personal notes" means:

(i) information disclosed to the therapist in confidence by other persons
on condition that such information would never be disclosed to the recipient or
other persons;
(ii) information disclosed to the therapist by the recipient which would
be injurious to the recipient's relationships to other persons, and
(iii)

the therapist's speculations, impressions, hunches, and reminders.

(5) "Pa::ent" means a parent or, in the absence of a parent or guardian, a
person in loco parentis.
(6) "Recipient" means a person who is receiving or has received mental
health or developmental disabilities services.

213

(7) "Record" means any record kept by a therapist or by an agency in
the course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities service to a
recipient concerning the recipient and the services provided. Record does not
include the therapist's personal notes, if such notes are kept in the therapist's
sole possession for his own personal use and are not disclosed to any other
person, except the therapist's supervisor, consulting therapist or attorney. If at
any time such notes are disclosed, they shall be considered part of the
recipient'& record for purposes of this Act. Record does not include testing
material used in the course of providing services if the di&elosure of such
material would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing process.
(8) "Record custodian" means a person responsible for maintaining a
recipient's record.
(9J "Therapist" means a psychiatrist, physician, psychologist, social
worker, or nurse providing mental health or developmental disabilities services
or any other person not prohibited by law from providing such services or from
holding himself out as a therapist if the recipient reasonably believes that such
person is permitted to do so. Therapist includes any successor of the therapist.
Section 3. (a) AI1 records and communications shall be confidential and
shall not be disclosed except as provided in thh Act.
(b) A therapist is not required to but may, to the extent he determines it
necessary and appropriate, keep personal notes regarding a recipient. Such
· personal notes are the work product and personal property of the therapist and
shall not be subject to discovery in any judicial, administrative or legislative
proceeding or any proceeding preliminary thereto.
Section 4. (a) The following persons shal1 be entitled, upon request, to
inspect and copy a recipient's record or any part thereof:
0)

the parent or guardian of a recipient who is under 12 years of age;

(2)

the recipient if he is 12 years of age or older;

(3) another person on such recipient's behalf if the recipient so authoriz.es in writing;
(4) the parent or guardian of a recipient who is at least 12 but under 18
years, if the recipient is informed and does not object or if the therapist does not
find that there are compelling reasons for denying such access. The parent or
guardian who is denied access by either the recipient or the therapist may
petition a court for access to the record; or
(5)

the guardian of a recipient who is 18 years or older.

(b) Assistance in interpreting the record may be provided without charge
and shal1 be provided if the person inspecting the record is under 18 years of
age. However, access may in no way be denied or limited if the person
inspecting the record refuses such assistance. A reasonable fee may be charged
for duplication of a record.
(c)

Any person entitled to access to a record under this Section may
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submit a written statement concerning any disputed or new information, which
statement shall be entered into the record. Whenever any disputed part of a
record is disclosed, any submitted statement relating thereto shall accompany
the disclosed part. Additionally, any person entitled to access may request
modification of any part of the record which he believes is incorrect or
misleading. If such request is refused, the person may seek a court order to
compel modification.
(d) Whenever access or modification is requested, the request and any
action taken thereon shall be noted in the recipient's record.
Section 5. (a) Except as provided in Sections 6 through 11 of this Act,
records and communications may be disclosed only with the written consent of:
(1)

the parent or guardian of a recipient who is under 12 years;

(2) both the parent or guardian of a recipient who is at least 12 but under
18 years and the recipient. If only the recipient refuses to consent there shall be
no disclosure unless the therapist finds that such disclosure is in the best
interests of such recipient. If the parent or guardian refuses to consent,
disclosure shall not be made; or
(3) the recipient if he is 18 years or older or his guardian if he has been
adjudicated incompetent.
(b)

Every consent form shall be in writing and shall specify the follow-

( 1)

the person or agency to whom disclosure is to be made;

(2)

the purpose for which disclosure is to be made;

(3)

the nature of the information to be disclosed;

(4)

the right to inspect and copy the information to be disclosed;

(5)

the consequences of a refusal to consent, if any; and

(6)

the fixed period of time for which the consent is valid; and

(7)

the right to revoke the consent at any time.

ing:

The consent form shall be signed by the person entitled to give consent and
the signature shall be witnessed by a person who can attest to the identity of the
person so entitled. A copy of the consent and a notation as to any action taken
thereon shall be entered in the recipient's record.
(c) Only information relevant to the purpose for which disclosure is
sought may be disclosed. Blanket consent to the disclosure of unspecified
information shall not be valid. Advance consent may be valid only if the nature
of the information to be disclosed is specified in detail and the duration of the
consent is indicated. Consent may be revoked in writing at any time; any such
revocation shall have no effect on disclosures made prior thereto.
(d)

No person or agency to whom any information is disclosed under this
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Section may redisclose such information unless the person who consented to
the disclosure specifically consents to such redisclosure.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, records and communications shall remain confidential after the death of a recipient and shall not be
disclosed unless the recipient's representative, as defined in the Probate Act of
1975, approved August 7, 1975, as now or hereafter amended, and the therapist
consent to such disclosure or unless disclosure is authorized by court order after
in camera examination and upon good cause shown.
(f) Paragraphs (a) through (e) of this Section shall not apply to and shall
not be construed to limit insurance companies writing Life, Accident or Health
insurance as defined in Section 4 of the Illinois Insurance Code, as now or
hereafter amended, and Non-Profit Health Care Service Plan Corporations,
writing Health Care Service contracts, under The Non-profit Health Care
Service Plan Act, as now or hereafter amended, in obtaining general consents
for the release to them or their designated representatives of any and all
confidential communications and records kept by agencies. hospitals. therapists
or record custodians. and utilizing such information in connection with the
underwriting of applications for covemge for such policies or contracts, or in
connection with evaluating claims or liability under such policies or contracts,
or coordinating benefits pursuant to policy or contract provisions.

Section 6. Such information from a recipient's record as is necessary to
enable him to apply for or receive benefits may be disclosed with consent
obtained pursuant to Section ) ot this Act. Disclosure may be made without
consent when despite every reasonable effort it is not possible to obtain consent
because the person entitled to give consent is not capnble of consenting or is not
available to do so. The recipient shall be intormed of any disclosure madt
without consent. The information disclosed without consent under this Section
may include only the identity of the recipient and therapist and a description of
the nature, purpose, quantity, and date of the services provided. Any request
for additional information shall state with particularity what further information
is needed and the reasons therefor. Refusal to consent to the disclosure of more
information than is necessary to apply for or receive direct benefits shall not be
grounds for in any way denying, limiting, or cancelling such benefits or
refusing to accept an application or renew such benefits. Such information shall
not be redisclosed except with the consent of the person entitled to give
consent.
Section 7. When a therapist or agency which provides services is being
reviewed for purposes of funding, accreditation, audit, licensure, statisti<.;:-tl
compilation, research, evaluation, or other similar purpose, a recipient's record
may be used by the person conducting the review to the extent that this is
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the review, provided that personally
identifiable data is removed from the record prior to the use. Personally
identifiable data may be disclosed only with the consent obtained pursuant to
Section 5 of this Act. Funding, accreditation, licensure, and the like may not be
withheld or withdrawn for failure to disclose personally identifiable data if
consent is not obtained.
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Section 8. In the course of an investigation, a regional human rights
authority of the Guardianship and Mental Health Advocacy Commission
created by the Guardianship and Mental Health Advocacy Act enacted by the
80th General Assembly may inspect and copy any recipient's records in the
possession of a therapist or agency which provides services. However, a
regional authority may not inspect or copy records containing personally
identifiable data which cannot be removed without imposing an unreasonable
burden on the therapist or agency which provides services, except as provided
herein. The regional authority shall give written notice to the person entitled to
give consent for the identifiable recipient of services under Section 4 that it is
conducting an investigation and indicating the nature and purpose of the
investigation and the need to inspect and copy the recipient's record. If the
person notified objects in writing to such inspection and copying, the regional
authority may not inspect or copy the record. The therapist or agency which
provides services may not object on behalf of a recipient.
Section 9. (a) In the course of providing services, a therapist may
disclose a record or communications without consent to:
(I) the therapist's supervisor, a consulting therapist, members o(a staff
team participating in the provision of services, a record custodian, or a person
acting under the supervision and control of the therapist;

(2)

persons conducting a peer review of the services being provided; and

(3) an attorney or advocate consulted by a therapist or agency which
provides services concerning the therapist's or agency's legal rights or duties in
relation to the recipient and the services being provided.
Information may be disclosed under this Section only to the extent that
knowledge of the record or communications is essential to the purpose for
which disclosure is made and only after the recipient is informed that such
disclosure mav be made. A pc;:rson 10 wnom disclosure is maae under this
Section shall not redisclose any information except as provided in this Act.
Section IO. (a) Except as provided herein, in any civil, criminal,
administrative, or legislative proceeding, or in any proceeding preliminary
thereto, a recipient, and a therapist on behalf and in the interest of a recipient,
has the privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the disclosure of the
recipient's record or communications.
(1) Records and communications may be disclosed in a civil or administrative proceeding in which the recipient introduces his mental condition or
any aspect of his services received for such condition as an element of his claim
or defense, if and only to the extent the court in which the proceedings have
been brought, or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, the court to
which an appeal or other action for review of an administrative determination
may be taken, finds, after in camera examination of testimony or other
evidence, that it is relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory,
or otherwise clearly admissible; that other satisfactory evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts sought to be established by such
evidence; and that disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial
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justice than protection from injury to the therapist-recipient relationship or to
the recipient or other whom disclosure is likely to harm. No record or
communication between a therapist and a recipient shall be deemed relevant for
purposes of this subsection, except the fact of treatment, the cost of services
and the ultimate diagnosis unless the party seeking disclosure of the communication clearly establishes in the trial court a compelling need for its production.
However, for purposes of this Act, in any action brought or defended under the
''Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act", approved September 22,
1977, as now or hereafter amended, or in any action in which pain and
suffering is an element of the claim, mental condition shall not be deemed to be
introduced merely by making such claim and shall be deemed to be introduced
only if the recipient or a witness on his behalf first testifies concerning the
record or communication.
(2) Records or communications may be disclosed in a civil proceeding
after the recipient's death when the recipient's physical or mental condition has
been introduced as an element of a claim or defense by any party claiming or
defending through or as a beneficiary of the recipient, provided the court finds.
after in camera examination of the evidence, that it is relevant, probative, and
otherwise clearly admissible; that other satisfactory evidence is not available
regarding the facts sought to be established by such evidence: and that
disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection from any injury which disclosure is likely to cause.
(3) In the event of a claim made or an action filed by a recipient, or, following the recipient's death, by any party claiming as a beneficiary
of the recipient for injury caused in the course of providing services to such
recipient, the therapist and other persons whose actions are alleged to have been
the cause of injury may disclose pertinent records and communications to an
attorney or attorneys engaged to render advice about and to provide representation in connection with such matter and to persons working under the
supervision of such attorney or attorneys, and may testify as to such records or
communication in any administrative, judicial or discovery proceeding for the
purpose of preparing and presenting a defense against such claim or action.
(4) Records and communications made to or by a therapist in the course
of examination ordered by a court for good cause shown may, if otherwise
relevant and admissible, be disclosed in a judicial or administrative proceeding
in which the recipient is a party or in appropriate pretrial proceedings, provided
such court has found that the recipient has been as adequately and as effectively
as possible informed before submitting to such examination that such records
and communications would not be considered confidential or privileged. Such
records and communications shall be admissible only as to issues involving the
recipient's physical or mental condition and only to the extent that these are
germane to such proceedings.
(5) Records and communications may be disclosed in a proceeding
under the Probate Act of 1975, approved August 7, 1975, as now or hereafter
amended, to determine a recipient's competency or need for guardianship,
provided that the disclosure is made only with respect to that issue.
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(6) Records and communications may be disclosed when such are made
during treatment which the recipient is ordered to undergo to render him fit to
stand trial on a criminal charge, provided that the disclosure is made only with
respect to the issue of fitness to stand trial.
(7) Records and communications of the recipient may be disclosed in
any civil or administrative proceeding involving the validity of or benefits under
a life, accident, health or disability insurance policy or certificate, or Health
Care Service Plan Contract, insuring the recipient, but only if and to the extent
that the recipient's mental condition, or treatment or services in connection
therewith, is a material element of any claim or defense of any party, provided
that information sought or disclosed shall not be redisclosed except in connection with the proceeding in which disclosure is made.
(8) Records or communications may be disclosed when such are relevant
to a matter in issue in any action brought under this Act and proceedings
preliminary thereto, provided that any information so disclosed shall not be
utilized for any other purpose nor be redisclosed except in connection with such
action or preliminary proceedings.
(b) Before a disclosure is made under this Section, any party to the
proceeding or any other interested person may request an in camera review of
the record or communications to be disclosed. The court or agency conducting
the proceeding may hold an in camera review on its own motion. When,
contrary to the express wish of the recipient, the therapist asserts a privilege on
behalf and in the interest of a recipient, the court may require that the therapist,
in an in camera hearing, establish that disclosure is not in the best interest of the
recipient. The court or agency may prevent disclosure or limit disclosure to the
extent that other admissible evidence is sufficient to establish the facts in issue.
The court or agency may enter such orders as may be necessary in order to
protect the confidentiality, privacy, and safety of the recipient or of other
persons. Any order to (iisclose or to not disclose shall be considered a final
order for purposes of appeal and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal.
Section 11. Records and communications may be disclosed, (i) in
accordance with the provisions of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting
Act, approved June 26, 1975, as now or hereafter amended; (ii), when, and to
the extent, a therapist, in his sole discretion, determines that such disclosure is
necessary to initiate or continue civil commitment proceedings under the laws
of this State or to otherwise protect the recipient or other person against a clear,
imminent risk of serious physical or mental injury or disease or death being
inflicted upon the recipient, or by the recipient on himself or another; (iii) when
and to the extent such is, in the sole discretion of the therapist, necessary to the
provision of emergency medical care to a recipient who is unable to assert or
waive his rights hereunder and there is no relative or other third party available
to give consent; and (iv) in commitment proceedings under the "Mental Health
and Developmental Disabilities Code'', enacted by the 80th General Assembly,
and proceedings and investigations preliminary thereto, to the State's Attorney
for the county of residence of a person for whom involuntary or judicial
admission is sought, or in which such person is found, or in which the facility is
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located, provided that the information so disclosed shall not be utilized for any
other purpose nor be redisclosed except in connection with such proceedings or
investigations. Any person, institution, or agency, under this Act, participating
in good faith in the making of a report under the Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act, approved June 26, 1975, as now or hereafter amended, or in the
disclosure of records and communications otherwise in accordance with this
provision, shall have immunity from any liability, civil, criminal or otherwise.
that might result by reason of such action. For the purpose of any proceeding,
civil or criminal, arising out of a report or disclosure in accordance with this
provision, the good faith of any person. institution. or agency so reporting or
disclosing shall be presumed.
Section 12. (a) If the United States Secret Service requests information
from the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities relating
to a specific recipient and the Director of the Department determines that
disclosure of such information may be necessary to protect the life of a person
under the protection of the Secret Service, only the following information may
be disclosed: the recipient's name, address, and age and the date of any
admission to or discharge from a Department facility.
(b) The Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
and all private hospitals are required, as hereafter described in this subsection,
to furnish the Department of Law Enforcement only such information as m::~y
be required for the sole purpose of determining whether an individual who may
be or may have been a patient is disqualified because of that status from
receiving or retaining a Fire::~rm Owner's Identification Card under subsection
(e) of Section 8 of "An Act relating to the acquisition, possession and transfer
of firearms and firearm ammunition", approved August 3, 1967, as amended.
Any such information disclosed under this subsection shall remain privileged
and confidential, and shall not be redisclosed nor utilized for any other purpose.
The method of requiring the providing of such information shall guarantee that
no information is released beyond what is necessary for this purpose. One
acceptable method is that of periodically providing lists to the Department of
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities or any private hospital of
Firearm Owner's Identification Card applicants on which the Department or
hospital shall indicate the identities of those individuals who are to its
knowledge disqualified from having a Firearm Owner's Identification Card for
reasons described herein. The Department may provide for a centralized source
of information for the State on this subject under its jurisdiction.
For purposes of this subsection (b) only. the following terms shall have the
meaning prescribed:
( l) ·'Hospital" means only that type of institution which is providing
full-time residential facilities and treatment for in-patients and excludes institutions. such as community clinics, which only provide treatment to out-patients.
(2) "Patient" shall mean only a person who is an in-patient or resident
of any hospital. not an out-patient or client seen solely for periodic consultation.
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Section 13. Whenever disclosure of a record or communication is made
without consent pursuant to this Act or whenever a record is used pursuant to
Sections 7 and 8 of this Act. a notation of the information disclosed and the
purpose of such disclosure or use shall be noted in the recipient's record
together with the date and the name of the person to whom disclosure was made
or by whom the record was used.
Section 14.
this Act is void.

Any agreement purporting to waive any of the provisions of

Section 15. Any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act may sue for
damages, an injunction, or other appropriate relief. Reasonable attorney's fees
and costs may be awarded to the successful plaintiff in any action under this
Act.
Section 16. Any person who knowingly and wilfully violates any provision of this Act is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 17. The Director of the Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities shall adopt rules and regulations to implement this
Act.
This Act takes effect January I , ! 979.
This Act amends the following:
Chapter 51, Evidence. par. 5 .I
Chapter 23. Charities and Public Welfare, "Social Workers Registration
Act", par. 5320 (Note: Transferred to Ch. Ill, Professions and
Occupations).
Chapter 911/2. :'v1ental Health. ··Psychologists Registration Act". par.
406 (Note: Transferred to Ch. Ill, Professions and Occupations).
This Act repeals par. 5.2 of Chapter 51, Evidence.

APPENDIX B

222

MENTAL HEALTH CENTffi
Sangarnon - Menard Office
707 North Rutledge
Springfield, illinois 62702
Fred A. Ludwig, A.C.S.W.
Executive Director
(217) 525-l 064

s
E
R

v
I

SANGAMON

MENARD

LOGAN

MASON
COUNTIES

N

G

C. :-1. Johnston, Jr. A.C.S.W.
Clinicai Director

A Umted Way Agency

Dear Madam or Sir:
Enclosed please find a survey and questionnaire regarding
confidentiality in psychotherapy.
The Mental Health Center
of Sangamon-Menard Counties is sponsoring this research in
an effort to provide data that will be helpful in determining
policy and to lawmakers.
In addition, I will be using the
results in a Doctoral Dissertation for the fulfillment of
the Ph.D. requirements at Loyola University of Chicago.
All responses to the survey and questionnaire will be kept
confidential.
It is not necessary to put your name on the
survey or questionnaire.
If there are any questions which
you feel may identify you, please feel free to skip them.
Please fill out the enclosed postcard when you return the
questionnaire. This will enable me to send reminder letters
only to those who have not returned the postcard.
If you wish to receive a summary of the results and conclusions, please indicate this on the postcard.
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
are very much appreciated.

Helen P. Appleton, M.A.

They
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SURVEY CF OPINION

Directions:

1.

Please mark the space that best reflects your opinion of each of the
following situations. Asslli~e that the client is not an immediate danger
to himself or others.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's education and vocation
t.o the Department of M:=ntal Heal t:•
because he does not have the client's
~lear con.sa;1t:. to disclose.

10.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's financial situation
to the client's employer
without the client's clear consent.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the client's insurance company
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve _____________ Disapprove

Approve _______________ Disapprove
2.

Form A

11.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's personal problems
to the client's relatives
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

Approve _______________ Disapprove
Approve
3.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the client's physician
without the client's clear consent.

12.

Approve _______________ Disapprove
4.

A psychotherapist disclosing
that a person is a client
to the client's insurance comp;;.ny
without the client's clear consent.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
that a person is a client
to the client's friends
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

13.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's financial situation
to legal authorities
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

14.

A 9sychotherapist disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to the client's physician
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

8.

15.

16.

A psychotherapist disclosing
that a person is a client
to the client's employer
without the client's clear consent.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's financial situation
co the client's insurance company
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's personal problems
to the client's physician
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

17.

Approve _______________ Disapprove
9.

Disapprove

Approve ____________ Disapprove

___________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist not jisclosing
a client's personal problems
to the Department of Mental Health
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

A psychotherapist disclosing
that a person is a client
to the Department 0f Hental Health
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

Approve ____________ Disapprove
7.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's financial situation
to the client's relatives
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve __________ ---· Disapprove

Approve ______________ Disapprove
6.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to the client's friends
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve ____________ Disapprove

Approve _______________ Disapprove
5.

Disapprove

Disapprove

A psychotherapist not disclosing
that a person is a client
to legal authorities
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve ______________ Disapprove

13.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the client's employer
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

Disapprove
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19.

A

psychotherapis~

disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to th~ client's insurance company
without the client's clear consent.
:lis approve

Approve
20.

A

28.

psychotherapis~

not disclosing
a client's financial situation
to the Department of Mental Health
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

Approve
29.

30.

A :;;sycho therapist not disclosing
a client's Fersonal problems
to the client's insurance company
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

22.

23.

24.

A

Disapp.rove

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to legal authorities
without the client's clear consent.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

27.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's personal problems
to the client's employer
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve

Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's psyc~iatric diagnosis
to the client's friends
without the client's clear consent.
____________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to legal authorities
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve ______ ------ ___ Disapprove

33.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the client's relatives
without the client's clear consent.
Approve ________________ Disapprove

34.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
that a person i.s a client
to the client's physician
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve

26.

32.

disclosing
a client's ?ersonal problems
to the client's friends
without the client's clear consen~.
____________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the Department of Mental Health
without the client's clear consent.

Approve

psycho~~erapist

Approve
25.

31.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's personal problems
to legal authorities
without the client's clear cons~nt.
Approve ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Disapprove

____________ Disapprove

Disapprove

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to the client's employer
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

____________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
that a person is a client
to the client's relatives
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

Approve _______________ Disapprove
21.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to the client's relatives
without the client's clear consent.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's financial s~tuation
to the client's friends
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve

35.

Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's financial situation
to the client's physician
without the client's clear consent.
Approve _______________ Disapprove
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Directions:

l.

Q!

Please mark the space that best reflects your opinion of each of the
following situations. Assume that the client is not an immediate danger
to himself or others.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to the Departmen~ of Mental health
without the client's clear consent.

10.

Approve ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Disapprove
2.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's financial situation
to the client's employer
because he does not have ~~e client's
clear consent to disclose.

11.

12.

4.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
that a person is a client
to the client's insurance company
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
App:cove _______________ Disapprove

s.

6.

7.

____________ Disapprove

9.

15.

A psychotherapist no~ disclosing
that a person is a client
to the client's employer
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist not disclosing
that a person is a client
to the Department of Mental Health
becauae he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's financial situation
to the client's insuranca company
without the client's clear consent.
Approve· ______________ Disapprove

16.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's personal problems
to the client's physician
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve _____________ Disappro·re

17.

A psychotherapist ~isclosing
a client's personal problems
to the Department of Mental Health
wi~~out the client's clear consent.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's financial situation
to the client's relatives
without the client's clear consent.

Approve- __________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist no~ disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to the client's physician
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

a.

14.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's financial situation
to legal authorities
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

____________ Disapprove

Approve ______________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
that a person is a client
to the client's friends
without the client's clear consent.
Approve ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Disapprove

___ ,_______ Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to the client's friends
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

13.

____________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's personal problems
to the client's relatives
without ~~e client's clear consent.
Approve

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a cl~ent's psychiatric diagnosis
to the client's physician
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the client's insurance company
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

Approve _______________ Disapprove
3.

Form B

OPINION

A psychoti1erapist disclosing
that a person is a client
to legal authorities
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

18.

__________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the client's employer
because he does not nave ~~e client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve

Disapprove

226

:9.

A psychotherapist ~ot disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to ~~e client's insurance company
because he does ~ot have the ~lient's
clear consent to disclose.

28.

Approve _______________ Disapprove
20.

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's financial s~tuation
to the ~epar~~ent of Mental Health
witbout the client's clear consent.
Approve

21.

Approve ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Disapprove
29.

____________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to the client's employer
without the client's clear consent.
Approve

23.

30.

____________

31.

~isapprove

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's personal problems
to legal authorities
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's personal problems
to the client's friends
because he does not have ~~e client's
clear consent to disclose.

A psychotherapist disclosing
that a person is a client
to the client's physician
without the client's clear consent.
."-pprove

26.

32.

Approve _______________ Disapprove

....
~.,

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's personal problems
to the client's employer
wi~~out the client's clear consent.
Approve

Disapprove

A ?Sychotherapist ~ot disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the cliant's friends
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

A psych0therapist disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to legal authorities
without the client's clear consent.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

33.

A psychot:herapist not disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the cl~ent's relatives
because he does not have ~~e client's
clear consent to di3close.
Approve

34.

____________ Disapprove

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to legal authorities
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

A ?sychotherapist not disclosing
a client's psychiatric diagnosis
to the Department of ).!ental P.:ealth
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

Approve _______________ Disapprove

Approve _______________ Disapprove

25.

Disapprove

Approve _______________ Disapprove

Approve _______________ Disapprove
24.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
that a person is a client
to the client's relatives
because he does not have the client's
clear cosent to disclose.
Approve ______

A psychotherapist disclosing
a client's personal problems
to the client's insurance company
without the client's clear consent.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

22 ..

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's education and vocation
to the client's relatives
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.

:::isapprove

A psychotherapist disclosinq
a cl~ent's financial situation
to the client's friends
without the client's clear consent.
Approve _______________ Disapprove

35.

A psychotherapist not disclosing
a client's financial situation
to the client's physician
because he does not have the client's
clear consent to disclose.
Approve

Disapprove
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?lease

:lo~e:

Age

Al~~ough the following demographic ~nformat1on is requested, if you
believe that ~t may identify you, it is not necessary for completion
of ~~e survey.

Race

Sex

Religion

Education (last year completed) -------------------- Occuoation
Directions:

A.

The follow1ng questions are separate from the previous Survey Of 0pinion.
Please make an effort to consider them individuallv and not in relation
to the previous questions.
·

~ost patients/clients expect that communications with mental health profess1onals
will remain confidential.

Agree
a.

Disagree

A therapist has a professional/eth1cal obligation to keep information concerning
a client/patient confidential.
Agree

c.

Disagree

How 1mportant is confidentiality 1n maintaining a positive therapeutic relat1onship?
Essent1al

D.

Nonessential

Have you ever consulted a mental health professional?
If yes, for what length of time?

-·

Have you ever hesitated to consult a mental health professional because you were
not certain that 1t would remain confidential?

F.

Have you ever had

confidentiali~f

broken by

~psychotherapist?

If yes, please explain.

Directions:

G.

The following questions should only be completed by mental health
professionals.

In certain cases, there is a legal requirement to disclose information to a third
party (e.g., reports of child abuse).
In making a decision, should the emphasis be
placed on confidentiality or the legal requirements?
Confidentiality _____________________ Legal requirement

H.

!n a recent California case (Tarasoffl, the California Suoreme Court =uled that the
psychologist was responsible for warning a threatened third party.
In your opin1on,
which would you emphasize in making a decision - confidentiality or safety of third
party?
Confidentiality _____________________ Third party

I.

If a court made a ruling to the effect th~t you would receive a contemot-of-cour~
citation if you did not disclose confidential information, which would you choose contempt citation or disclosure?
Contempt citation

J.

Disclosure

Please list or brieflv describe situations in which confidentiality has oresented
the greatest difficulty for you.
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Sangamon- Menard Office
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Fred A. Ludwig. A.C.S.W.
Executive Director

v

SANGAMON

G

(217) 525·1 064

C. N. Joluuton,Jr. A.C.S.W.
Clinical Director

A United Way Agency

Dear Madam or Sir:
In ~ovember, 1979, you were sent a copy of the enclosed survey and questionnaire and our records indicate that we have not yet received a reply. It
w~uld be greatly appreciated if you would fill out this surJey regarding
confidentiality in psychotherapy so that this study may be completed this
spring. The Mental Health Center of Sangamon-Menard Counties is sponsoring
this research in an effort to provide data that will be helpful in determining policy and to lawmakers. In addition, I will be using the results in
a Doctoral Dissertation for the fulfillment of Ph.D. requirements at Loyola
University of Chicago.
If you have completed and returned the first copy of this survey, please simply
fill out the postcard indicating that you have already replied. Several more
surveys than postcards have been received in response (perhaps the smaller
postcards were lost in the mail). In such cases, I apologize for the intrusion of. this reminder letter.
All responses to the survey and questionnaire will be kept confidential. It
is not necessary to put your name on the survey or questionnaire. If there
are any questions which you feel may identify you, please feel free to omit
them.
Please fill out the enclosed postcard when you return the questionnaire.
This will enable me to send second reminder letters only to those who have
not returned the postcard. If you wish to receive a summary of the results
and conclusions, please indicate this on the postcard.
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
appreciated.
Sincerely,

~I!~
Helen P. Appleton, M.A.
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